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PNA Palestinian National Authority
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Main Trends: Security, mobility and security sector reform
The period November 2004-July 2005 was marked by the decision of the new Palestinian leadership (led by 
President Mahmoud Abbas) to put an end to the Intifada. This decision was followed by a signiﬁcant decrease in
the degree of military violence in the oPt and, consequently, by the decline in the numbers of Palestinian casualties, 
which reached their lowest levels, in terms of those killed or injured, since the outbreak of the Intifada. 
Despite the decrease in the number of casualties, Israeli occupation nevertheless emerged as the main threat to the 
Palestinians’ security throughout the oPt, and more especially in the West Bank. Jerusalemites felt comparatively 
more threatened by the existence (and expansion) of the settlements and overall regional security problems, 
while socio-economic problems and internecine ﬁghting among diﬀerent armed factions (various security forces
of the Palestinian Authority, armed militias aﬃliated to political factions, etc.) had a more acute impact in Gaza.
The easing of mobility restrictions in the oPt is to some degree reﬂected in the ﬁndings of our survey. In July
2005, a majority of Palestinians still considered that their mobility status, including access to public services, 
place of work and relatives, was seriously aﬀected by mobility problems, but to a lesser extent than eight months
earlier. This improvement in the mobility status of the Palestinians was particularly felt in the Jerusalem and Gaza 
regions.
The construction of the Separation Wall continued in the central and southern regions of the West Bank. Our 
survey ﬁnds that, in general, the negative socio-economic impacts of the Wall have diminished signiﬁcantly
since 2004. This may be explained by the re-routing of the Wall and increased passage opportunities through it 
following the Israeli Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice rulings of 2004. It may also be explained 
by household and collective socio-economic strategies adopted by the Palestinians as a means of coping with 
the existence of the Wall. This was however less the case in Jerusalem than in the West Bank.
While Israeli occupation impacts on Palestinian perceptions of security and imposes severe constraints on the 
Palestinian authorities, it does not explain the limited trust the Palestinian population has in the security sector. 
It appears rather that the governance of these institutions and their legitimacy are questioned. 
Domestically, the Palestinian Authority and the oﬃcial security organisations are confronted with a major
legitimacy deﬁcit. Unless conﬁdence in the oﬃcial institutions is restored, popular support for substitute
organisations, such as private militias and parallel court systems, is likely to grow. This could further undermine 
the already weak conﬁdence in the public system. It could also widen the gap between residents in Jerusalem
and residents in the West Bank and Gaza and eventually be detrimental to Palestinian unity and the nation-
building process. From a Palestinian perspective, improving security sector governance should therefore be a 
matter of high national interest. 
The strong and widespread popular demand for an in-depth reform of the whole security sector indicates 
dissatisfaction with the present situation. But it is also expresses broad-based willingness to strengthen oﬃcial
institutions and improve their performance, which provides a foundation of political capital upon which the 
political leadership can build.
The challenge for the Palestinian Authority will be to build a nationally owned and led vision of how the security 
sector should be reformed and to map and implement a government-wide strategy for security sector reform 
that can deliver tangible results to Palestinian citizens, such as a substantial reduction in corruption and nepotism 
and enhanced respect for human rights. 
8While the Palestinian Authority can count on overwhelming support in the population for disarming and 
disbanding the militias, it will unlikely be able to achieve this objective unless it succeeds in strengthening its own 
legitimacy. Representative institutions and a well-governed security sector would help the Palestinian Authority 
gather the support needed to take on riskier tasks.
Main Trends: Politics, media and peace process
= The majority of respondents (76%) supported the Legislative Council elections, carried out in January 
2006. Results show that the strongest support for the elections was in the Gaza Strip. It is in Jerusalem 
where one can also ﬁnd a strong opposition to the elections totalling (29%). When looking at such
results it is important to highlight the special situation of Jerusalem that reﬂected on the respondents’
perceptions. 
= Despite the general support for the PLC elections, in July 2005 29% of respondents was undecided about 
their selection of a candidate, whereas 21% mentioned that they would not participate in the elections. 
Hence, basically six months before the elections the position of 50% of the electorate was still unclear.
= In July 2005 24% of respondents indicated they would vote for Fateh whereas only 12% said they would 
choose Hamas in the January 2006 PLC elections. 
= When choosing a candidate respondents attached a great importance to moral values as 45% aﬃrmed
that honesty and integrity is the ﬁrst most important reason for their choice followed by qualiﬁcation
and experience of the candidate (29%) as the second and third most important reason for selection. The 
emphasis given to the question of honesty and integrity as the main factor for choosing a candidate 
combined with the scepticism about the reform of the PNA are indications that the PLC elections have 
probably to be interpreted as a protest vote against a PNA seen as incapable to bring positive change. 
= In July 2005, the Palestinian president enjoyed high levels of support among the Palestinian public despite 
the general pessimism concerning the Palestinian Authority. Results indicated that the ﬁrst biggest issue
of concern regarding the PA is once more nepotism/ clientelism whereas the PA’s inability to maintain 
public order is the second biggest issue of concern.
= Despite the fact that certain reforming measures were introduced following the appointment of Abbas 
as President, the majority of the Palestinians showed in July little conﬁdence in the PA’s reforming eﬀorts.
49% of the respondents believe that the reform is only cosmetic while 25% didn’t hear of such reform.
= When asked about the main measure of the PA reform, more than 50% of respondents think that some of 
PA employees should be forced to early retirement and 38% of them think that some of the PA employees 
should be laid oﬀ.
Freedom of Expression and Media
= Despite the little trust the Palestinians seem to have in the PA, the vast majority of Palestinians (65%) aﬃrm
that they can freely express their opinions and views without any fear from the Palestinian Authority.
= When looking at Palestinians’ trust in media, Al-Jazzera TV is the single most trusted ﬁrst (43%) and second
(25%) source of information, showing an increase of 16% in the popularity of Al-Jazeera among the 
Palestinian public in the last six month. Palestinian TV and Al-Quds newspaper with 10% of preferences, 
Palestinian radio with 9% of preferences follow Al-Jazeera as the as the ﬁrst most trusted sources of
information. At the same time, analysis shows that 52% of respondents think that the Palestinian media’s 
coverage to Palestinian needs and views could be improved and 24% think it is very bad.
Peace Process
= The vast majority of the Palestinian public (72%) supported a peace settlement with Israel. This result 
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varies according three independent variables, namely, “refugee status”, ”area of residence” and “geographic 
area”.
= In principle, the respondents seem to be willing to make considerable concessions. When respondents 
were asked what the Palestinian Authority should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state, 35% of 
respondents are willing to relinquish 5-10% of the land of the West Bank and 32% are willing to relinquish 
the refugee right of return. This represent a striking change from the previous survey. 
Main Trends: Changes in the socio-economic situation
= In July 2005, the overall poverty rate was 68% and the depth of poverty was very severe, as 35% of the 
population were in a situation of extreme poverty.
= There was an overall deterioration in living conditions in the oPt in the months preceding the Israeli 
disengagement from the Gaza Strip, as extreme poverty in the oPt increased from 26% to 35% between 
November 2004 and July 2005.
= The deterioration of the situation in the Gaza Strip and the building of the Separation Wall in the West 
Bank have both especially aﬀected poor villagers and farmers in rural areas. The poverty rate increased
from 56% to 69% in villages between November 2004 and July 2005, while extreme poverty reached 32% 
as compared to 23% in November 2004.
= One striking result to appear is that the living conditions of Palestinians outside refugee camps have 
deteriorated sharply in the past year. Until recently, poverty was higher in the camps than outside, in 
both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But in July 2005, the overall level of poverty in the West Bank 
was higher outside refugee camps than within them, aﬀecting, 72% of respondents outside refugee
camps as compared to 66% inside.– Nevertheless, extreme poverty remains higher in the refugee camps, 
measuring 36% as compared to 31% outside. In the Gaza Strip, the poverty rate was about the same 
outside and inside refugee camps, but extreme poverty had become higher amongst people outside 
camps, where it increased dramatically from 33% to 49% between November 2004 and July 2005. 
= In respect to subjective poverty, the results indicate that 79% of respondents stressed that their household 
income was slightly less or much less than what was needed to meet their basic needs, compared with 
61% in November 2004.
= In July 2005, 10% of those surveyed stressed that, in the last month, their household food consumption 
was much less than needed, and 19% reported that it was less than needed. 
= As many as 45% of the poorest stated that their household food consumption was much less or less than 
needed, with 18% of the poorest stressing they were suﬀering from severe food deprivation.
= Overall, only 32% of respondents maintained that they could cope ﬁnancially for as long as it takes, 
whereas 45% stressed that they could barely manage or were in serious condition.
= Five consecutive years of deep socio-economic crisis have exhausted the savings of the poorest. The 
results show a signiﬁcant decrease in the percentage of the poorest who were relying on past savings,
from 72% in July 2003 to 36% in July 2005.
= The deterioration of the economic situation in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps led to an increase, 
from 46% to 51%, of the percentage of respondents who reported that they were not paying their 
bills, while the percentage of those who stressed that they were buying on  credit  increased, between 
November 2004 and July 2005, from 49% to 63%.
= Despite the economic and humanitarian crisis, Palestinian society has avoided up till now, any major 
social fragmentation and has secured social cohesion, as two-thirds of respondents consider the ﬁnancial
situation of their household to be similar to that of other members of their community.
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Main Trends: Changes in the labor market
= The results show that, in July 2005, only 40% of the labour force was employed full-time, while one-third 
of the labour force was unemployed and about one-quarter were underemployed.
= The rate of full-time employment slightly increased between November 2004 and July 2005, but this 
trend did not lead to a decrease in unemployment which, on the contrary, increased sharply from 27% to 
33%.
= The unemployment rate was especially high in refugee camps, where, in July 2005, it reached 44% in the 
West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip as compared to 30% in November 2004.
= Outside refugee camps, unemployment also increased sharply as it reached 34% in the West Bank and 
35% in the Gaza Strip as compared to, respectively, 28% and 26% in November 2004.
= In the oPt, only 33% of main household breadwinners have never been unemployed during the second 
Intifada, whereas 49% were long-term unemployed (i.e., unemployed for more than a year). Moreover, 
the results show that the very long-term unemployed (unemployed for more than two years) represent 
as many as 32% of the respondents.
= Unemployment is especially severe for less-educated and young workers. The results indicate that the 
unemployment rate in the age group of 18-24 years is 55% as compared to about 22% in the age group 
of 25-49 years.
= The level of education is also a key variable in explaining workers’ vulnerability in the labour market, as 
only 20% of the poorly educated workers are employed full-time, while 56% are unemployed. In contrast, 
70% of workers with a high level of education are employed full-time and only 15% are unemployed.
= Only 29% of respondents stated that their current job is stable and that the probability they may lose it 
is very unlikely, while 12% stated it was very likely and 34% that it was rather likely.
= The poorest are more likely to be unemployed but also more likely to be trapped in bad segments of the 
labour market and to lose their current job.  Only 9% of the poorest declared they had very secure jobs 
compared to 39% of the non-poor, while 20% of the former declared that the risk of losing their job was 
very likely as compared to 4% of the latter.
= Full-time employment is the best way to escape poverty as 71% of the non-poor were employed full-
time, while 57% of the extremely poor were unemployed and 27% worked only few hours a day.
= Although employment is a key factor in escaping poverty, a signiﬁcant proportion of the poor are, in
fact, currently working, and the results indicate a dramatic level of working poor who cannot secure their 
livelihood. Indeed, 37% of those working full-time were poor and 9% were extremely poor in July 2005.
=  The percentage of respondents stressing it was almost impossible or very diﬃcult to cultivate land in the
Gaza Strip between November 2004 and July 2005 increased from 27% to 41%. 
= Farmers from the Jerusalem region had also to face growing problems in cultivating land, as 60% of the 
respondents stressed, in July 2005, that it was almost impossible or very diﬃcult to cultivate land as
compared to 39% in November 2004.
Main Trends: Health
= Health is considered to be the second most important household need, but is only the fourth most 
important unmet household need, which might suggest that this need is already quite well catered for. 
Health is considered to be the third most important community need.
= In the survey conducted for this report, respondents were asked if they themselves or members of their 
household had been in need of 10 diﬀerent types of medical care in the six months prior to the survey.
The most frequently needed type of medical care during this period was emergency hospital care (8%), 
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followed by ambulatory care for a sick child (6%).
= Respondents were asked whether or not the various types of medical care that they needed in the six 
months prior to the survey were delivered within an acceptable time or whether it was not received at all. 
The results indicate that concerning the 10 types of medical care that were under study, invariably over 
80% of the respondents received the required medical care according to acceptable standards. The only 
exception concerns emergency hospital care as only 75% of the respondents stated that they received 
such care within two hours of seeking it.
= Concerning the providers of various types of medical care, the Ministry of Health is the main provider of 
most types of health services, with the exception of ambulance services and family planning.
= Palestinian governmental health insurance and, to a lesser extent, UNRWA remain the main providers 
of assistance through covering Palestinians' medical expenses. The lowest percentage of Palestinians 
covering their medical bills from their own resources can be found among refugees, in refugee camps 
and in the Gaza Strip.
Main Trends: Children
= The need of children to attend school regularly is by far the priority for the majority of the respondents, 
followed by the need for safe opportunities to play and the need of children to receive psychological 
support. Still concerning the latter and in comparison with Palestinian Public Perceptions report VIII, the 
importance of the more immediate need for children to eat better than before the Intifada seems to have 
increased at the expense of the more long-term – but not less required – need for children to receive 
psychological support.
= The new Palestinian curriculum is seen as the main impediment to children’s education, followed by the 
ﬁnancial limitations of the household. Deeper analysis across various subgroups of Palestinian society
revealed that the perception that the present curriculum is the main impediment to children’s education 
is most explicit among respondents in the Gaza Strip, camp residents, refugees, the extremely poor and 
the low educated.
= A majority of Palestinians are dissatisﬁed with the new Palestinian curriculum. This dissatisfaction is most
explicit in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps and among refugees.
= A majority of 64% of Palestinians are satisﬁed with the quality of education in the oPt. The level of
satisfaction is highest in the West Bank, in villages, and among the low educated.
= Only 35% of the respondents believe that schools in the oPt prepare children suﬃciently for higher
education, and a mere 22% are of the opinion that schools prepare children suﬃciently for entering the
labor market.
= Children in the oPt continue to shows signs of stress since the beginning of the Intifada. Of a pre-
determined list, 62% detected anxiety among their children, 48% bad school results, 38% aggressive 
behavior, 28% a lack of interest in cultural or social or sports activities, 27% nightmares, 21% bedwetting, 
and 17% a lack of interest in socializing.
= A majority of 73% of parents believe that they are fully able to meet the children’s needs for care and 
protection. This is less the case for parents in the Gaza Strip, those in households living in hardship, and 
those with low levels of education.
= A majority of 84% of respondents believe that there is violence against children in the oPt. This perception 
is least prevalent in the Gaza Strip, among hardship cases, and the low educated. As for the main source 
of violence against children in the past year, a majority of 62% of respondents blame the Palestinian-
Israeli conﬂict, while 11% point the ﬁnger at the lack of internal security in the oPt.
= Concerning the most important sources that Palestinians rely on to obtain information about the health 
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and well-being of the children, the ﬁve most important sources in order of importance are: (1) local TV
stations, (2) friends and relatives, (3) satellite channels, (4) local radio stations, and (5) local daily newspapers. 
Not many of the respondents seem to rely for information about the health and psychological conditions 
of their children on posters or pamphlets, or health clinics or even on social or health workers.
= The results of the poll conducted for this report indicate that adolescents (14-19 yrs) in the oPt spend 
their free time in order of importance as follows: 73% of the adolescents hang out with friends during 
their free time, 57% play in the neighbourhood, 34% follow up with their hobbies and interests, 25% 
participate in sports activities, 21% attend remedial classes, 16% go to clubs, 11% attend political or 
cultural meetings, 10% work, while 10% walk around in the streets.
Main Trends: Needs and priorities
Evaluation of the Palestinian household needs
= 53% of Palestinians households were in need of a lot of assistance in July 2005, an increase of 7% since 
Nov. 2004. 
= 57% of refugees are in need of a lot of assistance, while 48% of non-refugees reported such a need. 
= 76% of Palestinians living in hardship are in need of a lot of assistance.
= 55% of respondents from the West Bank and from the Gaza Strip are in need a lot assistance.
= The neediest areas are refugee camps (61% of camp dwellers are in need of a lot of assistance), while half 
of the population of cities and villages are also in need of a lot of assistance. 
= In comparison with the previous survey, the need for a lot of assistance has grown, particularly outside 
refugee camps for both the West Bank (an increase of 9%) and the Gaza Strip (an increase of 5%), while 
the need remains fairly stable in the refugee camps.
The most important household need
= Food remains, in July 2005, the major need of Palestinian households, followed by the need for health, 
education and employment.
= Interestingly, the needs for housing and re-housing has emerged as a signiﬁcant need for households in
the past six months. 
= The most important need for West Bankers is health, while, for Gaza Strip inhabitants, it is employment.  
= In terms of the respondents’ status, refugees consider housing (21%), ahead of employment (20%), health 
and food (both 17%); as the major need for households. Non-refugees consider food and health (both 
21%) as their top priority. 
= Employment remains, in July 2005, the most important unmet needs of households. It leads as the most 
important unmet need for Gaza Strip respondents, while West Bankers consider ﬁnancial assistance as
their most important unmet need. 
Most important community need
= A signiﬁcantly high percentage of Palestinians interviewed (44%) think that the most needed assistance
is in the ﬁeld of employment. The need for housing has sharply increased (by 12%), as well as the need
for education in the community, followed by health needs, cited by 13% of respondents. 
Most important infrastructures needed
= Water supply networks are considered as the most important infrastructural facility needed, cited by 52% 
of respondents. 
= The majority of respondents consider the ﬁxed phone line as the most important communication facility.
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Availability of services
= In general, the majority of the Palestinian population is connected to an electricity network (97%) and to a 
water network (91%). 57% of households beneﬁt from a connection to a sewage disposal network, while
64% are connected to a solid-waste disposal facility. When examining the availability of communication 
services, more than half of the population is connected to a ﬁxed phone network (58%), while 75% are
connected to a mobile phone network. 95% have a TV set and 75% have access to satellite TV.
Main Trends: Assistance in general
In general
= The level of assistance delivered has decreased by 8% since November 2004. In July 2005, 38% of 
respondents received assistance in the six-month period prior to the July 2005 poll. 
= The decrease in assistance received is particularly acute for the West Bank (a decline of 8% since November 
2004) and the level of assistance is the lowest outside the West Bank camps. On the other hand, levels of 
assistance remain high in the Gaza Strip (56%), especially in the refugee camps (72%). 
= During the period under scrutiny, the provision of assistance has focused on the poorest segment of the 
population. The level of assistance delivered to non-refugees has decreased. 
= About one-third of the respondents have received food assistance (31%), followed by ﬁnancial aid (8%),
while 4% have beneﬁted from employment assistance.
= There is a decrease in the median value for all the types of assistance combined: 300 NIS in July 2005 as 
against 400 NIS in November 2004. 
= The main providers of food assistance remain UNRWA, cited by 26% of respondents, followed by the PA 
(10%) and, thirdly, international organisations (3%). 
= In comparison with the November 2004 survey, the level of satisfaction has improved in July 2005.  
Employment 
= Roughly 150,000 households received employment assistance in July 2005. 
= Employment assistance received personally has decreased by 12%, while the percentage of respondents 
whose households have beneﬁted from such assistance has decreased by 19%.  
= Since November 2004, for both the respondents and their households, the highest decline occurred in 
short-term jobs. In the survey conducted in July 2005, the PA is perceived by 58% of the respondents as 
the most important provider of personal employment assistance. UNRWA remains an important source, 
cited by a quarter of the interviewees. In general, a majority of beneﬁciaries of employment assistance
(66%) evaluated it positively. 
The issue of food and its delivery
= The proportion of Palestinians whose food consumption was not suﬃcient is quite high, as 19% of
respondents have consumed less food than needed and 10% consumed much less food than needed. 
= West Bankers consumed 19% less food than needed and 10% much less food than needed. În the 
Gaza Strip, it is clear that households cannot aﬀord to meet their basic needs in food. It appears that
households living outside refugee camps seem to face slightly more diﬃculty in being able to aﬀord
their food needs.
= In July 2005, 78% of respondents cited basic commodities as their most-needed food items. Meat and 
poultry stand together as the second most important food item.  
= Fewer Palestinian households rely on food assistance in July 2005 than they did in November 2004, the 
majority of the respondents (86%) reporting that they rely on their own income for food.
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= In July 2005, 50% of respondents stated that they have reduced the quantity of food in the past six 
months, while almost half of the respondents have bought less-preferred food in the same period of 
time. 
= 33% of respondents have received food assistance in the past six months. UNRWA was cited by 25% of 
respondents as their main provider of food aid. 45% of interviewees have received food assistance twice 
in the six-month period up to July 2005.
Main Trends: Refugees and UNRWA
One of the main results is that in July2005, refugees were signiﬁcantly poorer than non-refugees, changing the
trend towards uniformity of poverty status between refugees and non-refugees that had been underscored in 
previous reports. As an example, refugees saw their percentage of hardship cases outmatch that of non- refugees 
by 8%.
More refugees conﬁrmed that their income had decreased over the past six months (23% as against 18% of
non-refugees), while fewer refugees stated that their income had remained the same (72%  as against 76% of 
non-refugees). 
From a geographical perspective, the refugee camps are still the poorest areas in the oPt. However, the degradation 
of living conditions that aﬀected the oPt has mainly aﬀected cities and villages.
Refugees (and more especially those residing in the camps) are still the main targets of socio-economic assistance 
in general (60% of them receiving some kind of assistance in July 2005, as against only 21% of non-refugees). 
Despite this fact, the main identiﬁed reason for the degradation of the refugees’ poverty status is the decrease
in assistance received by them. With the exception of food assistance, all other types within this category of 
assistance have decreased in importance for refugees and non-refugees alike during the period under scrutiny. 
However, given the refugees’ heavier dependence on institutional assistance, this trend may have aﬀected them
comparatively more. 
In the case of employment assistance, the survey shows that although more refugees beneﬁted from UNRWA’s
job projects during this period, UNRWA’s eﬀorts to increase job opportunities could not counteract alone the
overall employment crisis that hit the oPt during the ﬁrst half of 2005.
Not surprisingly, employment assistance services have become the refugees’ (and non-refugees’) most important 
unmet need during the period under survey (29%), ahead of ﬁnancial assistance (27%, and previously the
refugees’ most important unmet need), housing (15%), food (9%) and education (9%). 
Overall, one can see a signiﬁcant decrease in the percentages of refugees characterising such traditional assistance
items as health, education, ﬁnancial assistance and food as unmet needs. This may be directly and /or indirectly
due to improvements in access to basic services that has resulted from the easing in the Israeli closure policy and 
the reduction of the number of military clashes in the oPt. 
This may also partly be due to the fact that UNRWA has enhanced the provision of basic services (education, 
health, relief and social services, and income generation) for registered refugees (over 95% of our refugee sample) 
on regular and emergency bases.
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Objectives and Methodology
Matthias Brunner, Benjamin Firmenich
Introduction
The main objective of the PPP studies is to provide government oﬃcials, aid professionals, donors and
civil society representatives with tools for monitoring the situation and the assistance in Palestine. It 
relies on polls that measure Palestinians’ perceptions about the situation and its evolution, the assistance 
received, its impact and their satisfaction with it, as well as many other topics relevant for individuals 
and organizations involved in assistance in Palestine.
In this part of the report, the objectives of the study as well as its methodology will be described. Since 
for the 9th report we worked with a new partner for data collection, the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics (PCBS) and that some results may seem very diﬀerent from the previous polls, the discussion
of our methodology will be much more detailed in the present release than in the previous ones.
In fact, in the second section on the methodology of the project, we will ﬁrst describe the problem:
the apparent diﬀerences between poll no9 and the previous ones. In the two following parts of the
section, we will suggest an explanation for these diﬀerences and discuss the general principles of over-
sampling some population groups and weighting of the data. 
I.  Objectives of the Study
Since January 2001, nine polls on the perceptions of Palestinians have been conducted1. The fact that 
most questions remained the same throughout this period provides a unique wealth of monitoring 
information. Whenever possible and meaningful, the analysis in each chapter will refer to this evolution. 
For the purpose of our analysis, we standardized the results of eight of these nine polls to allow precise 
monitoring of the evolution of answers over time2.
 
The results of this standardization can be found on http://www.iuedpolls.org. In this location, the 
interested reader can ﬁnd all the relevant information, from question wording to distribution frequencies
as well as bivariate analysis with our list of independent variables. For this reason, no table of frequencies 
is included with this report.    
Because of data standardization, it is not possible to use question numbers to designate the variables 
used for the analysis. In the present report, the variables are referred to in the format o### where ### 
Objectives 
& Methodology
1 Representative polls of the Palestinian population living in the oPT were conducted in January, June 
and November 2001, in April and November 2002, July 2003, March and October 2004 and July 2005. 
2 In April 2002, we conducted a poll in the aftermath of the Israeli army’s reoccupation of the Autonomous 
Palestinian Territories. However, due to the diﬃcult conditions, the data were collected by phone on a 
sample that is not totally random (see Bocco, Brunner, Daneels and Rabah 2002b). The data from this 
poll - covering only the West Bank - were not standardized with the other polls. 
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is the number of the variable. To ﬁnd the name of the variable that is related to a particular question,
the interested reader can use the correspondence table that is presented in Annex II just before the 
questionnaire. 
The questionnaire for the study (see Annex I and II) was elaborated in order to oﬀer data on Palestinians in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on nine main topics that correspond to the nine parts of the report.
In the outline below, we present these nine chapters and give the list of relevant variables for each of 
them.
Chapter 1: Security, mobility, and security sector reform
The general situation in terms of mobility and security conditions is presented in the ﬁrst chapter.  
Variables:  o031, o113, o114, o115, o116, o118, o140, o164, o195.  
Chapter 2:  Politics, media and peace process
 
The last chapter of the report addresses issues related to politics and government such as the faction 
or leader Palestinians feel closest to, support for the PA and its executive as well as issues pertaining to 
the media.
Variables:  o133, o134, o136, o176, o178, o256, o257, o258, o259, o260, o261, o262, o306, 
o307, o308, o309, o310, o311, o312, o313, o314, o315, o316, o324, o331 . 
Chapter 3: Changes in socio-economic conditions
A portrait of the socio-economic conditions is given in the third chapter of the report. It helps the 
reader in assessing change in the evolution of the perceptions on poverty and of Palestinians’ strategies 
for sustaining the hardship and coping with the situation. 
Variables:   poverty3, o040, o057, o095, o108, o109, o131, o156, o162, o163, o177, o194, o248, 
o283, o327.
Chapter 4:  Changes in the labor market
The labor market and the employment status (including the place of work, occupation and the eﬀects
of the Intifada on jobs) are under scrutiny in Part 3.  
Variables:  o008, o009, o011, o012, o013, o014, o017, o019, o063, o100, o157, o196, o197, 
o198, o199, o200, o201, o202, o204, o205, o206, o207, o208, o243, o244, o245, 
o246, o279, o280, o281, o282.
Chapter 5:  Health
Additional questions relate to Health. They concern assistance received, priorities, access to basic 
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services and educational attainment, and constitute the bulk of chapter 5 
Variables:  educ, o056, o091, o126, o168, o169, o186, o187, o188, o190, o247, o287, o288, 
o289, o294, o295, o296, o297, o298, o300, o301, o302, o303.
  
Chapter 6:  Children
Other questions in chapter 6 concern Children. The eﬀect of the Intifada on children, parents’responses,
psychological support, children’s work and women’s contribution to the household’s income are 
investigated in this part. 
Variables:  o061, o086, o105, o187, o192, o193, o219, o220, o221, o222, o223, o224, o225, 
o226, o227, o228, o229, o230, o231, o232, o233, o234, o253, o285, o286, o290, 
o291, o292, o293.
Chapter 7:  Needs and priorities
Chapter 7 covers the perceptions of the Palestinians on the needs of their families and neighborhood 
as well as their views on the main priorities of assistance.
Variables:  o038, o079, o080, o180, o250, o251.
Chapter 8: Assistance in general
An overview of the assistance delivered according to type, value, source and satisfaction is presented in 
chapter 8. In the present report, the chapter on assistance also includes the discussion on “food” which 
was usually discussed in a separate chapter   
Variables:  o024, o025, o026, o035, o036, o037, o074, o075, o077, o081, o107, o123, o131, 
o166, o173, o181, o252.
Chapter 9:  Refugees and UNRWA
 
An assessment of UNRWA’s strategies during the past months, the type of assistance provided by the 
UN Agency (in particular food aid, employment generation and ﬁnancial assistance), the patterns of
aid distribution and its eﬀectiveness, as well as the satisfaction of its beneﬁciaries are the content of
chapter 9.
Variables:  o002, o263, o264, o265. 
The sampling and data collection was done by PCBS in the same way as for the previous polls (Bocco, 
Brunner and Rabah 2001a and 2001b; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels and Rabah 2001; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, 
Lapeyre and Rabah 2002; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Al Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah 2003; Bocco, Brunner, 
Daneels, Al Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah 2005). There was an over-sampling of refugee certain zones in 
Jerusalem (see section 2). 
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A representative sample of 1,796 Palestinians aged 18 and over was interviewed face-to-face in July 
2005 in the Palestinian Territory: Gaza, Jerusalem and the West Bank. 
II.  Methodology
1 The Problem: Striking Diﬀerences in the Results of Poll no9
Until poll no 8, there were, of course, diﬀerences in the responses from one poll to the next but they
made always much sense in the general context and compared to other literature. For poll no 9, we 
found very large diﬀerences which hinted on a brutal decrease in the Palestinian’s living conditions that
were not found by others and did seem to contradict our knowledge of the situation. 
It appears that there are important changes in the data between the results of poll no 9 and the 
preceding ones. For example the proportion of hardship cases has evolved from poll no 8 to poll no 9 
from 22% to 32% of the population. Figure 1 below shows the evolution of poverty since poll no 5. If we 
were to interpret this data in a straightforward way, we could say that we reached in poll no 9 the worst 
situation ever since November 2002. Such a result seems to seriously contradict the results of other 
polls and our historical and contextual analysis of the situation.    






















Another striking result is depicted in ﬁgure 2: There was an 11% increase in unemployment in eight
months from poll no 8 to no 9. Also, this increase seems too large to be realistic.
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A detailed comparison between PCBS and JMCC samples on gender and age did not show relevant 
diﬀerences. But when it comes to the education structure, as shown in ﬁgure 3, the samples diﬀer
signiﬁcantly:
• The proportion of lower education levels, especially the illiterate and those who attended 
elementary school only, is much higher in the PCBS poll than in the previous ones.
• While higher educational levels are slightly more represented in the JMCC polls, the striking 
diﬀerence relates to those people who have attended “some college” only but did not ﬁnish:
23% of the JMCC sample no 7 were in this case, 26% in JMCC sample no 8 and only 8% in the 
PCBS sample!    
According to United Nations Development Programme (2005), the adult literacy rate of the occupied 
Palestinian territories equals 90%. For this reason, it seems that the results of PCBS are closer to reality. 
In fact, these diﬀerences hint on a sample selection problems for JMCC: The lower educated Palestinians
are less likely to be selected while those who have not ﬁnished college tend to be over-represented.  




























2 A Possible Explanation: Questionnaire Response Rate
Both PCBS and JMCC use a similar three-step methodology for selecting the sample for the poll: 
1. They randomly select geographical areas. Each area has a probability to be selected that 
is proportional to its population size.
2. They randomly select households within these areas.
3. They randomly select the individual to be interviewed from these households.
More precisely, PCBS uses a sampling frame consisting of 150 Enumeration Areas (EA) from the 
Population, Housing and Establishment Census 1997. Enumerations areas are of relatively equal size 
in terms of number of households. These EAs are then stratiﬁed regarding two levels: stratiﬁcation by
Governorate and area of residence: urban, rural and refugee camp. 
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A stratiﬁed sample of 12 households in each EA is then selected randomly. Finally, the interviewee
is randomly selected within the household using the Kish technique3. According to our knowledge, 
JMCC uses the PCBS sampling frame and a very comparable procedure. There should not be too large 
diﬀerences in the original samples of both institutes.
We believe the diﬀerence arises during the ﬁeldwork and that it is related to the response rate to the 
questionnaire: Apparently, the interviewers of the public polling institute, PCBS, attain higher levels of 
people accepting to be interviewed than those of the privately owned JMCC. The explanation for this 
could be related to a better acceptance of a government institute, greater care for the replacement of the 
refusals (ﬁnd an interviewee in the same household or same block instead of the same neighbourhood
for example) or simply more eﬀort in trying to convince the sample members.   
It seems logical that an illiterate person will be less likely to answer a survey questionnaire. On the other 
hand, a person who has attended some college but did not ﬁnish will be more likely to answer. More
generally, educational level and answer probability are certainly highly correlated. 
3 Weighting and Sampling: The General Principles
In the majority of the samples for the Palestinian Public Perceptions Polls, some population groups 
were voluntarily over-represented. For example, we knew that on a sample of 1’200-1’500 respondents, 
only roughly 50-80 people would live in West Bank refugee camps. As we needed to investigate this 
population group thoroughly, we over-sampled it by 200 individuals. As an analysis of all respondents 
would yield a false population composition,  we used only ex ante weighting so that, for example, the 
250 West Bank refugee camp dwellers count only as 50. In other words, if we want to be representative 
of the total Palestinian Population, the WBRC dwellers’ number should be multiplied by 0.2 (50/250).
To better understand weighting, let us consider that we want to study a reference population of 10,000 
people who are distributed in three pre-selected sub-groups (group A= 2’500 people, B= 1’000 and 
C=6’500). If we simply draw a random sample of 1’200 interviewees from the total population of 10’000, 
we may end up having only 120 individuals from group B, which may not be very convenient for precise 
analysis of this group.
How to proceed if we don’t want to interview more than 1,200 people and still want to be representative 
of the three groups and of the total population? The answer to this question is outlined in ﬁgure 4
below: We could draw a random sample of 400 people from each of the three strata and weight the ﬁnal
results each time we want to be representative of the total population. 
3 The Kish technique is intended for randomly selecting one individual inside the household. Using the 
total number of people in the household and the total number of women, the researcher can easily 
select the person to be interviewed. It should be noted that JMCC and PCBS use slightly diﬀerent
procedures and tables.  
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In this example, each time we want to infer the whole sample’s results to the general population, the 
400 people from the ﬁrst group will be weighted to count only as 250. They will be multiplied by a
weighting factor of 0.625. The second group will be multiplied by a weighting factor of 0.25 (400/100). 
The third group, clearly under-represented in the sample, will be multiplied by 1.625 (650/400).
In poll no 9, it was decided to over-sample Jerusalem and, to a lesser extent, the West Bank. Table 1 
below gives the population and sample proportions of the three regions as well as their weighting 
factor.
Table 1 Poll no 9: Sampling and weighting
Sample Population Weight
West Bank 59.30% 52% 0.876897
Jerusalem 13.30% 11% 0.827068
Gaza Strip 27.40% 37% 1.350364
The published results for the general population will though always be weighted according to these 
ﬁgures. Each time the results will be presented for the three regions separately, the weighting will be
removed.
4 The Solution: Weighting for Education
 
To correct for the selection bias in polls no 1-8, we could use post hoc weighting. We could “apply” the 
educational structure of poll no 9 to the eight previous polls. In this way, the results of poll no 9 will be 
easier to analyze in a monitoring or evolution perspective.
A new variable has been designed in order to weight the polls No1 to 8 according to the educational 
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level. It has been named ed_wgt and its detailed description can be found on the IUED Palestine website 
(http://www.iuedpolls.org/ppp/doc/var/ed_wgt.htm)
As shown in table 2 below, after being weighted by ed_wgt, the proportions for the education variable 
o056 of the eight precedent polls have almost the same proportions as measured by PCBS for poll no 9. 
“Almost” because ed_wgt also contains the older variable called weight which weights results according 
to region, that is why the results for the education level variable slightly diﬀer in each precedent poll.
Table 2 Polls no 1-9: Education (http://www.iuedpolls.org/ppp/analysis/polls19c/o056_poll.htm) 
  
Number of the poll
Total
1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9
Illiterate
N 120 120 151 130 113 139 141 170 1084
% 9.5% 9.5% 9.6% 9.5% 9.4% 9.3% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5%
Until elementary
N 212 213 262 226 200 249 249 298 1909
% 16.7% 16.9% 16.6% 16.6% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7%
N 336 335 420 362 320 396 397 474 3040
 Until preparatory % 26.5% 26.5% 26.6% 26.6% 26.7% 26.6% 26.6% 26.6% 26.6%
N 352 351 440 380 335 416 416 497 3187
 Until secondary % 27.8% 27.8% 27.8% 27.9% 27.9% 27.9% 27.9% 27.9% 27.9%
N 96 96 120 103 91 114 113 135 868
 Some college % 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.7% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6%
N 150 149 187 161 141 176 176 210 1350
 College and above % 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 11.8%
ns (1.0)
When this weighting is applied, and as can be seen in ﬁgures 5 and 6, more than half of the previously
observed diﬀerences on hardship cases and unemployed people disappear.





















Hardship cases Below poverty line Above poverty line 
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III. A Word of Conclusion
Of course, the authors of the PPP reports would certainly all have preferred not to encounter artefactual 
diﬀerences in their last poll because of a change in the Polling Institution: This situation has implied
increased work for each of them individually, especially in the monitoring of the situation. But on 
another side, we acquired an essential knowledge about the process of polling, especially in developing 
countries. The sample should always be checked for the least educated, especially the illiterate: Do they 
have a similar probability than the rest of the population of being selected in the sample?  
In fact, such a problem could cast a doubt on the methodology of polling in general or for assessing the 
situation in Palestine at least. Those who don’t trust polls might argue that it is one more example of the 
weak methodology of this technique. To those critiques, we would like to remind that this bias has had 
almost no inﬂuence on the huge majority of the results highlighted in the previous polls: These results
point on diﬀerences among diﬀerent social, economical or geographical groups which are not aﬀected
by the “under-selection” of the least educated in the sample. The bias only impacts on the overall level 
of some variables such as poverty or unemployment that are strongly inﬂuenced by education.  
For the remainder of the analysis presented in the following chapters, we will always use weighted data 
that is corrected for polls no1 to no 8. Poll no 9 will not be weighted to correct the education bias.
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Chapter 1: Mobility, Security and Security Sector Reform
Jalal Al Husseini, Luigi De Martino
Riccardo Bocco, Roland Friedrich, Arnold Luethold
1.1 Introduction
The present chapter is a more developed version of a previous report produced in cooperation with the Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces DCAF).1
The ﬁrst part of this chapter will deal with security and mobility issues in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt)
within the context of the second Intifada while, in the second part, we will deal with the questions related to 
security sector governance and reform.
In this study, ‘security sector’ is the public sector that comprises all security forces and the relevant civilian 
bodies needed to oversee them, including the judiciary. ‘Security sector governance’, in a very general sense, 
refers to how this sector is run. It looks at people, institutions, processes and practices that aﬀect the functioning
of the security sector and its capability to deliver security in the broadest possible sense to the population. A 
successful security sector would eﬀectively provide security for the greatest number of people at aﬀordable
costs, in full transparency and in an accountable manner. How well this is done in practice, however, is a matter 
of perception.
Thus, understanding how the public views the security sector and its activities is important for good governance. 
That is why public perception studies of security sector governance are an important tool not only for assessing 
the quality of governance, but also for evaluating the direction of future reforms. By giving the public a voice in 
the discussion of their own future security, public perception studies are a step towards greater inclusiveness in 
the management and oversight of security issues. They are also a means for establishing public accountability of 
the security sector and involving civil society in its governance. This in itself is an important element of any sector 
reform agenda, given that the security sector, more than any other public sector, has a tendency to resist public 
input and oversight. 
While many governments in the Middle East would be reluctant to authorise similar studies, the Palestinian 
Authority deserves credit for having made this research possible.
1.2  Intifada–Related Security Issues 
The period November 2004-July 2005 was marked by the decision of the new Palestinian leadership (led by 
President Mahmoud Abbas) to put an end to the Intifada. This decision was followed by a signiﬁcant decrease in
the degree of military violence in the oPt. Consequently, the number of Palestinians killed or injured declined to 
its lowest level since the outbreak of the Intifada.
1 The report can be accessed on the IUED and DCAF web sites (www.iued.ch/palestine or www.dcaf.org) 
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1.2.1 Higher feelings of security   or More Palestinians feel secure
The number of Palestinians feeling secure increased signiﬁcantly from November 2004 until July 2005. While
82% felt insecure at the beginning of this period, this number declined to 47% by the end, a reﬂection of the
abatement of military action. For the ﬁrst time since the beginning of our surveys, the number of respondents
feeling secure outnumbered  those feeling insecure. 
Generally speaking, the feeling of security in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) is a matter of gender (60% 
of the women say that they feel secure), refugee status (58% of non-refugees feeling secure compared with 
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47% of refugees) and age (63% of those between 18-24 years of age feeling secure compared with 45% of those 
aged 50 and over). The feeling of security is also a matter of socio-economic status. The survey reveals that those 
respondents with an income below the poverty line (1,800 NIS) or with an income identifying them as hardship 
cases (i.e. below 900 NIS) do feel less secure than those above the poverty line (31%, 30% and 40% respectively). 
What is new is that, in comparison with November 2004, the percentage of hardship cases stating that they felt 
secure has increased by 18% (an increase of 15% for those below the poverty line and 18% for those above the 
poverty line), bringing back the general conﬁguration to what it was in February 2004.








In comparison with the last report (November 2004), the feeling of security has increased in all regions of the 
oPt. Change is most dramatic in the Gaza Strip: in July 2005, 55% percent of respondents  said they felt secure, 
compared to only 13% in November 2004.  The improvement is particularly signiﬁcant among the population
of the Gaza Strip refugee camps where 52% of the respondents feel secure in July 2005 compared to only 8% in 
November 2004. In the West Bank, the ongoing construction of the Separation Wall and concerns about the future 
of the region are factors that may well have contributed to make a majority of West Bankers feel comparatively 
less secure (50% outside camps and 39% in refugee camps). 












1.2.2 Reasons for remaining insecurity
Despite decreasing casualty ﬁgures, a majority of Palestinians still perceive Israeli occupation as the main threat
to their security. Shortly before the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, 60% of Palestinians in the West Bank and 44% in 
Gaza, compared to 51% in East Jerusalem, said Israeli occupation was the single most important reason for them 
to feel insecure. 
Figure 1.5: Reasons for insecurity by place of residence - July 2005
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In all regions, lack of socio -economic improvement was listed as the second most important reason for the 
feeling of insecurity. And 11% of Jerusalem respondents mentioned the existence settlements as a reason for 
insecurity. Respondents from the West Bank and Gaza refugee camps perceive their security more directly 
threatened by armed groups than by settlements (6% and 10% respectively). In the Gaza refugee camps this 
tendency is increasing since, in November 2004, 6% of respondents had mentioned the existence of armed 
groups as a source of insecurity. 
1.2.3 Mobility status of the Palestinians
In response to the Palestinian leadership’s decision to stop the Intifada, Israel has declared its willingness to 
improve Palestinians’ everyday life by easing the internal closure policy it has imposed on them since September 
2001. 
In Gaza, despite repeated blockings of the Erez Crossing and diﬃculties in reaching Palestinian enclaves
surrounded by Israeli settlements, movement in and out of the Gaza Strip improved steadily during the period 
under scrutiny. For instance, the number of Palestinian workers and merchants being allowed to enter Israel 
increased, from less than 1,600 in March to over 5,000 in late April. 
Likewise, the number of closure barriers in the West Bank decreased from 680 in November 2004 to 605 in April 
2005, i.e., a net decline of 75 closure barriers within ﬁve months, mainly in the governorates of Bethlehem, Hebron
and Jenin. In other stranded locations such as Nablus and Qalqilya, passage through checkpoints was facilitated 
and medical facilities were installed at these locations. The map, next page, of the United Nations Oﬃce for
Coordination of Humanitarian Aﬀairs (OCHA) highlights the easing of Israel’s closure policy since November
2004.
The easing of mobility restrictions in the oPt is to some degree conﬁrmed by the ﬁndings of the survey. In July
2005, a majority of Palestinians still considered that their mobility status, including access to public services, place 
of work and relatives, to be seriously aﬀected by mobility problems, but to a lesser extent than eight months
earlier. The percentage who admitted having experienced problems related to mobility restrictions decreased by 
6%, from 88% to 81%, during this period of time, as shown in Figure 1.6 below:  
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This improvement in the mobility status of the Palestinians was felt particularly in the Jerusalem and Gaza regions, 
where the percentage of people asserting that they had experienced no particular mobility problems increased 
by 9% (9% to 18%) in the former, and 8% (20% to 28%) in the latter. Improvement was less signiﬁcant in the West
Bank (+5%, from 8% to 13%). The south of the West Bank, where the closure system has not been signiﬁcantly
eased and where the Wall is supposed to be set up in the following months, was the least advantaged with 
regard to mobility, with only 5% of the inhabitants of this region not having suﬀered any problems, versus 14%
and 18% in the middle and north of the West Bank respectively. 
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Closure mapping is a work in progress.Data is collected by OCHA field staff and is subject to change.
Cartography: OCHA-oPt - April 2005Base data: PA MoPIC, July 2000, OCHA update 2005For comments contact <ochaopt@un.org> or Tel. +972 (02) 582 9962http://www.ochaopt.org







































































2005 2004 Bold numbers are April 2005 figures. Non-bold numbers are November 2004 figures. Italix numbers are totals.
Governorate Difference
Jenin 4 4 1 1 11 6 1 1 6 19 2 0 5 11 30 42 -12Tulkarm 2 2 0 0 5 4 0 1 13 16 0 0 3 3 23 26 -3Nablus 8 10 3 2 18 13 8 8 47 61 10 3 23 23 117 120 -3Tubas 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 6 0Salfit 2 2 0 0 18 12 2 1 9 13 0 0 3 3 34 31 3Qalqiliya 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 2 2 5 0 0 0 0 11 13 -2Jerusalem 8 8 0 0 6 9 1 1 28 29 0 0 0 0 43 47 -4Jericho 3 3 0 0 4 5 3 3 1 1 0 0 3 3 14 15 -1Ramallah 6 6 2 2 22 19 9 10 49 55 1 1 4 3 93 96 -3Bethlehem 9 10 0 0 5 8 2 1 27 55 4 6 6 7 53 87 -34Hebron 11 12 0 0 24 21 22 20 100 120 17 17 7 7 181 197 -16Total 57 61 7 6 118 102 51 48 282 374 35 28 55 61 605 680 -75
Checkpoint PartialCheckpoint Roadblock Road Gate EarthMound Earth Wall Trench Total
Closure Summary Statistics: April 2005 and November 2004
Improved mobility had positive socio-economic repercussions. Only 40%, compared to 59% before, said they 
had experienced various levels of diﬃculties in reaching their workplace. While work-related mobility improved
in all regions, workers from the West Bank and Gaza refugee camps beneﬁted most from the easing of the Israeli
closure policy, as illustrated in the ﬁgure 1.7.
Palestinian Public Perceptions Report IX 31


















In the West Bank, the percentage of inhabitants of the southern areas ﬁnding it diﬃcult or very diﬃcult to reach
their place of work was comparatively higher (62%) than in the central (44%) and northern areas (37%).
1.2.4 The Wall and its impact on mobility
Both the security steps taken in preparation for the disengagement process in the Gaza Strip and the construction 
of the Separation Wall have had a negative impact on Palestinian socio-economic conditions. The percentage of 
the respondents stressing it was almost impossible or very diﬃcult to cultivate land in the Gaza Strip between
November 2004 and July 2005 increased from 27% to 41%. 
The construction of the Separation Wall, which was initiated in June 2002, continued in the central and southern 
regions of the West Bank. About one-third of the 670-kilometre Wall has been completed. The Wall’s current route 
will end up including 10.1% of the West Bank and East Jerusalem (about 143 acres), in the area lying between the 
Wall and the Green Zone.







































According to our sample, the central area of the West Bank is currently the area with the highest percentage of 
Palestinians living within, or in concentrations around, the Wall: 32% compared to 6% and 0% in the south and 
north of the West Bank respectively. Not surprisingly, West Bankers in this central area felt more aﬀected in their
mobility status by the Wall, as is shown in ﬁgure 1.8, above.
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Farmers from the Jerusalem region had also to face growing problems in cultivating land: in July 2005, 60% 
of respondents stressed that it was almost impossible or very diﬃcult to cultivate land as compared to 39% in
November 2004. The Separation Wall creates more diﬃculties for business in the agricultural sector, not only
because it separates farmers from their land but also because it increases the price for material and transportation 
- as was stressed by 61% of the respondents in the Jerusalem area and 22% of those in the West Bank outside 
refugee-camp areas. 
However, this survey ﬁnds that, in general, the negative socio-economic impacts of the Wall have diminished
signiﬁcantly since 2004. This may be explained by the re-routing of the Wall and increased passage opportunities
through it, following the Israeli Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice rulings of 2004. It may also 
be explained by household and collective socio-economic strategies adopted by the Palestinians as a means 
of coping with the existence of the Wall. This was, however, less the case in Jerusalem than in the West Bank. As 
seen in ﬁgure 1.6, the percentage of Jerusalemites who have been forced to move, or who have had problems
meeting relatives or accessing basic services because of the Wall has increased.
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1.3 Security Sector Governance
While the ﬁrst part of this study examined changes in perceptions  of security and insecurity,  this second section
looks more speciﬁcally at perceptions related to the governance of the security sector. The security sector is
the public sector that comprises all security forces and the relevant civilian bodies needed to oversee them, 
including the judiciary. ‘Security sector governance’, in a very general sense, refers to how this sector is run. It 
looks at people, institutions, processes and practices that aﬀect the functioning of the security sector and its
capability to deliver security, in the broadest possible sense, to the population. A successful security sector would 
eﬀectively provide security for the greatest number of people at aﬀordable costs, in full transparency and in an
accountable manner. How well this is done in practice, however, is a matter of perception.
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Table 1: An overview of the Palestinian Security Sector2




Civil Police  18500
Preventive Security (Internal Intelligence) 5500
Civil Defence (Emergency and Rescue) 950
National Security Forces (PA Proto-Army) 11000
Naval Police (PA Proto-Navy) 900
Military Intelligence (including Military Police) c. 400 MI, c. 2000 MP
Presidential Security (including Presidential Guard) 2500




Special Security (currently being dissolved) <100
Special Forces (currently being dissolved) 1250
Non-statutory 
forces
Martyr Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigades (Armed wing of Hamas) 1000-1500
Al-Quds Brigades (Armed wing of Islamic Jihad) Several hundreds
Al-Aqsa Brigades (Fatah-aﬃliated militias and armed groups) 500-700 (full-time); 
2000 (part-time)
Others (Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Battalions (PFLP), National Resistance Brigades (DFLP), 
Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades (Popular Resistance Committees/PRC)
Each in the low 
hundreds 
Judiciary
Oﬃcial judiciary Civil: Magistrate Courts, District Courts and High Court; Military Courts; State Security Courts
N o n - o ﬃ c i a l
judiciary 
Sharia Courts, Clan-based law institutions
Civilian control and oversight
Executive Control President
Prime Minister
Ministry of Interior and National Security
National Security Council
P a r l i a m e n t a r y 
oversight
Palestinian Legislative Council 
§ Interior Committee
§ Committee for Oversight of Human Rights and Public Freedoms
§ Budget and Financial Aﬀairs Committee
§ Legal Committee
2  The security sector usually includes the armed forces, all branches of the police, intelligence services, and judicial and penal 
institutions. It also comprises the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight, e.g., the executive 
and parliament. For a detailed description of the Palestinian Security Sector see Roland Friedrich, Security Sector Reform in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, Passia: Jerusalem 2004.
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1.3.1 Palestinians place high trust in non-statutory forces
The survey results show that after the Civil Defense, non-statutory armed groups such as the Al-Aqsa and Al-
Qassem Brigades are the most trusted among the Palestinian security organisations in the occupied Palestinian 
territories.






































Organisations controlled by the Palestinian Authority (PA), such as Preventive Security, General Intelligence, 
National Security and the Civil Police scored signiﬁcantly lower trust levels. General Intelligence and Preventive 
Security are the least trusted of all organisations, with, respectively, 22 and 23 percent of respondents having no 
trust in them at all.






































































Trust in security organisations seems to be related to both the socio-economic and educational level of 
respondents: the higher the income or education, the lower the trust. The only exception to this is the Civil 
Defense, where no correlation could be found between the educational level of respondents and the trust placed 
in this organisation. It could be that the apolitical nature of its mission (emergency and rescue services, including 
ﬁre departments) has prevented the Civil Defense from getting involved in political disputes and resulted in 
higher trust and acceptance. Trust levels also vary with the area of residence. City dwellers have generally lower 
levels of trust than residents of villages. Compared to city dwellers, residents of refugee camps place higher trust 
in the Civil Defense and lower trust in the General Security. Otherwise, their ratings are similar.  
Palestinian Public Perceptions Report IX 35
In Gaza, non-statutory armed groups obtain very similar trust levels from residents inside and outside the refugee 
camps, whereas, in the West Bank, they are more trusted by people living outside the refugee camps. Trust in the 
Al-Qassem brigades is particularly strong in the Gaza Strip. 
1.3.2 High trust in Sharia courts and customary law institutions
Organisations responsible for guaranteeing the rule of law, such as the courts, the correctional system and bodies 
tasked with the oversight of human rights are important for a functioning security sector. When asked about 
their trust in several institutions of the judiciary, respondents said they had most trust in the Sharia courts. 
Figure 1.12: Overall trust in Judiciary System (o321a-e) - July 2005
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50% said they placed very high trust in Sharia courts and another 39% said they had some trust. Palestinian clan-
based customary law institutions ranked second. The comparatively lower rating of the oﬃcial PA institutions
is hardly surprising. The oﬃcial judiciary has often been described as the weakest link in the governance struc-
ture of the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian legal system is inﬂuenced by legislation of various origins
(British, Ottoman, Jordanian, Egyptian, Israeli) and, institutionally, is characterised by a proliferation of judicial 
organisations with overlapping mandates. It also struggles with serious shortages of funds and trained personnel. 
Unlike the oﬃcial judiciary, Sharia courts and customary law institutions oﬀer easy access and are present in all
regions. They also may appeal to people not only for the values they represent, but also because they deal mostly 
with civil cases.
Three factors appear to inﬂuence respondents’ trust in the judiciary: revenue, area of residence and level of
education. Respondents above the poverty line show lower levels of trust than those below the poverty line and 
those considered as hardship cases.3 City dwellers seem to have generally lower levels of trust than residents of 
villages or refugee camps. Trust also seems to be inversely dependent on the level of education, except for the 
Sharia courts where trust levels are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by level of education.
Figure 1.13: Trust in Sharia law by region of residence  - July 2005
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Place of residence is a key factor for explaining trust in Sharia courts: 55% of respondents in Gaza and the West 
Bank reported a high trust in the Sharia courts, compared to only 20% in East Jerusalem, where the comparatively 
lower trust level can be explained by better access to regular (Israeli) courts. 
3 With a revenue of 50% percent of those classiﬁed as below the poverty line.
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The availability or non-availability of satisfactory alternatives may also explain the considerable variations in trust 
levels in the clan-based customary law institutions. Only 6% of respondents in Jerusalem said they placed high 
trust in clan-based judicial institutions, compared to 42% in the Gaza refugee camps and 39% in the West Bank 
regions outside the camps, where Sharia courts and customary law institutions are easily accessible and deal 
predominantly with civil-law cases.
Figure 1.14: Trust in customary law by place of residence -  July 2005
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1.3.3 Strong and widespread support for security sector reform 
A strong message in support of change appears in the 
answers to questions related to security sector reform.4 
The changes in the security sector undertaken by the PA 
during the period under scrutiny are considered in general 
to be a ﬁrst step in the right direction (62% of support).
Respondents in the Gaza Strip are those showing the highest 
level of support.
When asked to rate the importance of eleven concrete 
security sector reform measures, a sweeping majority of 
respondents (76% to 94%) considered all proposed measures 
as either very important or rather important. 
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Figure 1.15: Support to changes in security 





4 ‘Security  sector reform (SSR)’ refers to a systemic transformation of the security sector so that the various institutions can play an 
eﬀective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens.
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1.3.4 Fighting corruption and nepotism seen as the top priority
84% consider it very important and another 13% as rather important to ﬁght corruption and nepotism. Such
a result is consistent with the fact that, despite the changes within internal Palestinian politics following the 
death of Arafat and measures introduced to increase the accountability and transparency of PA institutions, the 
majority of respondents (70%) think that corruption deﬁnitely exists in the PA.5 78% of respondents consider the 
legal prosecution of security personnel responsible for human rights violations very important.. Gaza residents 
and respondents living in refugee camps are those most supportive of this measure. Establishing an ombudsman 
to investigate citizens’ complaints and improving the training of police and security forces are also judged to be 
important; 75 and 73% of respondents, respectively, consider such measures as very important. Finally, 70% 
consider it very important to have independent institutions visit all places of detention. Such a result is in line 
with the low trust that Palestinians appear to have in the correctional system (only 29% of respondents reporting 
a high trust in the PA correctional system).  Such strong and widespread support for in-depth reform suggests 
that the security sector has largely failed to meet the Palestinian people’s expectations and ﬁnds itself in a major
crisis of conﬁdence and legitimacy.
1.3.5 Strong support for dissolution of armed groups 
Considering the high level of trust placed in non-statutory armed groups, such as the Al-Aqsa or the Al-Qassem 
brigades, it should be noted that a majority of respondents are in favour of dissolving them. 48% of all respondents 
consider the dissolution of armed groups a very important measure.  It may be surprising that support for 
dissolving armed groups is highest in the refugee camps. In the camps of Gaza, 69% approve this measure as 
very important. The combination of high trust in armed groups and the strong support for their dissolution 
in an area that has a reputation for having served as a recruitment pool for armed groups raises a number of 
questions that deserve further analysis. It could be that the camp population has suﬀered disproportionately
because of the presence of armed groups and sees in their disbandment an opportunity for increasing security. 
Among residents of refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, 10% listed the existence of armed groups as one of the main 
reasons for their insecurity. It could also possibly indicate a willingness of members of armed groups to join the 
statutory forces, if they were oﬀered the opportunity to do so. In recent months, many have sharply criticised the
Palestinian Authority for its partisan management of the security forces and have demanded that recruitment 
and selection be done on a non-factional basis.  
Figure 1.17: Dissolving armed groups by place of residence - July 2005
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1.3.6 Strong demand for accountability and increased oversight 
The support for particular security sector reform measures varies according to place of residence. As mentioned 
above, Gaza residents and respondents living in refugee camps, for example, attach a higher importance to the 
legal prosecution of security oﬃcials responsible for human rights violations. A majority of respondents in all
areas wanted the Palestinian Legislative Council to increase oversight of the security apparatus. Support for this 
measure was particularly high in the refugee camps of the West Bank, where 66% rated it as very important. 
5 FAFO, Gaza Poll, September 2005. See also AMAN, Opinion Poll on Corruption in the Palestinian Society, December 2004
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Figure 1.18: Increase Palestinian Legislative Council oversight by place of residence - July 2005
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1.3.7 Support for changes in the judiciary
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Respondents also perceive a strong need to improve the rule of law. Measures aimed at strengthening the legal 
framework and improving the functioning of the judiciary were usually seen as very important, with peaks of 
79% in support of the uniﬁcation of the Palestinian legal code and 74% for improving the training of judges and
prosecutors.
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The abolition of the state security and military courts is the most controversial of the proposed remedies. 
Interestingly, “only” 39% of interviewees strongly support this measure, despite the fact that a mere 19% of the 
respondents claimed to have high trust in these courts. Respondents living in the Gaza Strip outside the refugee 
camps are the least inclined to support the abolition of state security courts, while residents of East Jerusalem 
and of the West Bank refugee camps expressed the strongest support. Most in favor of such an abolition were 
interviewees above the poverty line.   
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A majority of Palestinians believe that salaries for judges and prosecutors should be increased, (as a means of 
ﬁghting corruption in the judiciary). 57% in Jerusalem, and even 64% of refugees living in  camps in the West
Bank, attach high importance to this measure. In Gaza however, one in four respondents considered the measure 
as very unimportant.
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1.4 Conclusions
The period November 2004-July 2005 was marked by the decision of the new Palestinian leadership (led by 
President Mahmoud Abbas) to put an end to the Intifada. This decision was followed by a signiﬁcant decrease
in the degree of military violence in the oPt and, consequently, by the decline in the numbers of Palestinian 
casualties, which reached their lowest levels, in terms of those killed or injured, since the outbreak of the 
Intifada. Despite the decrease in the number of casualties, Israeli occupation nevertheless emerged as the main 
threat to the Palestinians’ security throughout the oPt, and more especially in the West Bank. Jerusalemites felt 
comparatively more threatened by the existence (and expansion) of the settlements and overall regional security 
problems, while socio-economic problems and internecine ﬁghting among diﬀerent armed factions (various
security forces of the Palestinian Authority, armed militias aﬃliated to political factions, etc.) had a more acute
impact in Gaza.
The easing of mobility restrictions in the oPt is to some degree reﬂected in the ﬁndings of our survey. In July
2005, a majority of Palestinians still considered that their mobility status, including access to public services, 
place of work and relatives, was seriously aﬀected by mobility problems, but to a lesser extent than eight months
earlier. This improvement in the mobility status of the Palestinians was particularly felt in the Jerusalem and Gaza 
regions.
The construction of the Separation Wall, which was initiated in June 2002, continued in the central and southern 
regions of the West Bank. Our survey ﬁnds that, in general, the negative socio-economic impacts of the Wall
have diminished signiﬁcantly since 2004. This may be explained by the re-routing of the Wall and increased
passage opportunities through it following the Israeli Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice 
rulings of 2004. It may also be explained by household and collective socio-economic strategies adopted by the 
Palestinians as a means of coping with the existence of the Wall. This was however less the case in Jerusalem than 
in the West Bank.
While Israeli occupation impacts on Palestinian perceptions of security and imposes severe constraints on the 
Palestinian authorities, it does not explain the limited trust the Palestinian population has in the security sector. 
It appears rather that the governance of these institutions and their legitimacy are questioned. 
Domestically, the Palestinian Authority and the oﬃcial security organisations are confronted with a major
legitimacy deﬁcit. Unless conﬁdence in the oﬃcial institutions is restored, popular support for substitute
organisations, such as private militias and parallel court systems, is likely to grow. This could further undermine 
the already weak conﬁdence in the public system. It could also widen the gap between residents in Jerusalem
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and residents in the West Bank and Gaza and eventually be detrimental to Palestinian unity and the nation-
building process. From a Palestinian perspective, improving security sector governance should therefore be a 
matter of high national interest. 
The strong and widespread popular demand for an in-depth reform of the whole security sector indicates 
dissatisfaction with the present situation. But it is also expresses broad-based willingness to strengthen oﬃcial
institutions and improve their performance, which provides a foundation of political capital upon which the 
political leadership can build.
The challenge for the Palestinian Authority will be to build a nationally owned and led vision of how the security 
sector should be reformed and to map and implement a government-wide strategy for security sector reform 
that can deliver tangible results to Palestinian citizens, such as a substantial reduction in corruption and nepotism 
and enhanced respect for human rights. 
While the Palestinian Authority can count on overwhelming support in the population for disarming and 
disbanding the militias, it will unlikely be able to achieve this objective unless it succeeds in strengthening its own 
legitimacy. Representative institutions and a well-governed security sector would help the Palestinian Authority 
gather the support needed to take on riskier tasks.
The challenges of Palestinian security sector governance illustrate the overlapping problems of development 
and security and highlight the need for integrated development and security policies. In the Palestinian context, 
international development assistance and humanitarian aid should increasingly be judged on its capacity to 
respond to the challenges posed by poor security sector governance. A failure to address this fundamental 
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Politics, Government, Media and the Peace Process
Rania Al-Haddad, Sheik Fadisakho & Luigi De Martino
2.1 Main Trends
The survey covered the period from November 2004 to July 2005, one that was rich in signiﬁcant developments
on the Palestinian political scene. These included the death of President Arafat, the presidential elections and 
the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas as president, the local council elections and the political rivalry among the 
Palestinian factions and, ﬁnally, the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
• The majority of respondents (76%) supported the Legislative Council (PLC) elections, carried out in 
January 2006. Results show that the strongest support for the elections was in the Gaza Strip. It is in 
Jerusalem where there was strong opposition to the elections (29% of respondents). When looking at such 
results it is important to keep in mind that the special situation of Jerusalem impacted on respondents’ 
perceptions. 
• Despite the general support for the PLC elections, in July 2005 29% of respondents were undecided 
about their selection of a candidate, while 21% mentioned that they would not participate at all. Hence, 
six months before the elections, the position of 50% of the electorate was still basically unclear.
• In July 2005, 24% of respondents indicated they would vote for Fatah whereas only 12% said they would 
choose Hamas in the January 2006 PLC elections. 
• When choosing a candidate, respondents attached great importance to moral values, with 45% aﬃrming
that honesty and integrity is the ﬁrst most important reason for their choice, followed by the qualiﬁcations
and experience of a candidate (29%) as the second and third most important reason for selection. The 
emphasis given to the question of honesty and integrity as the main factor for choosing a candidate 
combined with the scepticism about the reform of the PA are indications that the PLC elections probably 
have to be interpreted as a protest vote against a PA seen as incapable of bringing about positive 
change. 
• In July 2005, the Palestinian president enjoyed high levels of support among the Palestinian public despite 
the general pessimism concerning the Palestinian Authority. Results indicated that the foremost issue of 
concern regarding the PA was once more nepotism/clientelism while the PA’s inability to maintain public 
order was the second-largest issue of concern.
• Despite the fact that certain reform measures were introduced following the appointment of Abbas as 
President, in July the majority of the Palestinians showed little conﬁdence in the PA’s reforming eﬀorts:
49% of the respondents believed that the reform was only cosmetic while 25% had not heard of such 
reform.
• When asked about the main measure PA reform should involve, more than 50% of respondents thought 
that some  PA employees should be forced to early retirement and 38% of them thought that some PA 
employees should be laid oﬀ.
• Despite the little trust the Palestinians seem to have in the PA, the vast majority of Palestinians (65%) 
aﬃrmed that they could freely express their opinions and views without any fear from the Palestinian
Authority.
• When looking at Palestinians’ trust in media, Al-Jazeera TV was the single most trusted ﬁrst (43%) and
second (25%) source of information, showing an increase of 16% in the popularity of Al-Jazeera among the 
Palestinian public in the last six months. Palestinian TV and Al-Quds newspaper with 10% of preferences, 
Palestinian radio with 9% of preferences followed Al-Jazeera as the as the ﬁrst most-trusted sources of
information. At the same time, analysis shows that 52% of respondents thought that the Palestinian 
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media’s coverage of Palestinian needs and views could be improved and 24% thought it to be very bad.
• The vast majority of the Palestinian public (72%) supported a peace settlement with Israel. This result 
indicates a 15% increase in the levels of support since November 2004. However, the level of support 
varies according three independent variables, namely, “refugee status”, ”area of residence” and “geographic 
area”.
• In principle, the respondents seemed to be willing to make considerable concessions. When respondents 
were asked what the Palestinian Authority should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state, 35% 
of respondents were willing to relinquish 5-10% of the land of the West Bank and 32% were willing to 
relinquish the refugee right of return. This represent a striking change from the previous survey. 
2.2 Introduction 
The chapter will focus on ﬁve main issues: (1) the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, (2) the reform of
Palestinian Authority, (3) perceptions about corruption (4) freedom of expression and media, and (5) perceptions 
about the peace process.
2.3 Elections of the Palestinian Legislative Council
In the Declaration of Principles in September 1993, Israel and the PA agreed upon the setting-up of an elected 
council in the Palestinian autonomous territories. The ﬁrst Palestinian Legislative Council was elected on January
20, 1996 and consisted of 88 seats. Elections for a new Palestinian Legislative Council were scheduled for 17 July 
2005 by Acting Palestinian Authority President Rawhi Fattuh in January 2005. However, following the Palestinian 
presidential elections, the newly elected president, Mahmoud Abbas, had postponed the elections after major 
changes to the Elections Law were enacted by the PLC which required more time for the Palestinian Central 
Elections Committee to process and prepare. Among those changes was the expansion of the number of the 
parliament’s seats from 88 to 132.
The elections have been carried out January 25, 2006 and have seen the victory of the list “Change and Reform,” 
led by the Hamas movement. Our survey (conducted in July 2005, seven months prior to the elections) will not 
go into a comparison between pre-election period attitudes and the results of the ballot. 
The following section will focus on analysing Palestinian support for elections, people’s criteria for selecting a 
candidate, the Palestinian factions and the PLC elections and the reasons for selecting a candidate.
2.3.1 Support for Legislative Council elections
The majority of respondents (76%) supported 
the Legislative Council elections, scheduled 
for January 2006.1
Despite this general support for the elections, 
an examination of results reveals variations 
according to the independent variables: 
region of residence, area of residence, gender, 
place of residence and area.  
In general, men show more strong support for the elections (40%) than women (31%). However, those who 
simply support them are more likely to be women (48%). One could explain this result by the considerably low 
participation of women in the political decision-making process. 









1 Result conﬁrmed by following surveys: The Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion (PCPO), Poll No.133, February 2005; Jerusalem Media
and Communication Centre, May 2005; The Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion (PCPO), Poll No.137, June 2005 
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Results show that the strongest support for the 
elections was in the Gaza Strip. The eagerness 
of the Gazans to have elections to deﬁne the
political landscape in the post-withdrawal era 
could be explained by: the internal situation in 
the Gaza Strip especially after Mahmoud Abbas 
was elected President and was able to reach 
an agreement with the Palestinian factions to 
declare truce with the Israel, the changes in the 
structure of the Palestinian security apparatus, 
the successful second stage of local councils’ 
elections and the Israeli disengagement plan 
from the Gaza Strip. In Jerusalem, results show, 
as indicated in the adjacent graph, a diﬀerent
pattern of support for the elections. Although 
one can ﬁnd a high percentage of respondents
who only support the elections (47%), it is in 
Jerusalem where one can also ﬁnd a strong
overall opposition to the elections totalling 
29%, of whom 11% strongly oppose.
It is important to highlight the special 
situation of Jerusalem, one that reﬂected
on the respondents’ perceptions. Jerusalem 
continues to be administered by the Israeli 
government and its ﬁnal status has not yet
been deﬁned.
When looking at the region of residence 
one can see that while in the Gaza strip the 
strongest support for the elections comes 
from regions outside refugee camps (48% of 
respondents stating a strong support), in the 
West Bank the answers are similar in both 
camps and non-camp regions. Interestingly, 
both in the regions outside the camps in the Gaza strip and in Jerusalem one can ﬁnd the highest percentage
of respondents who strongly oppose the elections (12% and 11% respectively). One could explain the strong 
support for the elections outside the camps in the Gaza Strip by a general feeling of optimism and hope that 
the elections will be a step forward towards improving the general situation in the territories. The high level of 
opposition in refugee camps in Gaza (27%) could be related to the general feeling of disappointment among the 
refugees with the performance of the Palestinian institutions.
2.3.2 Selection of a candidate
Despite the general support for the PLC elections, many respondents 
(29%) seem undecided about their selection of a candidate, as shown 
in the adjacent table. 
The explanation for this may be that the unpredictable changes on 
the Palestinian political scene were making it diﬃcult to ensure with
certainty that the elections would actually take place as scheduled in 
January 2006 (having already been postponed once before by President Abbas in July 2005). The Israeli opposition 
to the participation of Hamas in the elections probably added a factor of uncertainty to the process. However, 
support for a faction or a party seems to be an important factor when voting for a candidate (28%). Support for 
a party seems to be stronger among men (31%) and in cities (29% preferring a candidate from a party/faction) 
and persons below the poverty line.
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Select a candidate
Independent candidate 21%
Candidate from a faction/party 28%
I will decide during the elections 29%
I will not participate in the elections 21%
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If, in total, 21% of the respondents were saying 
that they would not participate to the elections, 
this percentage jumps to 48% in the case of 
Jerusalemites. The factors mentioned above 
(special status of Jerusalem, Israeli opposition 
to Hamas participation especially strong in 
Jerusalem, overall uncertainty of the process) 
could help explain this lack of enthusiasm 
about participation. Respondents living in 
refugee camps (34%) are the most undecided 
about the selection of a candidate, an attitude 
which could be related to the fact that 20% of 
respondents residing in camps indicated that 
they opposed the elections.
Interestingly, results show that the level of poverty of the respondents has also an inﬂuence on their selection of
candidates. Respondents who live in abject poverty (33%) are the most undecided voters, whereas respondents 
who live above the poverty line prefer to vote for a candidate from a faction (27%) or an independent candidate 
(19%). 31% of respondents who live below the poverty line prefer to vote for a candidate from a faction or 
party. 
2.3.3 Palestinian factions and the Legislative Council elections
Following the presidential elections in January 2005, the Palestinian factions have become increasingly more 
active on the Palestinian political scene. Both phases of the local council elections, in January and May 2005, were 
marked by ﬁerce factional competition that was mainly between Fatah and Hamas.
When respondents were asked about the faction they would vote for,2 their responses indicated a preference for 
secular groups3 (37%) rather than Islamic (22%), as explained in the graph below. The analysis also conﬁrmed the
high percentage of respondents who would not participate in the elections (24%).
Despite the rising popularity of Hamas, especially in the Gaza Strip, Fatah remained the most popular party.4 In 
July 2005, 24% of respondents indicated they would vote for Fatah,5 whereas only 12% said they would choose 
Hamas in the January PLC elections.6
In the seven months between the poll and the 
elections, the preferences of the Palestinian 
public have changed, giving Hamas a support 
that few had expected. Considering that 
Fatah, embodied in the PLO, is the traditional 
representative of the Palestinian people 
and was considered the only party able to 
deliver on the needs of the Palestinian public 
and to reach a peace agreement with Israel, 
the victory of Hamas has to be linked to the 
incapacity of the PA to seriously develop a 
process of reform. In the next section (2.4) we 
will look at this question in more detail.


































2 The question was: ‘In case the PLC elections were held in the near future, to which candidate of the various factions would you give 
your vote?
3 Poll 8, November 2004 indicated the same result
4 The Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion (PCPO), Poll No.16, June 2005
5 ‘44% Fatah, 21% Hamas’, PCPO, Poll No.133, February 2005; ‘38% Fatah, 26% Hamas’, PCPO, Poll 143, October 2005, 
6 Results of Poll 8 have indicated more trust in Fatah than in Hamas. 
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Looking at the July 2005 results from a geographical perspective, data conﬁrmed the previously mentioned
preference for Fatah across the three regions. As for Hamas, it was evidently more popular in the Gaza Strip (21%) 
than in the West Bank (8%); this is not surprising, considering that Hamas was ‘born’ in Gaza and that it is there 
where its inﬂuence is the strongest. Nevertheless, results show that a higher percentage of respondents in the
Gaza Strip would vote for Fatah (28%). 





































2.3.4 Reasons leading to the selection of a PLC candidate
 
In each electoral process, many reasons help to determine voters’ political choice. Respondents were asked to 
specify the three most important reasons determining their choice of a candidate in the coming PLC elections.
Results shown in the graph below indicate that respondents attached a great importance to moral values when 
choosing a candidate, as 45% aﬃrm that honesty and integrity is the ﬁrst most important reason for choosing a
candidate. Faction aﬃliation comes only in second position as ﬁrst most important reason whereas qualiﬁcations
and experience of the candidate (29%) are the second and third most important reason. In addition, the 
educational background7 of a candidate would inﬂuence the selection.









































7 An-Najah National University, Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No.12, May 2005
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Despite limited variations according to region of residence, area of residence, place of residence, level of poverty 
and area, the order of the three most important reasons for selecting a candidate remains unchanged: ﬁrst and
foremost comes the issue of honesty/integrity. 
When selecting a candidate, honesty/integrity is more important for respondents living in West Bank refugee 
camps (56%) than respondents living outside the camps (44%). In the Gaza Strip honesty/integrity is also the 
most important reason for a candidate’s selection, with little diﬀerence outside camps (50%) and in refugee
camps (45%). The candidate’s educational background continues to be the third most important reason after 
qualiﬁcations/experience, however it is more important for refugee-camp residents in both the West Bank
refugee camps (32%) and Gaza refugee camps (19%). This could be explained by the fact that education is 
traditionally valued, particularly by the refugee population in the oPt. Nevertheless, 17% of Gazans living outside 
camps indicate that the candidate’s struggle history is the third most important reason for their selection of a 
candidate. 
The emphasis given to the question of honesty and integrity as the main factor for choosing a candidate 
combined with the scepticism about the reform of the PA are indications that the PLC elections have probably to 
be interpreted as a protest vote against a PA seen as incapable to bring positive change. 
2.4 The manner by which Mahmoud Abbas is leading the PA
Although the analysis of the results on the issue of PA reform 
showed that, generally, the Palestinian public has little faith 
in these reforms, the Palestinian president enjoyed high 
levels of support among the Palestinian public.8 Nevertheless, 
results show that city dwellers (52%) are less satisﬁed than
refugee-camp dwellers (62%) and villagers (64%) regarding 
the way Abbas is leading the PA. Moreover, it is in the cities 
where one can ﬁnd the highest proportion of respondents
who disagree and strongly disagree (30% in total) with Abbas’ 
leadership. One could relate this dissatisfaction to the large 
numbers of respondents living in cities who believe in the 
existence of corruption in the PA: 51% of them think that PA 
reform is only cosmetic. Refugees are less supportive than non-
refugees. Refugees represent the highest proportion (30%) of 
respondents who disagree with the manner by which Abbas is leading the PA (disagree 21%, strongly disagree 
9%) compared to 23% of non-refugee respondents (disagree 14%, strongly disagree 6%). It appears that the 
Palestinian refugees are more frustrated than non-refugees with the progress of the peace process, and that they 
have had higher levels of expectations and are thus more demanding of the new president. 
2.4.1 Perceptions about the reform of the PA
This section examines the Palestinians’ perceptions about PA reform. It will focus on three issues: their biggest 
concern about the PA, opinions about reforms in the PA and the main measure that should be taken when 
reforming the PA.
2.4.1.1 Biggest concerns about the PA
Respondents were asked to express their ﬁrst and second issue of concern regarding the PA. Their responses are
summarised in the following graph: 
Consistent with the general result explained above regarding the concern about corruption, the analysis indicates 
that the ﬁrst issue of concern in regard to the PA is once more nepotism/clientelism,9 followed by the PA’s inability 
Figure 2.8: The manner by which Mahmoud 
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8 ‘72.1% support, to varying degrees, the PNA president Mr. Mahmoud Abbas – PCPO, Poll No.144, 9 November 2005
9 Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion (PCPO), Poll No.16, June 2005
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to maintain public order as the second-largest issue of concern. The occasional periods of chaos resulting at 
times from factional conﬂicts and the clear inability of the PA security forces to control it may explain why the PA’s
inability to maintain public order is a major Palestinian public concern.































If there are no diﬀerences between the three regions regarding nepotism/clientelism, the most important area
of concern, there are considerable diﬀerences in the three regions regarding the second most important concern
with the PA. In the West Bank, 16% say that their second most important concern about the PA is its inability to 
maintain public order. Incidents of competition between the Palestinian factions which developed, at times, 
into violent confrontations and the PA’s inability to control these factions and impose order on the Palestinian 
streets could explain this result. Jerusalemites and the Gazans alike seem to have diﬀerent concerns. For 17% of
Jerusalemites who responded, their second most important concern is the lack of transparency/accountability 
in the PA. This is not a surprising result as previous analysis indicated that 35% of Jerusalemites believed that 
there was widespread corruption and 44% of them believed there is signiﬁcant corruption in the PA. For 14% of 
Gazans, lack of human rights is their second biggest concern regarding the PA. This result could be explained by 
the fact that the PA’s reputation regarding respect of human rights has been damaged by incidents such as the 
arrests of faction members, particularly those of Hamas, and by criticism of the judicial system, unfair trials and 
unexplained arrests. 
When results are analysed according to gender, it is evident that for both men (27%) and women (28%) nepotism/
clientelism is the primary concern about the PA. Yet for 13% of men, the lack of transparency in the PA is their 
second biggest concern, while women (15%) seem to be more concerned about the lack of human rights, citing 
this as their second most important concern. 
2.4.2  Palestinians’ opinions about reform in the PA
Despite the fact that certain reform measures were introduced 
following the appointment of Abbas as president, the majority 
of the Palestinians polled in July showed little conﬁdence in
the PA’s reforming eﬀorts. 49% of respondents believe that the
reform is only cosmetic while 25% had not heard of any such 
reform. This continuously pessimistic perception of PA reform 
measures could be explained by the numerous corruption 
scandals involving PA oﬃcials (the last of which directly involved
Prime Minister Ahmad Qureia).
Pessimism is constant within all age categories, whereas there is a correlation between the level of education 
of correspondents and their perception that reform is cosmetic. More respondents with a high educational 
level (55%) than respondents with a medium educational level (50%) and low educational level (43%) believe 
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that PA reform is only cosmetic. Interestingly, a much higher 
percentage of women (33%) than men (18%) had not heard 
of any reform within the PA. A possible explanation could be 
that women might be less involved in the internal issues of 
Palestinian politics.
Looking at the geographic independent variables, respondents 
residing in refugee camps were the most distrustful of PA reforms. 
57% of them believe reform is only cosmetic whereas village 
residents represent the highest percentage of respondents 
believing that the reform is real (30%).
 
2.4.3 Reform of the PA: main measures
As explained in the previous sections, Palestinians have generally 
little faith in the reforms of the Palestinian Authority, and the 
recent reform measures undertaken by the PA have done little 
to change this. When asked about what should be the main 
measure of the PA reform, more than 50% of respondents think 
that some PA employees should be forced to early retirement 
and 38% of them think that some of the PA employees should 
be laid oﬀ. This is not a surprising result considering that 73%
of respondents believe that PA employees are corrupt or 
signiﬁcantly corrupt. In addition, the majority of respondents
also believe that the most disturbing form of corruption is the 
appointment of relatives and friends.
Forced early retirement and ﬁring of employees are, across the board, the most-welcomed measures across all
independent variables, despite the fact that the PA is the largest provider of employment in the oPt. The level of 
support for these measures tended to increase with the level of education; when looking at poverty levels, the 
strongest support for laying-oﬀ PA oﬃcials is to be found among those above the poverty level, whereas support
for forced early retirement is particularly strong among respondents below the poverty line (61%). In terms of 
geographic variables, early retirement as a reform measure received widespread support also among villagers 
(60%) and among respondents living in refugee camps in the Gaza strip. Jerusalemites seemed to be more severe 
in their preferences for reform,  as 57% of them believe that some PA employees should be laid oﬀ, compared to
40% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip. 
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Figure 2.11: Opinion about PNA reform according 
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2.5 Perceptions about corruption
The issue of corruption in the Palestinian Authority had been repeatedly discussed and highlighted, locally 
and internationally, over the last years. However, following the death of Arafat, the issue of corruption in PA 
institutions and the urgent need for reform has come under the spotlight internally as well as externally. We 
will look at Palestinian perceptions of corruption, its existence and its extent, in particular the disturbing forms 
of corruption in four sectors: the PA, the private sector, civil society institutions and international organisations 
working in  the oPt.  
2.5.1 Existence and stretch of corruption 
As shown in the table below, in July 2005 the Palestinian public considered that corruption existed in all sectors 






Definitely yes 68% 40% 38% 30%
Probably yes 26% 45% 41% 34%
Probably no 3% 6% 8% 13%
Definitely no 4% 9% 13% 23%
There are considerable variations regarding the 
perception of the extent of corruption in the 
four sectors, as shown in the graph. Yet, despite 
the changes in internal Palestinian politics 
following the death of Arafat and the measures 
introduced to increase the accountability and 
transparency of PA institutions, the majority 
of respondents (68%) think that corruption 
deﬁnitely exists in the PA.10 
The graph illustrates that a total of 80% of 
respondents believe that there is a widespread 
and a signiﬁcant level of corruption in the PA.
A similarly high percentage of respondents believe in the existence of signiﬁcant and widespread corruption
in the private sector (63%) and in civil society institutions (61%). One can also note that a high percentage of 
respondents (46%) believe that there is little corruption in the international organisations working in the oPt.

























����������������������������� �� ����� ��������������������������
����������������������������� ����������������������������
���
In order to clarify this perception of corruption in the diﬀerent sectors, respondents were asked if they agreed
that employees of these four sectors were corrupt. The perception that the PA is corrupt is based their perception 
of PA employees. The graph illustrates that a large percentage of respondents believe that a great or a signiﬁcant
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10 FAFO, Gaza Poll, September 2005. See also AMAN, Opinion Poll on corruption in the Palestinian society, December 2004
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proportion of PA employees are corrupt, while only 27% believe a small or a minuscule proportion of PA 
employees are corrupt. Private sector employees are considered less corrupt with a total of 33% of respondents 
believing that a great or signiﬁcant proportion of employees in the private sector are corrupt. Respondents seem
to be divided regarding the extent of corruption among employees of the civil society institutions. A total of 51% 
believe a great or signiﬁcant proportion of the employees are corrupt whereas 48% think only a small or tiny
proportion are corrupt.
Respondents seem to believe that employees of international organisations in the oPt are the least corrupt: only 
21% believe a large or signiﬁcant proportion of employees of international organisations are corrupt whereas
58% classify the question as non-applicable. 
Despite the Palestinian public perception of the existence of corruption in all the four sectors, there are variations 
according to the following independent variables: region of residence, gender, place of residence, regional 
situation, and level of poverty. In the next paragraphs we shall look at some of the results. 
2.5.1.1 Corruption within the PA 
Regardless of the respondents’ level of education, a large proportion of them believe that there is widespread 
corruption in the PA. However, the more people are educated, the more they believe that the PA is generally 
corrupt (50%). Similarly, 40% of respondents with low educational levels and 39% of respondents with medium 
educational levels think that there is a widespread corruption in the PA. 
Data show that the perception of the existence 
of corruption in the PA is strong across the 
three regions11 (over 60% in all regions). 
Nevertheless, more Gazans (73%) than West 
Bankers (68%) and Jerusalemites (56%) 
believe that there is deﬁnitely corruption in
the PA. Such results are conﬁrmed by looking
at views on the extent of corruption within 
the PA: data indicate that Gazans (48%) have a 
stronger perception of widespread corruption 
in the PA compared to West Bankers (37%) 
and Jerusalemites (35%).  By contrast, a higher 
percentage of Jerusalemites (43%) believe 
that there is signiﬁcant corruption in the PA
than West Bankers (41%) and Gazans (34%).
One could relate this result to major corruptions scandals in the PA institutions in the Gaza Strip in recent months 
as well as the stronger frustration among Gazans with the PA performance. There are few variations between 
results inside and outside the refugee camps in West Bank and Gaza. Finally, more men (72%) than woman (64%) 
believe that corruption deﬁnitely exists in the PNA. At the same time, more women (28%) than men (23%) 
believe that corruption probably exists in the PNA. 
2.5.1.2 Corruption within the private sector
In each area of residence, a high percentage of respondents believe that corruption probably exists in the private 
sector. Nevertheless, in the West Bank, more respondents living in refugee camps (60%) than respondents living 
outside the camps (48%) believe in the probable existence of corruption in the private sector, whereas in the 
Gaza Strip refugee camps, 46% of respondents deﬁnitely believe in the existence of corruption in the private 
sector while only 35% of them consider that it probably exists.
11 FAFO Report, December 2004: 82% believe in the existence of corruption in the governmental sector’














��������� �������������������� ��������� � ��������������������
��������������������������
Chapter 2: Politics, Media, & the Peace Process52
2.5.1.3 Corruption among civil society institutions
Jerusalemites are those who are strong in aﬃrming that corruption deﬁnitely exists among civil society institutions
(41%), while 38% of Gazans believe it exists at that level. In the West Bank, more respondents living in refugee 
camps consider that corruption in civil society exists than those living outside camps. 
In terms of gender, more men (41%) than women (34%) believe that corruption deﬁnitely exists in civil society 
institutions, whereas nearly as many men (41%) as women (40%) believe that corruption probably exists.
2.5.1.4 Corruption among international organisations in the oPt
If 30% of those living in refugee camps as well as in regions outside camps in the West Bank aﬃrm that corruption
probably exists in international organisations active in the oPt, it is in the areas of the Gaza Strip outside the 
refugee camps where conﬁdence in the international organisations is high: 42% of respondents assert that
corruption deﬁnitely doesn’t exist in international organisations in the oPt.
2.5.2 Palestinian Experience of corruption
Although the previous analysis indicates that Palestinians perceive the existence of corruption in all sectors and 
especially in the PA, such perceptions may be exaggerated especially when examining people’s real experience 
with corruption. Indeed, the majority of respondents (41%) know about corruption because “everybody says so,” 
i.e., everybody says there is corruption in Palestine. Moreover, 34% of them have heard about corruption from 
media (local media, Arab or international media, Israeli media). Only 10% of respondents admitted that they 
were confronted with corruption from personal experience. These results may seem contradictory (a perception 
of widespread corruption but little personal experience of corruption) but may partly be clariﬁed when seeing
that by contrast, 95% of respondents never heard of anyone who gave a bribe to a Palestinian oﬃcial. Indeed it is
nepotism and clientelism that Palestinians consider to be the main worrisome form of corruption.















2.5.3 The worrying forms of corruption
When asked to identify the most worrying form of corruption in the four sectors, the appointment of family and 
friends stands out.12 in all the sectors examined, followed by bribery.13
 
The analysis of the data according to the independents variables, region of residence, area of residence, place of 
residence, regional situation and educational level, conﬁrms this result to a large extent.
Nepotism is still the most worrying form of corruption (42%) in the PA, a result consistent with previous results 
on PA corruption.
12 AMAN, Opinion Poll on corruption in the Palestinian society, December 2004
13 Ibid – Poll 8 has also showed that bribery was a major form of corruption. 
Palestinian Public Perceptions Report IX 53





















��� �������������� ������������� � ������� ���� ��������� ��
2.6 Media and freedom of expression
The Palestinian public has access to a number of information resources. Some of these resources are widely 
accessible to the general public, particularly televised media, and some are less so, such as print media. In this 
section, we will ﬁrst look at the perceptions of the Palestinian public on freedom of expression they enjoy in
order gauge their opinions on the existence of a democratic atmosphere in the Palestinian territories. Then we 
will examine the most trusted sources of information in order to understand how the Palestinian public build 
perceptions and attitudes about certain issues and how they view the Palestinian media and its eﬀectiveness.
2.6.1 Media and freedom of expression
Despite the little trust the Palestinians seem to have in the PA, as explained in the previous sections, the vast 
majority of Palestinians (65%) aﬃrm that they can freely express their opinions and views without any fear from
the Palestinian Authority.
When looking at answers from a gender 
perspective, a slightly lower percentage of 
women (61%) than men (69%) say they can 
express their opinions freely without fear from 
PA. Equally, a slightly higher percentage of 
women (27%) than men (22%) say that they 
express their views only with a certain level of 
fear from the PA. An almost equal percentage 
of men (10%) and women (12%) say that they 
cannot express their opinions freely because 
of fear from the PA.
Results indicate that respondents living in the West Bank camps (58%) seem to feel slightly less free to express 
their opinions and views. It is also in West Bank refugee camps that one can ﬁnd the highest percentage of
respondents (40%) who say that they only express their opinions with a certain level of fear from PA.  By contrast, 
it is also in West Bank refugee camps that one can ﬁnd the lowest percentage (2%) of respondents who say that
they cannot express their opinions because of fear from PA.
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2.6.2 Media
Respondents were asked to identify their ﬁrst and second most important sources of information. As explained
in the graph below, 43% of respondents trust Al-Jazeera TV as the ﬁrst most-trusted source and 25% as the
second most-trusted source. Although the results of Poll 8 in November 2004 have indicated the same outcome, 
a comparison reveals an increase of 16%14 in the popularity of Al-Jazeera among the Palestinian public in the last 
six months. Palestinian TV and Al-Quds newspaper with 10% of preferences, and Palestinian radio with 9% of 
preferences, trail Al-Jazeera as the as the ﬁrst most trusted sources of information.
The two religiously oriented channels, the Lebanon-based channel Al-Mannar (16%) and the Dubai-based 
Al- Arabyyiah (15%), come in second and third place after Al-Jazeera as the second most trusted sources of 
information.15 Al Manar increased by 2% and Al Arabya remains stable, cited by 4% of respondents.16 









































However, in the last six months, Palestinian public trust in Palestinian sources of information (Palestinian TV, 
Palestinian radio and the Palestinian newspapers) seems to have dropped. The graph above shows that 31%17 
of the Palestinian public trust Palestinian sources of information.  One could explain the increased trust in Al-
Jazeera TV by the special focus and attention it dedicates to the Palestinian Territories, with the the speed and 
breadth of its live coverage, having correspondents in most major towns and cities. Al-Manar’s audience is mainly 
people with particular religious aﬃliations. Despite being a new18 TV channel, the rapid growth in popularity of 
Al-Arabiyyah could be explained by  its focus on delivering content that is relevant to Arabs around the world. 
Finally, the relatively low score of the Palestinian media is not surprising: analysis shows that 52% of respondents 
think that the Palestinian media’s coverage of Palestinian needs and views could be improved and 24% think it 
is very bad.
When looking at the above results concerning trust in the main two sources of information, one can see that 
trust in external sources such as Al-Jazeera is the strongest regardless the respondents’ level of education. At the 
same time, education is correlated with trust in Palestinian electronic media, the higher-educated respondents 
depending less on Palestinian radio and TV than medium- and lower-educated respondents.19 When examining 
14 Poll 8, November 2004, Al-Jazeera is the most trusted source of information with 27% 
15 Poll 8, November 2004: Al-Manar is the most trusted source of information with 11%
16 Poll 8, November 2004: Al-Arabiyyah is the most trusted source of information with 4%
17 Poll 8, November 2004: 39% of Palestinian public trust the Palestinian sources of information
18 Al-Arabiyyah TV channel was established in March 2003 and is based in Dubai Media City 
19 Whereas only 6% of respondents of high educational level trust Palestinian TV, the percentage is higher among respondents of medium 
(10%) and low (16%) educational level. Similarly, people with higher education depend less on the Palestinian radio as a main source of 
information than people with medium and low educational level.
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the level of trust in the Arabic satellite channels, particularly Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyyah, we note that there 
are no major diﬀerence between the economic level of respondents and their trust in these channels. In the
case of local electronic media, there is also a correlation between trust in sources of information and the level 
of poverty of the correspondents.  Palestinians who are economically disadvantaged tend to place more trust in 
Palestinian radio and TV than those who are economically better oﬀ. Whereas only 7% of respondents who are
above the poverty line trust Palestinian TV, this percentage increases to 11% and 14% among respondents below 
the poverty line and hardship cases.
If we analyse the results according to the region of residence we can see that, unlike Palestinians in the West Bank 
and in the Gaza Strip (who primarily trust Al-Jazeera TV),20 the Jerusalemites’ most trusted source of information 
is Al-Quds newspaper (28%), while for them Al-Jazeera is the second most-trusted source of information. This is 
not a surprising result considering the fact that Jerusalem is the birthplace of Al-Quds newspaper. Moreover, it 
is the oldest Palestinian newspaper and traditionally considered as a trusted source of information. Trust in Al-
Quds newspaper depends also on level of education21 and revenue: a higher percentage of respondents who are 
above the poverty line (13%) trust Al-Quds compared to only 8% of respondents below the poverty line and 6% 
of respondents living in hardship.
2.6.2.1 Quality of Palestinian media
When asked their opinion about the Palestinian 
media, the majority of respondents (52%) say 
the coverage of the Palestinian media of the 
needs and views of the Palestinian people 
could be improved. Moreover, an equal 
percentage of respondents (24%) say that the 
Palestinian media does a good job or that it 
is very bad. Cross-tabulation with various 
independent variables conﬁrm this general
result.
First of all the opinion about the Palestinian 
media is related the educational level of 
respondents. The more educated respondents 
are, the less they think that the Palestinian 
media does a good job covering Palestinian 
needs and views. Whereas 34% of respondents 
of low and 23% of medium educational level 
say that the Palestinian media does a good job, 
only 15% of respondents of high educational 
level think so. Similarly, 31% of respondents 
with high educational levels believe that the 
Palestinian media’s coverage of the Palestinian 
views and needs is very bad, compared to 23% 
and 19% of respondents of medium and low 
level of education. 
Analysing results according to the region of residence reveals that Jerusalemites, as illustrated in the adjacent 
graph, have the strongest opinions about the Palestinian media. Only 13% of Jerusalemites think that the 
Palestinian media does a good job in covering the Palestinian views and needs and 33% of them think the 
coverage is very bad. 
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20 Al-Manar TV is the second most trusted source of information, after Al-Jazeera, in both the West Bank (18%) and Gaza Strip (15%)
21 Persons with a higher educational level trust Al-Quds newspaper (11%) more than persons with medium and low educational level. As 
for the second most important source of information, respondents with medium (18%) and low educational level trust Al-Manar (18%), 
whereas respondents with higher educational level prefer Al-Arabiyyah (16%)
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However, there is little diﬀerence between the three regions regarding the opinion that the Palestinian media
could become better. One explanation for this is that the Jerusalemite might feel alienated by the Palestinian 
media (especially Palestinian radio and TV) which, for political reasons, has limited access to Jerusalem and thus 
focuses more on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
In terms of gender, although a similar 
percentage of male and women consider that 
Palestinian media could improve in quality, 
results indicate that a considerably higher 
percentage of female respondents (29%) think 
that the Palestinian media does a good job in 
covering the Palestinian needs and views. By 
contrast, male respondents are more critical of 
the Palestinian media and a high percentage 
of them think that its coverage is either very 
bad or it could be improved. 
Finally, there is a relationship between the 
economic situation of respondents and 
their opinion about the Palestinian media. 
The better-oﬀ respondents are the more
critical of the Palestinian media. While 30% 
of respondents who are classiﬁed as hardship
cases think the Palestinian media does a 
good job, only 16% of respondents above 
the poverty line think so. Similarly, more 
respondents above poverty level believe that 
the Palestinian media coverage is very bad 
than respondents below the poverty line and 
hardship cases.
2.7 Perceptions about the peace process 
In the aftermath of Oslo process, the support for peace with Israel was very strong among the Palestinians. 
However, this support gradually decreased since then as a result of the various and numerous obstacles and the 
continuous interruptions of the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. 
Since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 to the period considered by our survey (in July 
2005), there has been little, if any, progress in peace process. The Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip continued, settlement continued to expand in the West Bank and Jerusalem, with Israel conﬁrming
its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Israel continued building a Separation Wall into the occupied 
Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Jerusalem, the violence in the territories continued to escalate and 
the number of Palestinian casualties continued to rise. Nevertheless, the Israeli unilateral withdrawal plan could 
be considered the main single important event in 2005 in the oPt.
In this section, we continue to examine Palestinian perceptions towards peace with Israel in the period preceding 
the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza. We will examine the Palestinian support for a peace agreement with Israel, 
the support for the Israeli unilateral disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip, the concessions the Palestinians 
are willing to make for the sake of a viable state and the acceptance of an interim international force. 
2.7.1 Palestinians’ overall support of the peace process
The overall analysis indicates that the vast majority of the Palestinian public (72%) supported a peace settlement 
with Israel. This result indicates a 15% increase in the levels of support since November 2004.22 Despite the 
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22 Poll 8, November 2004 (55% supported a peace agreement with Israel, 45% opposed it)
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numerous interruptions to Palestinian-Israeli 
peace negotiations, one could assume that 
the Israeli unilateral disengagement plan from 
Gaza might have increased the Palestinian 
feeling of optimism regarding the possibility 
of reaching a peace agreement with Israel. 
Despite this high level of support for a peace 
agreement with Israel, the level of support 
varies according three independent variables, 
namely, refugee status, area of residence and 
geographic area.
First of all, refugee respondents (69%) are 
slightly less supportive than non-refugees 
(74%) of a peace settlement with Israel. This is 
not a surprising result considering the fact that 
most problematic issues that would determine 
a ﬁnal peace settlement with Israel are indeed
refugee issues such as refugee compensation 
and the refugee right of return.
When looking at the area of residence, results 
show that villagers (78%) support a peace 
settlement with Israel more than city-dwellers 
(71%) and refugee camp residents (65%).23 
One could explain this by understanding that 
villages, particularly in the West Bank, have 
been suﬀering greatly from Israeli incursions,
the destruction of their livelihood and means 
of living and the conﬁscation of their land,
especially after Israel started building the 
Separation Wall. Thus one would expect them 
to be more enthusiastic about reaching a 
peace agreement with Israel. These results 
tend to be conﬁrmed when we look at the data
according to geographic area: northern West 
Bankers (75%), southern West Bankers (72%) 
and Gazans (73%) are more supportive of a 
peace settlement with Israel than middle West 
Bankers (63%), i.e., those who are currently 
mostly eﬀected by the Separation Wall.
2.7.2 Gaza Disengagement Plan
In 2004, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced his intention to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and four 
settlements in the West Bank. In October 2004, the Knesset approved the unilateral disengagement plan which 
was scheduled for mid-August 2005. Despite some reservations about the plan, the withdrawal was welcomed 
nationally and internationally. 
When respondents where asked about their support 
for the disengagement plan, the data revealed that the 
majority of the Palestinian public (78%) supported the 
Israeli disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip, as shown 
in the table below. Only a mere 15% of respondents 
opposed or strongly opposed the disengagement plan. 
































Don’t know enough to decide 5%
Didn’t hear of it 2%
23 Similar result in Poll 8, November 2004 ( 71% of villagers supported a peace agreement with Israel and 29% opposed it) 
Chapter 2: Politics, Media, & the Peace Process58
Support for the disengagement plan was generally strong across the three regions, but, clearly, the highest 
percentage of respondents supporting it was in the Gaza Strip (totalling 83%).24  One could argue that it is in 
the Gaza Strip where the Israeli disengagement plan has been widely interpreted, especially within political 
circles, as a victory of the resistance over the Israeli occupation.25 At the same time, analysis reveals that there is 
less support in the Gaza Strip refugee camps (80%) than outside the camps for the disengagement plan, which 
conﬁrms the levels of support according to refugee status explained above. It is also inside refugee camps in the
Gaza Strip than one could ﬁnd the strongest opposition for the withdrawal plan (15%).
Interestingly there is a correlation between poverty level and the level of support for the Israeli disengagement 
plan. There is a much stronger support for the withdrawal among respondents who come from households 
in hardship (54%) than among respondents who are below the poverty line (44%) and those who are above 
the poverty line (42%). This result clearly indicates the hope for a better economic future following the Israeli 
withdrawal.
2.7.3 Concessions for a viable Palestinian state
It is clear that support for a peace agreement with Israel is strong among the Palestinian population even though 
the time the survey was carried was a period of hardly any signiﬁcant progress in the peace negotiations with
Israel, but rather a period marked by major developments in Palestinian internal politics and by continuous 
obstacles for any Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement. 
In principle, the respondents seem to be willing to make considerable concessions. When respondents were 
asked what the Palestinian Authority should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state, 35% of respondents 
are willing to relinquish 5-10% of the land of the West Bank and 32% are willing to relinquish the refugee right of 
return (see table below).
 “What should the PA relinquish for a viable State?”
Part of Jerusalem 11%
5-10% of the land of the West Bank 37%
Refugee right of return 31%
Palestinian control over borders 7%
Should relinquish anything if this will lead to ending occupation 14%
When these results are compared with results from the previous survey in November 200426 (see graph below), 
the sharp change in the attitude of Palestinians is striking. 
Although the period when the survey was carried could be characterised as a period of relative stability, one 
could explain this clear change in attitude by saying that the last ﬁve years of Al-Aqsa Intifada has considerably
eroded Palestinian patience and/or hope in achieving any political gains through violent resistance. Indeed, most 
Palestinians believe that the Intifada made the situation27 worse for them. 

















24 Results conﬁrmed by FAFO, Gaza Poll, September 2005
25 The Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion (PCPO), Poll No.16, June 2005
26 In Poll 8, November 2004, the majority of respondents (86%) said that the PNA should not relinquish anything of the Palestinian rights
27 Poll 8, November 2004, (84%) of respondents said that the general situation has worsened because of the Intifada
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Most interestingly, the refugee status of the 
respondents does not seem to inﬂuence their
willingness to hand over concessions. Indeed, 
31% of refugee respondents are willing to 
relinquish their right of return for the sake 
of a viable Palestinian state. Equally, a high 
proportion of them are willing to relinquish 
parts of the West Bank and Jerusalem. The 
striking diﬀerence between the two groups is
that 22% of refugees (as compared with. 8% 
of non-refugees) mention anything to end 
occupation as a concession in exchange of a 
viable Palestinian state.28 One could argue that 
the state of desperation these results indicate 
could be explained by the assumption that 
the Palestinian refugees have suﬀered most
from the conﬂict especially in the last ﬁve
years. Similarly, the global tendency observed 
in the table is conﬁrmed according to the
region of residence. In the graph below, it is 
striking to see that a high percentage of West 
Bankers (39%)29 would agree to relinquish 5-
10% of the land of the West Bank and 53% of 
Jerusalemites30 would agree to relinquish part 
of Jerusalem.
2.7.4 The 1967 borders
Although Palestinians seem to be willing to 
give major concessions for the sake of a viable 
Palestinian state, they are stricter regarding 
border issues. When respondents were asked 
if the Palestinian leadership could relinquish 
some of the Palestinian state based on 1967 
borders, 81% of respondents refused such a 
concession. 
2.7.5 Acceptance of an interim international force
Despite the various and continuous demands of the Palestinians in the last years to have an interim international 
force to monitor the situation in the oPt and Israeli violations, results of the survey show that 36% of Palestinians 
would not accept the presence of such a force. Nevertheless, 39% would accept the presence of such an interim 
international force only under certain conditions.
In all the three regions of the oPt support for an interim international force is limited: 29% of Palestinians in the 
West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip would accept such a measure without reservation, contrary to Jerusalem 
where one can ﬁnd the  highest proportion of respondents who would not accept such an international force
(48%). 



















































28 Poll 8, November 2004, results were 3%, 3%, 1% and &% respectively
29 In Poll 8, only 3% agreed to relinquish 5-10% of the land of the West Bank
30 In Poll 8, only (2%) of Jerusalemites agreed to relinquish part of Jerusalem 
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One could assume that because the major Intifada activities and confrontations with the Israeli forces mainly take 
place in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the residents in these two regions believe that they need international 
protection and, thus, they are generally more supportive of the idea. 
The opposition to the presence of an interim international force as well as the acceptance of an interim international 
force under certain conditions could be explained by the doubts Palestinians have regarding the utility of such 
a force. When respondents were asked about their expectations regarding outcomes of an interim international 
force, the majority of respondents (41%) believed that an it could not achieve anything. Nevertheless, 31% believe 
that such a force could achieve “an end to the violence on both sides.” Again, 20% of respondents think that such 
a force would guarantee their personal security. 
Socio-economic
Situation3
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Chapter 3: Changes in the socio-economic situation
Frédéric Lapeyre
3.1 Main trends
• In July 2005, the overall poverty rate was 68% and the depth of poverty was very severe, as 35% of the 
population were in a situation of extreme poverty.
• There was an overall deterioration in living conditions in the oPt in the months preceding the Israeli 
disengagement from the Gaza Strip, as extreme poverty in the oPt increased from 26% to 35% between 
November 2004 and July 2005.
• The deterioration of the situation in the Gaza Strip and the building of the Separation Wall in the West 
Bank have both especially aﬀected poor villagers and farmers in rural areas. The poverty rate increased
from 56% to 69% in villages between November 2004 and July 2005, while extreme poverty reached 32% 
as compared to 23% in November 2004.
• One striking result to appear is that the living conditions of Palestinians outside refugee camps have 
deteriorated sharply in the past year. Until recently, poverty was higher in the camps than outside, in 
both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But in July 2005, the overall level of poverty in the West Bank 
was higher outside refugee camps than within them, aﬀecting, 72% of respondents outside refugee
camps as compared to 66% inside.– Nevertheless, extreme poverty remains higher in the refugee camps, 
measuring 36% as compared to 31% outside. In the Gaza Strip, the poverty rate was about the same 
outside and inside refugee camps, but extreme poverty had become higher amongst people outside 
camps, where it increased dramatically from 33% to 49% between November 2004 and July 2005. 
• In respect to subjective poverty, the results indicate that 79% of respondents stressed that their household 
income was slightly less or much less than what was needed to meet their basic needs, compared with 
61% in November 2004.
 
• In July 2005, 10% of those surveyed stressed that, in the last month, their household food consumption 
was much less than needed, and 19% reported that it was less than needed. 
• As many as 45% of the poorest stated that their household food consumption was much less or less than 
needed, with 18% of the poorest stressing they were suﬀering from severe food deprivation.
• Overall, only 32% of respondents maintained that they could cope ﬁnancially for as long as it takes, 
whereas 45% stressed that they could barely manage or were in serious condition.
• Five consecutive years of deep socio-economic crisis have exhausted the savings of the poorest. The 
results show a signiﬁcant decrease in the percentage of the poorest who were relying on past savings,
from 72% in July 2003 to 36% in July 2005.
• The deterioration of the economic situation in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps led to an increase, 
from 46% to 51%, of the percentage of respondents who reported that they were not paying their 
bills, while the percentage of those who stressed that they were buying on  credit  increased, between 
November 2004 and July 2005, from 49% to 63%.
• Despite the economic and humanitarian crisis, Palestinian society has avoided up till now, any major 
social fragmentation and has secured social cohesion, as two-thirds of respondents consider the ﬁnancial
situation of their household to be similar to that of other  members of  their community.
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3.2 Objective poverty
On the eve of the disengagement process from the Gaza Strip, poverty in the oPt was widespread. In July 2005, 
the overall poverty rate was 68%. Figure 1 shows not only a situation of mass poverty but also that the depth of 
poverty was very severe, with 35% of the population being in a situation of extreme poverty. Since the Israeli-
imposed restrictions on mobility - through internal and external closure - are the main cause of the present 
economic and humanitarian crisis in the oPt, it is clear that any improvement of the material situation will depend 
greatly on Israeli policies towards removing its mobility - restriction measures. 





From a dynamic perspective, all the results show an overall deterioration in living conditions in the oPt in the 
months preceding the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip. Overall, extreme poverty increased from 26% 
to 35% between November 2004 and July 2005. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS, 2005) has 
evidence of the same trend, pointing out that 41% of respondents from the Gaza Strip reported that the overall 
well-being of their household was worse in July 2005 when compared to the situation a month before - the rate 
being 36% for the West Bank (PCBS, August 2005).






















The deterioration of the situation in the Gaza Strip has especially aﬀected poor villagers and farmers in rural areas.
Their ability to reach essential services, to travel, to work and market their goods was under considerable strain. 
Meanwhile, the Separation Wall in the West Bank has had a very negative impact on the living conditions of 
farmers close to it. This explains, to a great extent, why the poverty rate in the villages increased from 56% to 69% 
between November 2004 and July 2005, while extreme poverty reached 32% as compared to 23% in November 
2004. Poverty also increased in the cities from 57% to 65%, and this trend was associated with a sharp increase in 
extreme poverty, which increased from 24% to 34% between November 2004 and July 2005. However, it is still in 
the refugee camps that the level of poverty is the highest, as it reached a level of 72% in July 2005.


























Poverty rates diﬀer signiﬁcantly from one region of residence to another, and a more detailed poverty analysis
shows that individuals living in the Gaza Strip are more likely to be poor (77%) than those living in the West Bank 
(72%). Moreover, the depth of poverty is also much more severe in the Gaza Strip, where the rate of extreme 
Chapter 3: Changes in the socio-economic situation64
poverty is 47% while in the West Bank it is 32%. Extreme poverty is much less important in Jerusalem as it was 
measured at 5% in July 2005 but the rate of poverty reached 19%, very likely a consequence of both the mobility 
restrictions in the West Bank and the continued building of the wall around East Jerusalem, which has a great 
negative impact on the living and working conditions of Palestinians from Jerusalem. The results show a severe 
deterioration in the situation in the West Bank between November 2004 and July 2005, where the poverty rate 
increased from 60% to 72%, including an increase in the percentage of extremely poor from 25% to 32%. In the 
Gaza Strip, the overall poverty rate remains about the same but the depth of poverty increased sharply as the 
rate of extremely poor increased from 36% to 47%.


























Until recently, poverty was higher in the camps than outside, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, 
the collapse of the oPt economy since the beginning of the second Intifada has led to a sharp deterioration in 
the living conditions of the population outside camps. They were less protected from the economic crisis than 
those living inside the camps, who were much more able to rely on safety-net mechanisms implemented by 
international and national institutions. In July 2005, the overall level of poverty in the West Bank was higher 
outside refugee camps than inside - 72% outside refugee camps as compared to 66% inside refugee camps. 
Nevertheless, the depth of poverty has remained less severe outside refugee camps as extreme poverty was still 
higher in the refugee camps, where it measured 36% as compared to 31% outside. In the Gaza Strip, the poverty 
rate was about the same both outside and inside refugee camps, but extreme poverty was higher amongst 
people outside camps, where it reached 49%, as compared to 42% for those inside camps. One striking result 
is that the living conditions of Palestinians outside refugee camps has deteriorated sharply in the past months 
and especially in the Gaza Strip, where the rate of extreme poverty increased dramatically to include half the 
population. 










































The decline in household total income is mainly due to the problem of lack of access to employment and decent 
jobs, a situation which has a very negative impact on income generation.  The results indicate that, in the oPt, job 
loss and working-hour loss were considered to be the main cause of income decline by 69% of the respondents 
from the West Bank and, respectively, 64% and 59% of the respondents from Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. 
Furthermore, the poorest are much more vulnerable to job loss, as 34% of them stated that it was the main cause of 
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income decline compared 
to 22% of the non-poor.
The analysis of household 
income composition 
shows that only 23% of 
the extremely poor have 
access to salaries from 
long-term jobs, crucial 
to secure livelihoods, 
whereas two-thirds of the 
non-poor have access to 
such source of income. 
Financial help from the 
PA or international/
local organisations is 
an important source of 
income for the poorest, 
as more than one-quarter 
of them included it in 
their household income 
composition. This ﬁnancial
help seems well-targeted 
towards the poorest - as 
it is a source of income 
for only 10% of the non-
poor - and the refugee 
camps. Indeed, 26% of 
respondents from the 
West Bank refugee camps 
stressed it as a source of 
their household income as 
compared to 7% outside 
refugee camps, while 
in the Gaza Stripe such 
was the case for 39% 
inside refugee camps as 
compared to 33% outside 
refugee camps. 
When examining poverty 
risk, it is important to stress 
that education seems to 
protect individuals against 
poverty. 71% of those who 
had only completed their 
education to elementary 
school level were poor and 
44% extremely poor - the 
rate of extreme poverty 
reaching 50% for the 
illiterate group. But only 
30% of those who had 
completed their education 
to college level and above 
were poor, and only 13% 
were extremely poor. 
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Fig 3.9:  Household income composition - ﬁnancial help from the PA or international/







Fig 3.10: Household income composition - ﬁnancial help from the PA or international/













Chapter 3: Changes in the socio-economic situation66














���������� ���������������� ����������������� ��������������� ������������ ����������������
�������������� ������������������ ������������������
Family size is also an important variable in explaining poverty, as extremely poor families are composed of an 
average of 4.19 children of less than 18-years-old, while non-poor families average 2.33 children each. From a 
geographical perspective, it is in the Gaza Strip refugee camps that the family size is higher, with an average of 
4.4 children.


















In the previous section, the 
measure of poverty was based on 
income, where the PCBS poverty 
line was used to distinguish 
between the poor and non-poor. 
In the current section, the poverty 
analysis is based on a subjective 
measure of poverty, where the 
objective is to obtain the views of 
the Palestinian people themselves 
about the magnitude of material 
deprivation. To that end, a 
subjective ﬁnancial-satisfaction
poverty line has been elaborated. 
Respondents were asked to 
estimate the average amount of 
money they need to meet the 
basic needs of their household. 
Once the respondents estimated 
what they need to meet these 
household basic needs, they were 
asked how close their household 
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income was to this amount. Giving a voice to the population about their living conditions leads to a better 
understanding of the impact of the ongoing economic and political crisis on household welfare.
79% of respondents were of the opinion, in July 2005, that their household income was slightly less or much less 
than what was needed to meet their basic needs, compared with 61% in November 2004. 
In the West Bank, the situation was more dramatic for those outside the camps, as the number of households 
with an income much less than needed to meet their basic needs was measured at 49% as compared to 42% in 
the refugee camps. In the Gaza Strip, the situation has also deteriorated sharply outside refugee camps, where 
the rate of those responding that their household income was slightly less than what was needed to meet their 
basic needs increased from 14% to 35%, whereas the rate stressing their household income was much less 
than needed remained the same.  Surprisingly, the number of respondents from the Gaza Strip refugee camps 
stressing that their household income was much less than what was needed to meet their basic needs decreased 
from 61% to 29% between November 2004 and July 2005. The situation deteriorated sharply in Jerusalem, where 
the rate of subjective poverty increased from 43% to 75% between November 2004 and July 2005. 
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The Israeli military strategy toward the oPt over the last ﬁve years has deeply compromised Palestinian households’
access to basic needs by restricting income- generating activities. In July 2005, 10% of the population stressed 
that, in the last month, their household food consumption was much less than needed, and 19% reported that 
it was less than needed. 











Food deprivation - deﬁned as a household’s food consumption being much less or less than needed - was
especially high in the Gaza Strip where it aﬀected 34% of those outside camps and 31% inside camps. In the
oPt as a whole, about 12% of the inhabitants from the refugee camps and 10% of those outside refugee camps 
declared that their household’s food consumption was much less than needed. As many as 45% of the poorest 
stated that their household food consumption was much less or less than needed, with 18% of the poorest 
stressing they were suﬀering severe food deprivation.
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3.4 Coping strategies
There is no doubt that Palestinians in the oPt have suﬀered a severe decline in their well-being since the beginning
of the second Intifada. Overall, only 32% of the respondents were of the opinion that they could cope ﬁnancially
for as long as it takes, whereas 45% stressed that they could barely manage or were in serious condition. In the 
refugee camps, the situation seems to have improved, as the percentage of those who reported that they were in 
serious conditions decreased from 19% to 3% in the West Bank refugee camps and from 32% to 13% in the Gaza 
Strip refugee camps between November 2004 and July 2005. Amongst the extremely poor, the humanitarian 
crisis seems less severe, as those who stressed that they were in serious condition decreased from 39% to 21%, 
but the amelioration of the situation is limited, since those who stressed that they can barely manage increased 
from 39% to 47% between November 2004 and July 2005.
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People in the oPt are not entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance mechanisms. Coping strategies play a 
crucial role in managing these hardships and securing livelihoods. The ﬁrst coping strategies used by households
at the beginning of the second Intifada were to reduce their expenditures and to draw on their savings. However, 
some of the main initial coping strategies tend now to be exhausted for growing numbers of the population who 
must rely heavily on other strategies, such are not paying bills or buying on credit, thus reducing even more the 
quantity of food bought, or being forced to buy food of inferior quality. 







































These ﬁve consecutive years of deep socio-economic crisis have exhausted the savings of the poorest and have
pushed them to reduce their expenditure (both in terms of quantity and quality) as far as possible. Indeed, the 
results show a signiﬁcant decrease in the percentage of the poorest who were relying on past savings, a decline
from 72% in July 2003 to 36% in July 2005.














The deterioration of the economic situation in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps is very apparent through an 
analysis of the evolution of two main coping strategies: not paying bills or buying on credit. Indeed, the results 
show that the percentage of respondents who stressed that they were not paying their bills increased from 46% 
to 51% outside Gaza Strip refugee camps while the percentage of those who stressed that they were buying on 
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credit increased from 49% to 63% between November 2004 and July 2005.








































Reducing food consumption is one of the most common coping strategies in a situation of material deprivation. 
Within the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, it is outside refugee camps that the reduction of the quantity of food 
consumed was most severe as, respectively, 49% and 57% of respondents stressed it as compared to 34% and 
51% of those in refugee camps in these locations. Moreover, two-thirds of the extremely poor had to reduce the 
quantity of food consumption of their household to endure the hardship. The results also show that the extremely 
poor had to change their consumption patterns and buy less-preferred food to cope with this hardship, as a 
coping strategy.
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Despite the economic and humanitarian crisis, Palestinian society has, up till now, escaped any major social 
fragmentation and has maintained a social cohesion which may explain households’ coping capacities to 
sustain themselves under such hardship. Solidarity networks amongst family and friends are still functioning 
and widespread, even if some coping strategies have now become exhausted or have begun to show signs of 
exhaustion. In this way, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been able to absorb such levels of poverty and 
unemployment that could have led to the tearing of social ties and the breaking-up of the social fabric.
To evaluate the level of social cohesion, interviewees were asked how they would evaluate their ﬁnancial situation
in comparison to that of others in their community. Overall, two-thirds of respondents stated that they consider 
the ﬁnancial situation of their household to be similar to that of others in their community. This means that the
socio-economic crisis, initiated by the second Intifada, was not associated with any major trend towards income 
diﬀerentiation that could have led to social fragmentation.  However, the situation seems to have deteriorated
outside refugee camps in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where the rate of those feeling that the ﬁnancial
situation of their household has worsened as compared to the rest of their community increased, respectively, 
from 28% to 31% and from 22% to 26% between November 2004 and July 2005.
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Palestinian society has until now displayed great social cohesion, with 71% of the poor and 53% of the extremely 
poor still believing that the ﬁnancial situation of their household to be about the same of the rest of the people in
their community. The results indicate that the percentage of respondents feeling that their household ﬁnancial
situation has worsened compared to others decreased amongst the poorest from 59% to 45%, whereas it 
increased amongst the poor - excluding the poorest group - from 14% to 24% between November 2004 and July 
2005.
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Chapter 4: Changes in the labour market
By Frédéric Lapeyre
4.1 Main trends
• The results show that, in July 2005, only 40% of the labour force was employed full-time, while one-third 
of the labour force was unemployed and about one-quarter were underemployed.
 
• The rate of full-time employment slightly increased between November 2004 and July 2005, but this 
trend did not lead to a decrease in unemployment which, on the contrary, increased sharply from 27% to 
33%.
• The unemployment rate was especially high in refugee camps, where, in July 2005, it reached 44% in the 
West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip as compared to 30% in November 2004.
• Outside refugee camps, unemployment also increased sharply as it reached 34% in the West Bank and 
35% in the Gaza Strip as compared to, respectively, 28% and 26% in November 2004.
• In the oPt, only 33% of main household breadwinners have never been unemployed during the second 
Intifada, whereas 49% were long-term unemployed (i.e., unemployed for more than a year). Moreover, 
the results show that the very long-term unemployed (unemployed for more than two years) represent 
as many as 32% of the respondents.
• Unemployment is especially severe for less-educated and young workers. The results indicate that the 
unemployment rate in the age group of 18-24 years is 55% as compared to about 22% in the age group 
of 25-49 years.
  
• The level of education is also a key variable in explaining workers’ vulnerability in the labour market, as 
only 20% of the poorly educated workers are employed full-time, while 56% are unemployed. In contrast, 
70% of workers with a high level of education are employed full-time and only 15% are unemployed.
• Only 29% of respondents stated that their current job is stable and that the probability they may lose it 
is very unlikely, while 12% stated it was very likely and 34% that it was rather likely.
 
• The poorest are more likely to be unemployed but also more likely to be trapped in bad segments of the 
labour market and to lose their current job.  Only 9% of the poorest declared they had very secure jobs 
compared to 39% of the non-poor, while 20% of the former declared that the risk of losing their job was 
very likely as compared to 4% of the latter.
• Full-time employment is the best way to escape poverty as 71% of the non-poor were employed full-
time, while 57% of the extremely poor were unemployed and 27% worked only few hours a day.
• Although employment is a key factor in escaping poverty, a signiﬁcant proportion of the poor are, in
fact, currently working, and the results indicate a dramatic level of working poor who cannot secure their 
livelihood. Indeed, 37% of those working full-time were poor and 9% were extremely poor in July 2005.
 
• The percentage of respondents stressing it was almost impossible or very diﬃcult to cultivate land in the
Gaza Strip between November 2004 and July 2005 increased from 27% to 41%. 
• Farmers from the Jerusalem region had also to face growing problems in cultivating land, as 60% of the 
respondents stressed, in July 2005, that it was almost impossible or very diﬃcult to cultivate land as
compared to 39% in November 2004.
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4.2 Employment situation
Palestinian workers from the oPt must face a situation of mass unemployment and underemployment resulting 
from the paralysis of the Palestinian economy by Israeli military forces. Since the beginning of the second 
Intifada, Palestinian workers have faced two major problems: ﬁrstly, the crisis of the domestic Palestinian labour
market,,marked by depressed labour demand and falling wages in the private sector, and, secondly, the loss of 
access to work in Israel and the Israeli settlements, marked by the long-term substitution of Palestinian workers 
by foreign workers. 
The results in Figure 4.1 show that, in July 2005, only 40% of the labour force was employed full-time, while 
one-third of the labour force was unemployed and about one-quarter underemployed. The rate of full-time 
employment increased slightly between November 2004 and July 2005, but this trend did not lead to a decrease 
in unemployment which, on the contrary, increased sharply from 27% to 33%. Indeed, it is the rate of those 
working part-time - which, in the main, is involuntarily part-time - and those working a few hours per day which 
decreased. This is a very worrying result taking into account that unemployment is one of the main reasons of 
economic vulnerability and poverty. 




























The unemployment rate was especially high in the refugee camps in July 2005, where it reached 44% in the West 
Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip as compared to 30% in both cases in November 2004. Outside refugee camps, 
unemployment also increased sharply as it reached 34% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip as compared 
to, respectively, 28% and 26% in November 2004, Figure 4.2.
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The employment situation in villages was unique, as it is the only area where full-time employment decreased 
from 37% to 31% between November 2004 and July 2005, while unemployment increased from 31% to 34%. 
Elsewhere, the results indicate that full-time employment increased from 39% to 46% in the cities and from 29% 
to 37% in the refugee camps during this period. However, in both cases, unemployment also increased sharply 
from 23% to 31% in the cities and from 31% to 41% in the refugee camps. (Figure 4.3, below)
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The deterioration of the situation in villages is largely due, on the one hand, to the situation of rural areas in the 
Gaza Strip before the disengagement process and, on the other hand, to the situation of the areas crossed by the 
Separation Wall. Indeed, the percentage of the respondents who stressed it was almost impossible or very diﬃcult
to cultivate land in the Gaza Strip between November 2004 and July 2005 increased from 27% to 41%. Farmers 
from the Jerusalem region had also to face growing problems in cultivating land as 60% of the respondents 
stressed, in July 2005, that it was almost impossible or very diﬃcult, as compared to 39% in November 2004. The
Separation Wall is a major concern for business in the agricultural sector not only because it separate farmers 
from their land but also because it increases the price of materials and transportation - as was stressed by 61% 
of the respondents in the Jerusalem area and 22% of those in the West Bank outside refugee camps – and makes 
business diﬃcult. (Figure 4.4, below)
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Regarding the question of workers’ accessibility to their workplaces, mobility restrictions are still a problem but 
they are much less severe in the oPt than before. Overall, 40% of the respondents declared that it was more or 
less diﬃcult to go to work as compared to 61% in November 2004. The evolution has improved everywhere but
especially in Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, where the percentage of respondents stating that it was not diﬃcult
increased, respectively, from 34% to 64% and from 42% to 69%.  It is in the West Bank that the problem of access 
to the workplace remains the most severe, as only 53% of the respondents declared it was not diﬃcult. (Figure
4.5, next page)
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4.3 Unemployment and job precariousness
In the oPt, only 33% of main household breadwinners 
have never been unemployed during the second 
Intifada, whereas 49% were long-term unemployed 
(i.e., unemployed for more than a year). Moreover, 
the results show that the very long-term unemployed 
(unemployed for more than two years) represent as 
many as 32% of respondents. (Figure 4.6, adjacent)
It is in the West Bank that unemployment hit the main 
breadwinners hardest, as 75% of respondents outside 
refugee camps and 84% of those inside refugee 
camps declared that the main breadwinner of their 
household was unemployed at one time during the 
second Intifada. The results show also that as many 
as 53% of the main breadwinners outside refugee 
camps and 65% of those inside refugee camps were 
unemployed for more than one year. The situation is 
less dramatic in the Gaza Strip and in Jerusalem where, 
respectively, 48% and 57% of the main breadwinners 
have never been unemployed during the whole 
period of the second Intifada. However, there is a 
large segment of the active population in the Gaza 
Strip which is trapped in long-term unemployment, 
as 36% of the main breadwinners outside refugee 
camps were unemployed for more than two years, 
while this rate was 34% inside refugee camps. (Figure 
4.7, below)
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Mass and persistent unemployment amongst family breadwinners has had dramatic consequences on material 
deprivation, because income-generating activities by the main breadwinner had been the main source of income 
for most households. The results indicate that 67% of the extremely poor had experienced unemployment for 
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more than one year and 50% experienced it for more than two years, as compared to only 12% amongst the non-
poor. (Figure 4.8, below)
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Unemployment is especially severe for less-educated and young workers. The results indicate that the 
unemployment rate in the age group of 18-24 years is 55%, as compared to about 22% in the age group of 25-49 
years.  Moreover, when the younger workers have a job, they are less likely to have a full-time job than workers 
in the other age groups: only 25% of them held a full-time job compared to 46% in the age group of 25-34 years 
and 49% in the age group of 35-49 years. The level of full-time employment is also low for workers of 50 years of 
age or more, as only 27% of them are employed full-time, whereas 52% are unemployed. (Figure 4.9, below) The 
level of education is also a key variable in explaining workers’ vulnerability in the labour market, as only 20% of 
the poorly educated workers are employed full-time while 56% are unemployed. In contrast, 70% of workers with 
a high level of education are employed full-time and only 15% are unemployed. (Figure 4.10, below)
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Access to employment is a major policy issue considering the mass unemployment and underemployment in 
the oPt.  But an eﬀective labour market policy should take also into account the great level of job precariousness
in the oPt. The results indicate that a large number of workers are trapped in unstable jobs leading to great 
insecurity in household sources of income. Only 29% of the respondents stated that their current job is stable 
and that the probability of losing it is very unlikely, while 12% stated it was very likely and 34% that it was rather 
likely.  (Figure 4.11, next page)
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It is in the Gaza Strip where there are the larger proportion of secure jobs, as 46% of respondents from the refugee 
camps and 34% of those outside refugee camps reported that the risk of losing their job was very unlikely, as 
compared to only 24% in the West Bank outside refugee camps and 29% inside camps. In Jerusalem, the results 
also reveal a strong feeling of job insecurity amongst workers, as only 27% of them declared that they thought 
that the risk of losing their job was very unlikely.  It is in the West Bank refugee camps that job precariousness is 
the most severe, as 29% of the respondents declared that the risk of losing their job was very high. (Figure 4.12, 
below)
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The poorest are more likely to be unemployed, but also to be trapped in bad segments of the labour market 
and to lose their current job.  Only 9% of the poorest declared to have very secure jobs compared to 39% of the 
non-poor, while 20% of the former declared that the risk of losing their job was very likely, as compared to 4% 
of the latter. Other results show that this widespread feeling of job precariousness amongst the poorest is very 
real, as, in the past six months, 19% of them had, in fact, lost their job. Fighting poverty should then also include 
pro-active employment policies to avoid such a negative process that pushes individuals from a zone of job 
precariousness to a zone of exclusion from the labour market and the associated consequence of having to live 
in poverty.  (Figure 4.13, below & Figure 4.14, next page)
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4.4 Employment structure
The employment structure in the oPt is characterised by the predominance of employees, who are the largest 
group of workers, representing 35% of the total, but also by the large and growing number of self-employed, 
who are now the second-largest group represented in July 2005, totalling 23% of workers, as compared to 12% in 
November 2004. This new structure of employment in the oPt is the result of both the paralysis of the Palestinian 
economy and mass poverty, which has led people to develop various income-generating activities to cope with 
hardship.  (Figure 4.15, below)























One can ﬁnd a higher proportion of employees in the Gaza Strip, both outside refugee camps (41%) and inside
refugee camps (46%), as compared to 30% in the West Bank outside refugee camps and 39% inside refugee camps. 
Gaza Strip refugee camps are also characterised by a large proportion of skilled workers (22% of respondents), 
while the proportion of unskilled workers in the West Bank outside refugee camps is very high (23%) as compared 
to the other place. In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, self-employment is higher outside refugee camps than 
inside them because of more income-generating opportunities. (Figure 4.16, below)
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The severe socio-economic crisis and the related extensive involvement of domestic and international 
organisations deployed to avoid a major humanitarian crisis have all considerably changed the employment 
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structure in the oPt since the beginning of the second Intifada. The private sector has paid a very high price for 
the current situation - infrastructure destruction, internal and external closures, mobility restrictions, etc. - and 
its share in employment has dropped sharply since 2000. However, a positive trend has emerged since February 
2004, as the proportion of workers employed by the private sector increased from 24% to 38%. It is in Jerusalem 
and in the West Bank where the proportion of workers employed by the private sector is the highest.
The other very speciﬁc feature of the oPt employment structure is the astonishingly high share (7%) of local
and international NGOs as well as international agencies in employment..International agencies and, primarily, 
UNRWA, are key job opportunity providers in Gaza Strip refugee camps, where as many as 11% of respondents 
declared they were employed by an international agency. 
Finally, the Palestinian Authority plays a crucial role in employment by securing jobs and income for a large 
group of workers and their families. In the Gaza Strip, 29% of respondents were employed by the PA while the 
ﬁgure was about 20% in the West Bank. Donors are aware of this situation and ﬁnancially support the PA to ﬁght
poverty through securing employment in the public sector and delivering basic services. (Figure 4.17 & Figure 
4.18, below)
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4.5 Poverty risks
The strength of the links between employment situation and other dimensions of economic and social life (family, 
health, income or living conditions) suggests that people in situations of unemployment or not having a decent 
job are at great risk of becoming poor. Indeed, full-time employment is the best way to escape poverty, as 71% 
of the non-poor were employed full-time, while 57% of the extremely poor were unemployed and 27% worked 
only few hours a day. 
Chapter 4: Changes in the Labour Market82
Although employment is a key factor in escaping poverty, a signiﬁcant proportion of the poor are, in fact,
currently working, and the results indicate a dramatic level of working poor who cannot secure their livelihood. 
Indeed, 46% of those working a few hours a day were extremely poor. More surprisingly, in July 2005, 37% of 
those working full-time were poor and 9% were extremely poor. (Figure 4.19, below)
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The risk of poverty is more or less dependent on the type of employer. The results show that the Palestinian 
Authority, international agencies and local and international NGOs guarantee many of their employees a better 
level of income and job security and, as such, protect them from poverty. The poverty rates among workers 
employed by these organisations are much lower than average. On the other hand, employment in the private 
sector and self-employment are associated with high levels of poverty and extreme poverty. For example, 73% 
of the workers in the private sector, 77% of those involved in petty trade in manufacturing and 88% of those in 
agricultural petty trade were poor, compared with 37% of the workers employed by the government, 44% of 
those employed by international agencies and 31% of those employed by international NGOs. 
Employment in the public sector is associated with a lower extreme-poverty risk, as only 7% of Palestinian 
Authority employees were extremely poor as compared to 42% of the workers of the private sector. The results 
show that extreme-poverty risk is highest for the workers involved in agricultural petty trade activities where 62% 
of the respondents belonging to this group were extremely poor. Figure 21 shows the same results from another 
perspective, and displays the very speciﬁc employment structure according to the level of poverty. (Figure 4.20,
below)
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To conclude, it is important to stress that the place (or most recent place) of work has a great impact on poverty 
risk. The exclusion of Palestinian workers from both the Israeli and the settlements’ labour market is a major 
challenge, as it had been an important source of income for Palestinian households. (Figure 4.21, above) The 
results show that the rate of poverty among workers who work or used to work in the settlements (67%) or in 
Israel (79%) is much higher than the overall oPt average. Those workers who lost their job or have had great 
diﬃculty in reaching their workplace as a consequence of mobility restrictions are the big losers of these changes
in the labour market. As there is very little hope of returning to pre-September 2000 employment levels inside 
Israel and the settlements, this exclusion has placed great pressure on the oPt labour market to create new jobs. 
(Figure 4.22, below) 
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1 For the ﬁrst time, several questions have been added in the questionnaire that aimed to evaluate the various types
of health care in terms of several variables, such as waiting time, availability of drugs, distance, health staﬀ attitude,
consultancy time, and hours of work of the health center. The results of those questions can be found and analyzed at the 
following websites: www.unige.ch/iued/palestine or dartmonitor.org. They are, however, too copious and detailed to fall in 
the scope of this chapter. 
2 This question has been discussed in more detail in Part 4 of the report.




Part 5 of the study is focusing on issues related to health. Speciﬁc attention will be given to the need of various
types of health care in the past six months, the providers of these various types of health care, and their prompt 
or delayed delivery. Furthermore, and as has traditionally been the case in previous reports, the issue of health 
coverage and its providers will be tackled.1 
5.2 Health in general
Before going into depth into issues related to health, it is important to brieﬂy evaluate the importance of the
need of health both for the household and for the community.
When the interviewees were asked about the two most important needs of their household,2 the results in ﬁgure
5.1, below, indicate that health (19%) comes second as the ﬁrst most important need after employment (20%).
When the ﬁrst and second most important needs are analyzed together, health (39%) holds the second place
after food (42%).
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When taking into consideration only the unmet needs of the household,3 the importance of health is ranked in 
fourth place (11%), which suggests that the need of health is already quite well catered for as there are more 
important unmet needs such as employment (29%), ﬁnancial assistance (25%), and food (14%), see Fig. 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Taking into consideration the unmet needs only, which of the following, in your opinion, is the most 
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When the question to interviewees concerned the two most important needs of their community, health (13%) 
is ranked in third place as the ﬁrst most important community need. When the ﬁrst and second most important
needs of the community are analyzed together, health (28%) is ranked in third place after employment (62%) and 
education (35%) as illustrated in Fig. 5.3.





















Respondents were also asked to rank the 5 main expense types of the household in order of importance. One 
type of household expense concerns health. The results are summarized in table 5.1, below. It is clear that food 
(80%) is by far the ﬁrst main expense type of the household, while health (4%) comes in a very distant fourth
place. In the second main expense type of the household, health (20%) comes in third place after education (30%) 
and household items (23%). Concerning the third main expense type of the household, health takes the lead as 
a household expense with 25%. In the fourth and ﬁfth main expense types of the household, the importance of
health diminishes again to fourth place with respectively 16% and 10%. 
Table 5.1: Please rank in order of importance the ﬁve main expense types your household income is primarily
devoted to: (o194)
Importance ranking of main expenses (1 to 5) in percent
1st expense 2nd expense 3rd expense 4th expense 5th expense
Food 80% 13% 5% 1% 0.7%
Education 6% 30% 16% 8% 8%
Health 4% 20% 25% 16% 10%
Rent 3% 3% 2% 1% 1%
Household items 5% 23% 22% 18% 8%
Sustaining family 
business
0.4% 0.2% 1% 1% 2%
Transportation 0.3% 4% 15% 26% 25%
Buying house, car, 
or business
1% 0% 0.8% 1% 0.6%
Clothes 0% 7% 13% 26% 34%
Leisure 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 1% 10%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
5.3 The need for various types of health assistance in the past six months
In an attempt to monitor the need for medical care among Palestinians, interviewees were asked from a 
predetermined list what type of medical care they or any of their household members had been in need of in 
the past six months. In general, and as overviewed in ﬁgure 5.4, below, 8% of the respondents were in need of
emergency hospital care, while 6% were in need of ambulatory care for a sick child. In the six months prior to the 
survey conducted for this report, respectively 4% of the respondents needed an ambulance, hospitalization for 
delivery care, and follow-up for chronic diseases (such as diabetes, hypertension, or asthma). Furthermore, 3% 
of the respondents speciﬁed that they themselves or any of the household members had needed vaccinations.
Lastly, respectively 2% of the respondents stated that there had been a need for specialized care for non-acute 
problems and antenatal care, while respectively 1% of the respondents explained that in the six months prior to 
the survey there had been a need in their household for mental health care and family planning.
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In order to be able to get a better idea about the delivery of medical care, those respondents who had speciﬁed
that they themselves or any of their household members had been in need of any of the types of medical care 
in the predetermined list, were asked to specify whether or not they had received the needed medical care 
within an acceptable time or whether they had perhaps not at all received the type of medical care that they 
had been seeking. Logically, diﬀerent types of medical care have diﬀerent acceptable time-frames during which
it is acceptable to receive such types of medical care. The various types of medical care that are included in the 
predetermined list can be organized according to the following time-frames: (1) delivery of care within 1 hour, 
(2) delivery of medical care within two hours, (3) delivery of care within one day, and (4) delivery of care within 
one week.4 
Starting with the delivery of medical care within one hour, of the 4% of respondents who explained that either 
they themselves or their household members had needed an ambulance in the six months prior to the survey, 
80% were delivered with such a service within one hour of requesting it. As illustrated in ﬁgure 5.5, below, 13%
had to wait longer than one hour before the ambulance arrived, while 7% who needed such a service were not 
provided with it at all.
When in need of emergency hospital care and 
hospitalization for delivery care, it is acceptable to 
expect the delivery of such types of medical care within 
two hours after seeking it. Concerning emergency 
hospital care, 75% of the respondents who had been 
in need of such care received it within two hours, 18% 
after two hours, and 6% did not receive such care even 
if they sought it. As for hospitalization for delivery care, 
82% of those in need of it received it within two hours, 
18% after two hours, while all of the respondents who 
sought such care receive it. The results are overviewed 
in ﬁgure 5.6, below.
Figure 5.6: Delivery of emergency hospital care (injury or severe acute illness) and hospital/maternity service for 











�������������������� ������ � ���
���������������������������� ���
����������� ���������������� ����
����������������������� �������������� ������������� ��������
4 It is worth noting that the results on the delivery of various types of medical care will not be disaggregated according to 
diﬀerent variables as the number of respondents concerned is too small to be able to draw any reliable conclusions.
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The delivery of ambulatory care for a sick child and the delivery of mental health care can be expected to be 
received within one day of requesting such care. As portrayed in ﬁgure 5.7, below, 87% of the respondents who
needed ambulatory care for a sick child in the household received such care within one day, 11% received it after 
one day, while 3% did not receive such care for their child, even if they sought to receive such care. All of the 4 
respondents who speciﬁed that or any of their household members needed mental health care in the six months
prior to the survey conducted for this report, received it within one day of seeking it.











Lastly, when seeking specialized care for non-acute problems, follow-up for chronic diseases, vaccination, 
antenatal care, or assistance in family planning, it is normal practice to expect the delivery of such types of medical 
care within one week of seeking it. As detailed in table 5.2, below, the large majority of respondents seeking any 
of those ﬁve types of medical care in the six months prior to the survey have received it within one week.
Table 5.2: Delivery of various types of health care, in general
Sought & received 
within 1 week





N % N % N % N
Specialized care for non-acute problems 25 82% 4 13% 1 5% 30
Follow-up for chronic disease 57 88% 3 5% 5 8% 65
Vaccination 47 84% 4 8% 5 9% 56
Antenatal care 32 93% 1 4% 1 3% 34
Family planning 22 93% 1 5% 1 2% 24%
5.4 The service providers of various types of health assistance
The respondents who had speciﬁed that they had been in need of any of the types of medical care from the
predetermined list in the six months prior to survey were also asked which institution provided them with the 
health service (see Figure 5.8, next page).5
In general, the Ministry of Health is the main provider of most types of health services, with the exception of 
ambulance services and family planning. The Red Crescent’s main contribution to the provision of health services 
is clearly in the ﬁeld of ambulance services (55%). In the areas where UNRWA seems to provide a considerable
amount of the medical services, such as the ambulatory care for a sick child, follow-up for chronic diseases, 
vaccination, and antenatal care, the results reveal a tendency that UNRWA provides these services to a larger 
extent in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, and among refugees. Still, these tendencies have to be considered 
with care as the number of cases on which the analysis of service providers is performed is too small to be 
conclusive.
5 Again, the results on the service providers of health assistance will not be disaggregated according to diﬀerent variables
as the number of respondents concerned is too small to be able to draw any reliable conclusions.
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5.5 Health ﬁnancing6
Traditionally and as health ﬁnancing is an important element that can help facilitate access to health care,
interviewees were asked whether or not they receive any assistance in covering their medical expenses. As 
indicated in ﬁgure 5.9, below, 22% of the respondents cover their medical expenses from their own sources.
When the respondents do receive assistance in covering their medical expenses, the main providers are the 
government health insurance (47%) and UNRWA (10%).7 An additional 14% of the respondents replied that they 
rely on a combination of UNRWA and the PA to cover their medical expenses. Respectively 2% of the respondents 
cover their medical bills through private health insurance and charitable organizations.



























Sources of health coverage vary considerably according to the region and area of residence of the respondents 
and according to their refugee status. The results in ﬁgure 5.10, below, indicate very clearly that a far lower
percentage of respondents of refugee origin (12%) and those residing in the Gaza Strip (3%) and in refugee 
camps (6%) than non-refugees (30%) and those living in the West Bank (37%) and in cities (24%) or villages (28%) 
cover their medical expenses from their own pocket. Not unexpectedly, assistance in covering medical expenses 
by UNRWA or by a combination of UNRWA and the PA is most pronounced in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, 
and among refugees. Lastly, the percentage of respondents covered by Palestinian government health insurance 
is the lowest in refugee camps (29%) and among refugees (30%).
6 It should be noted that in the analysis regarding health coverage, respondents in Jerusalem are excluded. Jerusalemites 
are entitled to Israeli government health coverage and as such their inclusion into the analysis would provide inaccurate 
results about Palestinians covered by Palestinian government health insurance.
7 It is worth noting that UNRWA does not oﬀer its own health insurance scheme, although the Agency (partially) covers
hospitalization costs and also some medication charges.
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When examining the sources of health coverage according to the variable of poverty, a rather unbalanced picture 
appears. As overviewed in ﬁgure 5.11, below, UNRWA and the PA mainly assist respondents with a monthly
household income that falls below the poverty line. However, 61% of the relatively better-oﬀ respondents
receive assistance in covering their medical expenses from charitable organizations compared to only 39% of 
the respondents below the poverty line. Similarly, a mere 32% of the respondents with an income above the 
poverty line are covered by private health insurance, while this is the case for 68% of those with a living standard 
below the poverty line. Lastly, 76% of the respondents with a monthly household income below the poverty line 
compared to 24% of those above the poverty line cover their medical bills from their own pocket.
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Finally, when examining the 
sources of health coverage 
exclusively among respondents 
living in hardship, the Palestinian 
government health insurance is by 
far the main provider, followed by 
UNRWA. One ﬁfth of the respondent
hardship cases cover their medical 
expenses from their own sources. 
The results are detailed in ﬁgure
5.12, adjacent.






























The main ﬁndings concerning health can be summarized as follows:
< Health is considered to be the second most important household need, but is only the fourth most 
important unmet household need, which might suggest that this need is already quite well catered for. 
Health is considered to be the third most important community need.
< In the survey conducted for this report, respondents were asked if they themselves or members of their 
household had been in need of 10 diﬀerent types of medical care in the six months prior to the survey.
The most frequently needed type of medical care during this period was emergency hospital care (8%), 
followed by ambulatory care for a sick child (6%).
< Respondents were asked whether or not the various types of medical care that they needed in the six 
months prior to the survey were delivered within an acceptable time or whether it was not received at all. 
The results indicate that concerning the 10 types of medical care that were under study, invariably over 
80% of the respondents received the required medical care according to acceptable standards. The only 
exception concerns emergency hospital care as only 75% of the respondents stated that they received 
such care within two hours of seeking it.
< Concerning the providers of various types of medical care, the Ministry of Health is the main provider of 
most types of health services, with the exception of ambulance services and family planning.
< Palestinian governmental health insurance and, to a lesser extent, UNRWA remain the main providers 
of assistance through covering Palestinians’ medical expenses. The lowest percentage of Palestinians 
covering their medical bills from their own resources can be found among refugees, in refugee camps 





This part of the study focuses on issues related to children in the oPt, particularly in the context of the impact of 
the second Intifada. First of all, the most important needs of children will be examined, followed by a closer look 
at several aspects of children’s lives, such as education, their psychological well-being and their free time.
6.1 Children and their needs
In order to be able to formulate relevant policies towards children, it is imperative to have accurate information 
about the actual needs of children. To this end, parents in the survey conducted for this report were asked to 
specify from a predetermined list the two most important needs of the children in the household. As such, the 
analysis, below, will study both the results of the two most important needs of children together and will also 
consider the ﬁrst most important need separately.
In general, when the two most important needs of children in the household are examined together, attending 
school regularly (66%) is by far the most frequently cited need, followed by the need for safe opportunities to 
play (43%) and the need for psychological support for children (31%). Interestingly, and in comparison with 
Palestinian Public Perceptions Report VIII,1 the “immediate” need for children to eat better than before the Intifada 
(27%) seems to have gained considerable importance at the expense of a possibly more long-term need for 
children to be able to receive psychological support (31%). Lastly, the need for children to eat more than before 
the Intifada has remained quite stable when compared to the results in Palestinian Public Perceptions Report VIII. 
This rather stable percentage of the need for children to eat more than before the Intifada in combination with 
the sharp increase in the importance attached by parents to the need for their children to eat better than before 
the Intifada might suggest that the concern surrounding the food intake of children is not so much related to the 
lack of food (quantity), but is rather concentrated on the quality of the food intake.
When one looks at the ﬁrst and second most important need of children separately, the results in ﬁgure 6.1,
below, clearly illustrate that the need for children to attend school regularly is by far more frequently mentioned 
as a ﬁrst need (54%) than as a second need (12%). The opposite is true for the need for children to have safe
opportunities to play, to have psychological support available, to get unrestricted access to medical services 
and to eat better than before the Intifada. They are all more frequently mentioned by parents as a second most 
important need than as a ﬁrst most important need.
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When analysing the two most important needs of children together according to the region in which the parents 
of those children reside, it is apparent that the need for children to attend school regularly and the need for 
children to have unrestricted access to medical services are important to a higher percentage of parents in the 
1 Daneels, I., “Women and Children”, in: Rabah, J., Lapeyre, F., al-Husseini, J., Daneels, I., Brunner, M., Bocco, R., Palestinian 
Public Perceptions Report VIII, June 2005, p. 190.
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West Bank (respectively 70% and 27%) than they are to parents in the Gaza Strip (respectively 60% and 19%) and 
Jerusalem (respectively 63% and 22%). The importance of the needs for children to have access to psychological 
support (34%) and to have safe opportunities to play (57%) are more marked in Jerusalem than in the West 
Bank (respectively 30% and 37%) and the Gaza Strip (respectively 32% and 48%). Finally, the results in ﬁgure 6.2,
below, also clearly indicate that the need for children to eat better than before the Intifada is far more pressing in 
the Gaza Strip (34%) than it is in the West Bank (25%) and Jerusalem (10%).
When examining the ﬁrstmost importantneedofchildren separately, the results again indicate that the importance 
of children attending school regularly is highest in the West Bank (60%), while the importance attached to 
children eating better than before the Intifada is the highest in the Gaza Strip (11%). It is in Jerusalem that the 
perceived importance for children to have safe opportunities to play (22%) and to have access to psychological 
support (15%) is most prevalent.



























































Whether one examines the two most important needs of children in the household according to area together, 
or whether one looks at the ﬁrst most important need of children according to this variable separately, similar 
trends appear. As is apparent in ﬁgure 6.3 below, the need for children to have safe opportunities to play and
to be able to receive psychological support are more of a concern to parents in refugee camps than to parents 
in cities and villages. Conversely, the need for children to attend school regularly, to have unrestricted access to 
medical services and to eat more than before the Intifada are less of a concern to households in refugee camps 
than to those in cities and villages.
Interestingly, and although not illustrated in the ﬁgure below, the varying levels of importance attached to
the range of listed needs of children according to area correspond very well with the analysis of this question 
according to refugee status. As was the case for respondents residing in refugee camps, refugee respondents 
generally gave more importance than their non-refugee counterparts to children having safe opportunities to 
play and being able to receive psychological support. On the contrary,, a higher percentage of non-refugees than 
refugees gave high importance to children being able to attend school regularly, to children having unrestricted 
access to medical services and to children eating more than before the Intifada. 
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Finally, a statistically signiﬁcant relationship could also be established between the issue of the two most
important needs of children in the household and the poverty level of the respondents, especially when one 
contrasts the responses of respondents with a monthly household income above the poverty line with those of 
respondents who live in hardship. Moreover, the trends apparent when comparing the opinions of the extremely 
poor and the relatively better-oﬀ on the importance of the needs of children totally match the comparison in
opinions on this issue between respondents with a low level of education and those who possess high levels of 
education.
In any case, in regard to the two most important needs of children according to poverty level, respondents with 
a living standard above the poverty line systematically attach greater importance than those facing hardship to 
children having safe opportunities to play, being able to receive psychological support and having unrestricted 
access to medical services. On the contrary, and as illustrated in ﬁgure 6.4 below, the relatively better-oﬀ
respondents are consistently less concerned than the extremely poor respondents about the need for their 
children to attend school regularly, and the need for their children both to eat better and more than before the 
Intifada.
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It is possible to tentatively conclude from the results on the two most important needs of children in the household 
that the extremely poor, those with low levels of education, non-refugees, non-camp residents and respondents 
residing in the Gaza Strip have a tendency to be more concerned about the immediate and daily needs of their 
children as they are more often unable to provide for those needs, while their counterparts have the luxury to 
be more concerned about more long-term - yet no less necessary -  needs of their children, such as being able 
to receive psychological support.
6.2 Children and education
From the above analysis on the most important needs of children, the importance of education to Palestinians 
in the oPt has become patently clear, as the need for children to attend school consistently scored highest in 
importance across all sub-groups under study. In the current section, several aspects concerning children and 
their education will be discussed. However, before entering the analysis on this topic, it is important to ﬁrst
outline the actual educational attainment of the respondents in the poll that was conducted for this report.
As illustrated in ﬁgure 6.5 below, 10% of respondents said that they are illiterate, 16% stated that they only went
to elementary school and 26% speciﬁed that they only went to preparatory school. Slightly fewer than 30% of
respondents ﬁnished secondary school, while 7% attained some level of college education and 12% went to
college or above. For the purposes of analysis in this study, the various levels of education were categorised into 
three categories: poor education (illiterate and elementary), medium education (preparatory and secondary), 
and high education (some college, and college and above). When the various levels of educational attainment 
are grouped in such a manner, one can see that 26% of the total sample of interviewees are poorly educated, 55% 
are moderately educated and 19% are highly educated.
Although not illustrated in the ﬁgure below, there is a clear, statistically signiﬁcant, relation between the
educational attainment of respondents and their level of poverty. More speciﬁcally, whereas 15% of the
respondents in households with a monthly income above the poverty line only enjoyed low levels of education, 
this is the case for 25% of the respondents with a household income below the poverty line, and 38% of those 
living in hardship. In contrast, whereas a mere 9% of the hardship cases and 13% of those below the poverty line 
are highly educated, this is the case for 34% of the respondents in households with a monthly income above the 
poverty line. These results point out the pivotal role that education can play in improving people’s economic 
circumstances.






























When respondents were asked what, in their opinion, the main impediment to children’s education is, 40% 
replied that it was the present curriculum, 22% speciﬁed that it was the ﬁnancial limitations on the household,
while 19% said that it was the lack of qualiﬁed teachers. An additional 10% of respondents mainly blamed the
lack of access to better facilities as an impediment to children’s education, while 7% saw the quality of education 
as the main impediment.
As seen in ﬁgure 6.6 below, opinions on the main impediment to children’s education vary considerably depending
on the region and area of residence of the respondents and their refugee status. Indeed, systematically, a larger 
percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip, camp residents and respondents of refugee origin consider the 
present curriculum to be the main impediment to children’s education. Conversely, and again consistently, a 
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larger percentage of respondents outside the Gaza Strip, outside refugee camps and non-refugees blame, in the 
main, the ﬁnancial limitations on the household as an impediment to children’s education.2
Figure 6.6: The main impediment to children’s education in general and according to region of residence , area of 
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Opinions on the main impediment to children’s education also vary according to poverty level and educational 
level; a larger percentage of the extremely poor and poorly educated respondents than those who are, ﬁnancially,
relatively better-oﬀ and those with higher levels of education consider either the present curriculum or the
household’s ﬁnancial limitations to be the main impediment to children’s education. In addition, the very poor
and badly educated believe that either the lack of qualiﬁed teachers or the lack of access to better facilities
constitute the main impediment to children’s education. These results are detailed in ﬁgure 6.7, below.
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From the above analysis on the main impediments to children’s education, it became clear that the new 
Palestinian curriculum that has been gradually introduced in the ﬁrst 10 grades of basic schooling is seen by
many as a problem. This reluctance to accept the curriculum is also obvious from the results in ﬁgure 6.8, below,
as, in general, a majority (53%) of respondents are dissatisﬁed with the new Palestinian curriculum, while only
40% are satisﬁed with it and 7% do not know enough about it to be able to state an opinion. Consistent with
the results on the main impediment to children’s education, those least satisﬁed with the new curriculum can be
found in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps and among refugees.
2 It may be argued that refugees and camp residents are less concerned than their counterparts about the ﬁnancial
limitations as an impediment to children’s education because they have the possibility of to access to free educational 
services oﬀered by UNRWA.
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Figure 6.8: Level of satisfaction with the new Palestinian curriculum in general and according to region of residence, 







































As for parents’ overall level of satisfaction with the quality of education 
that their children receive, 64% are satisﬁed with it, while 36% are 
dissatisﬁed with it. More speciﬁcally, the level of satisfaction among 
parents with the quality of the education that their children receive 
is the highest in the West Bank (70%), in villages (71%) and among 
the poorly educated (72%). These results are summarised in ﬁgure 6.9, 
below. 
Figure 6.9: Parents’ level of satisfaction with the quality of the education their children receive in general and 


































Two of the criteria according to which one may want to evaluate the quality of education provided would include 
(a) the ability of schools to prepare children for higher education, and (b) the ability of schools to prepare children 
for entering the labour market.
Starting with the ability of schools to prepare children for higher 
education, the majority of respondents believe that schools in the oPt 
are either able to prepare children suﬃciently for higher education 
(35%) or at least are able to do so to a certain extent 
(38%). As illustrated in ﬁgure 6.10 below, 27% of respondents believe 
that schools do not suﬃciently prepare children for higher education. 
The belief that schools are unable to prepare children for higher 
education is more prevalent among respondents in households with a monthly income above the poverty line 
(33%) than among respondents in households that fall below the poverty line (23%) or those living in hardship 
(26%).
75% of parents with children in 
private schools in the oPt are 
more satisﬁed with the quality of 
education their children receive 
than parents with children in either 
government schools (63%) or 
UNRWA schools (60%).
While 22% of parents with children 
in either private schools or UNRWA 
schools believe that the school does 
not suﬃciently prepare children for 
higher education, this is the belieﬀ 
among 31% of the parents with 
children in government schools.
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����� ��� �����������������Concerning the ability of schools in the 
oPt to prepare children for entry into 
the labour market, the picture appears 
more negative. As seen in ﬁgure 6.11, a 
mere 22% of the respondents believe 
that schools prepare children suﬃciently 
for entry into the labour market, while 
36% feel schools are only able to do so 
to a certain extent. The remaining 42% 
of respondents believe that schools 
do not suﬃciently prepare children for 
entry into the labour market. While not 
detailed in the ﬁgure below, the results 
indicated that the conviction that 
schools are unable to prepare children 
suﬃciently for labour-market entry is 
highest in the Gaza Strip (52%), in cities 
(45%) and among refugees (44%). 
6.3 Children and their psychological well-being
In the section on the needs of children in the oPt, the analysis showed that a rather large percentage of 
respondents indicated that their children were in need of psychological support. In order to be able to create a 
more concrete picture of the reasons behind the importance attached by respondents to the need for children 
to be able to receive psychological support, respondent parents were asked to specify from a list of stress signs 
whether or not their children had displayed such signs since the beginning of the Intifada. As can be seen in 
ﬁgure 6.12, below, 62% of parents detected anxiety among their children, 48% reported bad school results and 
38% noticed aggressive behaviour, while 28% said that their children no longer had an interest in cultural, social 
or sports activities. Furthermore, 27% of parents reported that their children had suﬀered from nightmares since 
the beginning of the Intifada, 21% related that their children wet their beds and 17% said that their children have 
no interest in socialising.
It is worth noting that when results 
on the main signs of stress in children 
were cross-tabulated according to the 
various independent variables at hand, 
no consistent trends across all the signs 
of stress could be detected in any of 
the sub-groups under examination. 
Still, it is perhaps worth mentioning 
that signs of stress among children 
since the beginning of the Intifada, 
such as anxiety, bad school results, 
While 42% of parents with children 
in government schools and 41% of 
parents with children in UNRWA 
schools in the oPt believe that 
the school their children attend 
does not suﬃciently prepare their 
children to enter the labor market, 
this is the case for 37% of parents 
with children in private schools in 
the oPt.
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bedwetting and nightmares are consistently more prevalent among children who are members of extremely 
poor households. 
Perhaps surprisingly, given the many manifestations of psychological distress among Palestinian children, a 
majority of 73% of parents still feel that they are fully able to meet the children’s needs for care and protection. 
Still, this needs to be be qualiﬁed, as deeper analysis shows that parents in the Gaza Strip (68%) and parents in
extremely poor households (64%) are less able to fully meet their children’s needs. The results in ﬁgure 6.13,
below, further show that a considerably higher percentage of parents who enjoy high levels of education (79%) 
are able to fully meet their children’s needs for care and protection than parents with medium (71%) or low levels 
of education (73%).
Figure 6.13: Ability of parents to fully meet the children’s needs for care and protection, in general and according to 

































The main challenge to children’s psychological well-being and the ability of parents to meet their children’s needs 
seems to be related to the often violent atmosphere in which Palestinian children in the oPt grow up. When 
parents were asked whether they believe that there is violence against their children, the large majority of 84% 
replied that they do believe this is the case. As detailed in ﬁgure 6.14 below, the smallest percentage of parents
feeling that there is violence against children can be found in the Gaza Strip (80%), among hardship cases (81%), 
and among the poorly educated (78%). 



































Given the high percentage of respondents feeling that there is violence against children in the oPt, it is very 
valuable to try and gauge the main source of violence against children in the year before the survey for this 
report was conducted. As is apparent in ﬁgure 6.15 below, a majority of 62% of the respondents consider the
Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict to be the main source of violence against the children, while, respectively, 11% of
parents pointed the ﬁnger at the lack of internal security and 11% at children’s friends and peers. About 10%
Chapter 6: Children102
of the respondents locate the source of violence within the household, with 6% blaming the parents and 4% 
referring to other relatives. The remaining 6% of the sample believe teachers are the main source of violence 
against children.
When the data on the sources of violence against children are analysed according to the region of residence of 
the respondents and their poverty level, one notices that the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict is least speciﬁed as the
main source of violence by Jerusalemites (52%) and respondents that are relatively better-oﬀ (55%). Respondents
in the Gaza Strip most frequently blame both the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict (65%) and the lack of internal security
(13%) as the main sources of violence against children, while they least often blame teachers (4%) and friends or 
peers (8%).
Figure 6.15: The main source of violence against children in the past year, in general and according to region of 
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Taking into consideration the large number of children who need psychological support in the oPt and the high 
level of perceived violence against children, it is important to ﬁnd out which sources Palestinians rely upon to
gather information about the health and psychological conditions pertaining to the well-being of children. 
Indeed, an answer to this question might help those who have valuable information on these subjects to channel 
this information through the most eﬀective available channels.
Respondents were asked to specify the two most important sources that they rely upon to obtain information 
about the health and well-being of children. The detailed results are illustrated in ﬁgure 6.16 below. In general, it is
clear that the ﬁve most relied upon channels of information on the subject in order of importance are: (1) local TV
stations, (2) friends and relatives, (3) satellite TV channels, (4) local radio stations, and (5) local daily newspapers. 
Not many of the respondents seem to rely for information about the health and psychological conditions of their 
children on posters or pamphlets, health clinics or even on social or health workers.
Figure 6.16: The two most important sources of information about the health and psychological conditions pertaining 
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When looking at the ﬁrst most important source used to get information about the health and psychological
well-being of children in more detail, local TV stations and friends or relatives are least relied upon in Jerusalem, 
among the relatively better-oﬀ and respondents with high levels of education. Conversely, respondents in
Palestinian Public Perceptions Report IX 103
Jerusalem, the relatively better-oﬀ and the highly educated rely most frequently on local daily newspapers and
on information received from social or health workers. Lastly, the lowest percentage of respondents who get 
information about the health and psychological well-being of their children from satellite channels can be found 
in the Gaza Strip, among the extremely poor and the poorly educated.
Figure 6.17: The ﬁrst most important source of information about the health and psychological conditions pertaining
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6.4 Adolescents and their free time
This last section deals with the issue of how adolescents between the ages of 14 to 19 years old spend their free 
time. As laid out in ﬁgure 6.18 below, 73% of the adolescents hang out with friends during their free time, 57%
play in the neighbourhood, 33% pursue their hobbies and interests, 25% participate in sports activities, 21% 
attend remedial classes, 15% go to clubs, 11% attend political or cultural meetings, 10% work, while 10% walk 
around in the streets.
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When cross-tabulating the eight activities of adolescents between the ages of 14 to 19 under study with the 
independent variables at hand, some trends appear, but they are not consistent over all the activities. Still, the 
results show, for example, that a larger percentage of adolescents in extremely poor households than those in 
other Palestinian households hang out with friends in their free time, walk around the streets or attend remedial 
classes. Conversely, fewer of the extremely poor adolescents than their peers in households that are relatively 
better oﬀ go to clubs or participate in sports activities. Similarly, when analysing the results according to
educational level, the lowest percentage of adolescents going to clubs, participating in sports activities, hanging 
out with friends, pursuing activities related to their hobbies or attending political and cultural seminars can be 
found in the households of respondents with low levels of education. These more in-depth results can be viewed 
on either of two websites: http://www.iued.unige.ch/palestine/ or http://www.dartmonitor.org.
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6.5 Conclusion
When examining speciﬁc issues related to children, a number of interesting ﬁndings are worth remembering and
are summarised bullets below:
< The need of children to attend school regularly is by far the top priority for the majority of the 
respondents, followed by the need for safe opportunities to play and the need of children to have 
the opportunity of receiving psychological support. Nevertheless, concerning this last need and in 
comparison with Palestinian Public Perceptions report VIII, the importance of the more immediate 
need for children to eat better than before the Intifada seems to have increased at the expense of the 
more long-term - but no less required - need for children to be able to receive psychological support.
< The new Palestinian curriculum is seen as the main impediment to children’s education, followed by 
the ﬁnancial limitations of the household. Deeper analysis across various sub-groups of Palestinian
society revealed that the perception that the present curriculum is the main impediment to children’s 
education is most explicit among respondents in the Gaza Strip, camp residents, refugees, the extremely 
poor and the badly educated.
< While a majority of Palestinians are dissatisﬁed with the new Palestinian curriculum, this dissatisfaction
is most explicit in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps and among refugees.
< A majority of 64% of Palestinians are satisﬁed with the quality of education in the oPt. The level of
satisfaction is highest in the West Bank, in villages and among the poorly educated.
< Only 35% of the respondents believe that schools in the oPt prepare children suﬃciently for higher
education, and a mere 22% are of the opinion that schools prepare children suﬃciently for entering
the labour market.
< Children in the oPt have continued to show signs of stress since the beginning of the Intifada. Of a 
pre-determined list, 62% of respondents detected anxiety among their children, 48% specifying bad 
school results, 38% aggressive behaviour, 28% a lack of interest in cultural or social or sports activities, 
27% nightmares, 21% bedwetting and 17% a lack of interest in socialising.
< A majority of 73% of parents believe that they are fully able to meet their children’s needs for care and 
protection. This is less the case for parents in the Gaza Strip, those in households living in hardship and 
those with low levels of education.
< A majority of 84% of respondents believe that there is violence against children in the oPt. This 
perception is least prevalent in the Gaza Strip, among hardship cases and the poorly educated. As for 
the main source of violence against children in the past year, a majority of 62% of respondents blame 
the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict, while 11% point the ﬁnger at the lack of internal security in the oPt.
< The ﬁve most important sources that Palestinians rely on to obtain information about the health and
well-being of the children are, in order of importance: (1) local TV stations, (2) friends and relatives, (3) 
satellite channels, (4) local radio stations, and (5) local daily newspapers. Not many of the respondents 
seem to rely for information about the health and psychological conditions of their children on posters 
or pamphlets, or health clinics or even on social or health workers.
< The results of the poll conducted for this report indicate that adolescents (14-19 yrs) in the oPt spend 
their free time as follows, in order of importance: 73% of the adolescents hang out with friends during 
their free time, 57% play in the neighbourhood, 34% follow up with their hobbies and interests, 25% 
participate in sports activities, 21% attend remedial classes, 16% go to clubs, 11% attend political or 
cultural meetings, 10% work, while 10% walk around in the streets.
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Chapter 7: NEEDS AND PRIORITIES
Matthias Brunner – Nadia Boulifa – Céline Calvé
Introduction
This chapter is an overview of the needs of the Palestinian people at both the household and the community 
level. It will also focus on population needs in regard to infrastructure and the facilities available to Palestinians. 
Main ﬁndings:
1. Evaluation of the Palestinian household needs
4 53% of Palestinians households were in need of a lot of assistance in July 2005, an increase of 7% since 
Nov. 2004. 
4 57% of refugees are in need of a lot of assistance, while 48% of non-refugees reported such a need. 
4 76% of Palestinians living in hardship are in need of a lot of assistance.
4 55% of respondents from the West Bank and from the Gaza Strip are in need of a lot assistance.
4 The neediest areas are refugee camps (61% of camp dwellers are in need of a lot of assistance), while 
half of the population of cities and villages are also in need of a lot of assistance. 
4 In comparison with the previous survey, the need for a lot of assistance has grown, particularly 
outside refugee camps for both the West Bank (an increase of 9%) and the Gaza Strip (an increase of 
5%), while the need remains fairly stable in the refugee camps.
2. The most important household need
4 Food remains, in July 2005, the major need of Palestinian households, followed by the need for health 
care, education and employment.
4 Interestingly, the needs for housing and re-housing has emerged as a signiﬁcant need for households
in the past six months. 
4 The most important need for West Bankers is health care, while, for Gaza Strip inhabitants, it is 
employment.  
4 In terms of the respondents’ status, refugees consider housing (21%), ahead of employment (20%), health 
care and food (both 17%); as the major need for households. Non-refugees consider food and health care 
(both 21%) as their top priority. 
4 Employment remains, in July 2005, the most important unmet needs of households. It leads as the most 
important unmet need for Gaza Strip respondents, while West Bankers consider ﬁnancial assistance as
their most important unmet need. 
3. Most important community need
4 A signiﬁcantly high percentage of Palestinians interviewed (44%) think that the most needed assistance
is in the ﬁeld of employment. The need for housing has sharply increased (by 12%), as well as the need 
for education in the community, followed by health care needs, cited by 13% of respondents. 
4. Most important infrastructures needed
4 Water supply networks are considered as the most important infrastructural facility needed, cited by 
52% of respondents. 
4  The majority of respondents consider that the ﬁxed phone line is the most important communication 
facility. 
5. Availability of services
4 In general, the majority of the Palestinian population is connected to an electricity network (97%) and to a 
water network (91%). 57% of households beneﬁt from a connection to a sewage disposal network, while
64% are connected to a solid-waste disposal facility. When examining the availability of communication 
services, more than half of the population is connected to a ﬁxed phone network (58%), while 75% are
connected to a mobile phone network. 95% have a TV set and 75% have access to satellite TV.
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7.1 The need for assistance 
Before examining in detail the most important needs of the households, interviewees were asked to evaluate 
whether or not their household was in need of more assistance.


















As clearly indicated in the ﬁgure above, 53% of Palestinians households were in need of much more assistance
in July 2005. This percentage has increased by 7% in the past six months. Obviously, this evolution is not due to 
the decrease in the level of assistance delivered, as the majority of Palestinians (51%) state that the assistance 
did not change much in the past six months.1 Also, only 1% of people interviewed answered that they have 
received enough assistance, while 17% said they do not need assistance at all. If we consider that the overall level 
of assistance in 2004-2005 was quite signiﬁcant in the oPt, the fact that households’ needs are not completely
fulﬁlled is of great concern.
More concretely, through an analysis of the main explanatory variable, it is possible to draw a proﬁle of the
neediest Palestinian households. When examining refugee status, we ﬁnd a high level of refugee respondents
who are in need of assistance: 57% of them are in need of a lot of assistance, while 48% of the non-refugees 
reported such a need. 












































1 The question regarding the changes in assistance to the household budget was: “During the past 6 months did the 
importance of assistance increase or decrease in your household budget?” 51% stated that the assistance did not change 
much, 28% that six months ago assistance was less important and 21% that it had increased. 
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As observed in the ﬁgure above, Palestinians living in hardship comprise the neediest households, with 76%
claiming to be in need of a lot of assistance in July 2005, while 35% of households above the poverty line do 
not need assistance. Since November 2004, the need for a lot of assistance has decreased amongst the hardship 
cases by 12%, but it increased for those living below the poverty line (10%) as well as for those above the poverty 
line (5%). Lastly the results also indicate that 31% of households above the poverty line are in need of a little 
assistance, which seems logical if we consider that the majority of Palestinian households have been aﬀected by
the second Intifada. 












































From a geographical perspective, if we consider the region of residence of the respondents, the results are similar 
for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 55% of respondents need a lot of assistance both in West Bank and Gaza 
Strip,2 and 24% answered that they needed a little assistance. Also, it is noticeable in the ﬁgure above that 35% of
Palestinians in Jerusalem need a little assistance. These trends clearly indicate a worsening of the humanitarian 
situation in the oPt, on the eve of the ﬁfth year of the second Intifada and despite the massive mobilisation of the
international community in the humanitarian ﬁeld.
Those results are not surprising with regard to the overall poverty situation in the oPt. They conﬁrm the growing
dependency of the Palestinian population on assistance. Since the outbreak of the second Intifada, there is no 
doubt that the Palestinians households have suﬀered a deep decline in their well-being. Obviously, on the eve of
the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, all the results of the current poll show a worsening in living conditions 
in the oPt. This deterioration explains, to a large extent, the high percentage of respondents who are in need of 
assistance. In comparison with the previous poll, the need for a lot of assistance has increased in the West Bank 
by 8%. Also, the percentage for the Gaza Strip remains fairly stable, with a slight increase of 3% since November 
2004. 
To conclude the mapping of the population in need, the independent variables - area of residence and place of 
residence - provide more accurate details about the geographical distribution of the neediest Palestinians within 
the oPt. 
Through an examination of the results according to area of residence, it becomes apparent that, as in November 
2004, the neediest areas are the refugees camps, where 61% of the camp dwellers are in need of a lot of 
assistance. When monitoring the results obtained for the cities and the villages, the structure of the needs has 
clearly changed since November 2004: half the population of cities and villages is in need of a lot of assistance. 
These results show an increase by 6% in the cities and 10% in the villages in the number of Palestinians who need 
a lot of assistance. In parallel, the percentage of respondents who declared that they received enough assistance 
has decreased for each area in the past six months. 
2 The exact rates are 55.3% for the West Bank and 54.70% for the Gaza Strip.   
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In addition, the results by place of residence indicate that the neediest Palestinians are more concentrated in 
the West Bank and speciﬁcally in the refugee camps: 64% of refugee camps inhabitants are in need of a lot of
assistance, while only 5% consider that they don’t need any assistance. As the Gaza Strip has faced a worsening 
humanitarian crisis since the beginning of the second Intifada, 63% and 18% of refugee camps inhabitants are 
respectively in need of a lot of assistance and a little assistance. Lastly, the breakdown by place of residence 
conﬁrms the results mentioned previously: the need for a lot of assistance has increased outside refugee camps
in both the West Bank (9%) and the Gaza Strip (5%), while the need remains fairly similar in the refugee camps. 
(Figure 7.5, above)
7.2 Households needs 
Respondents were asked to state the two most important needs for their household. Through their answers, we 
can ﬁrst examine the two most important needs together, and then analyse in detail what is the most important
need for Palestinian households. 
In looking at the ﬁrst and second most important need, we can come to a balanced view of what is considered by 
Palestinians as the most important need for their households. (Figure 7.6, next page)
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In the previous polls conducted in November 2004, food followed by employment was clearly the most frequently 
cited household need. When considering the two most important needs together, food remains, in July 2005, the 
major need of the population, but to a lesser extent than in our previous survey (42% of the respondents cited 
food in July 2005 versus 61% in November 2004). The need for food is followed by health care (39%), education 
(38%) and employment (33%). 
Interestingly, when analysing the ﬁrst and the second most important need together, housing and re-housing 
assistance has emerged as a signiﬁcant need for households.





















When examining Figure 7.7 above, the structure of household needs has clearly changed in the past six months. 
The distribution of household priorities for assistance was more balanced in July 2005 in comparison with our 
previous survey. The need for food was measured at 19% in July 2005, and 10% of the population stressed that, 
in the past six months, their household’s food consumption was much less than needed. Also, the need for 
employment is still one of the main concerns for 19% of the Palestinian population, as half of the household 
breadwinners were long-term unemployed (unemployed for more than a year) in July 2005. 
However the context of the the poll carried out in July 2005 explains, to a certain extent, the considerable 
increase in the need for housing from 3% of respondents in November 2004 to 17% in July 2005. Damage to 
and destruction of property and infrastructure resulting from Israeli military operations have been a primary 
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humanitarian concern. Since 2000, over 24,000 Palestinians living in Gaza have been made homeless by Israeli
house demolitions.3 In the ﬁrst 9 months of 2004, Rafah in southern Gaza, was badly aﬀected (demolitions were
running at an average of 77 per month).4 But the Israeli army has recently ended this strategy and no house 
demolitions were recorded during the ﬁrst six months of 2005.
In the meantime, over 12,000 houses have been either demolished or damaged in the West Bank since 2000.5 
Destruction is particularly visible in the West Bank, where since 2002, hectares of land have been cleared for the 
Separation Wall construction in the East Jerusalem.6 The proposed extension of the Wall from East Jerusalem to 
form a circle around the settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim would have similar eﬀects. 2004 saw a near tripling of the
number of Palestinian buildings demolished in East Jerusalem; at least 152 buildings (most of them residential) 
were demolished, a sharp increase over previous years (66 in 2003, 36 in 2002, 32 in 2001 and 9 in 2000).7 These 
demolitions might explain, to a certain extent, the increase in the need for housing. 
On the other hand, as mentioned in the chapter on refugees, this attitude toward housing may be directly or 
indirectly due to the improvements in access to services that have resulted from the easing in the Israeli closure 
policy imposed by Israeli authorities in the oPt8. 
This analysis is illustrated in the following ﬁgure, where 29% of Jerusalemites cite housing and re-housing as their
ﬁrst most important need in the households.




























Needs vary according to region of residence. For West Bank respondents, the most important need is health 
care (23%), whereas it is employment for the inhabitants of Gaza respondents. The need for employment is not 
surprising in the Gaza Strip,considering the high level of unemployment in this region (38% of the respondents), 
a situation that may be explained by the collapse of the Palestinian economy as a consequence of the Israeli 
military strategy. 
   
3 Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) 2005, occupied Palestinian territories, page 14. 
4 UNRWA, Emergency Appeal 2005, Special Report, pages 3-4. 
5 Idem. 
6 OCHA, West Bank Barrier reports, http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt/
7 According to the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, 52 buildings (including a seven-storey building and eight petrol stations) 
have been demolished in East Jerusalem in the ﬁrst six months of 2005. EU Report on East Jerusalem, Jerusalem and Ramallah Heads of 
EU Mission, November 2005. Israeli Committee against House Demolitions (www.icadh.org).  
8 See the chapter in this report on refugees.
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When we analyse the results according the area of residence, most city inhabitants consider that the most needed 
assistance for their households is in housing and re-housing (22%) ahead of food (20%) and employment (18%). 
In the meanwhile, the most needed assistance for Palestinian from refugee camps is food (20%) and employment 
(19%). Again, this makes sense as the unemployment rate is higher in the camps (see chapter 2 of this report). 
(Figure 7.9, above)
Lastly, the village-dwellers consider health care as their most important need (27%), understandable considering 
that they are likely to face diﬃculties gaining access to health services. The health sector has responded to closure
and fragmentation by increasing the number of small clinics and mobile clinics. This has resulted in a decline in 
the quality of service because clinics can provide only primary health care and are not able to handle emergency 
cases.9





















For refugees, housing (21%), ahead of employment (20%), health care and food (both 17%), is considered as the 
major need for household, while non-refugees consider food and health care (both 21%) as their top priorities.
When examining the ﬁrst most important need according to the level of poverty, for the hardship cases as well
as for those living below the poverty line, the most needed assistance remains employment and food, while for 
those living above the poverty line, the most needed assistance is health care (for 25% of the respondents) and 
then housing (for 21%). (Figure 7.10, above)
9 Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) 2005, occupied Palestinian territories, page 11.   
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These household priorities seem logical. People living above the poverty line need much less food assistance 
than hardship cases. As such, their needs are much more oriented towards health care or housing. 




























Lastly, when considering the ﬁrst most important need separately, the importance placed on health care and
education (22%), as well on housing (20%) is highest among respondents with a high level of education. On 
the other hand, the importance assigned to households’ needs for food (24%) and employment (20%) reach 
substantial rates for the least-educated respondents. 
7.3 Household unmet needs
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In line with the previous report, employment remains, in July 2005, the most important unmet need of  households 
for 29% of respondents, a decrease of 3% in comparison with the results of the poll in November 2004.10 Financial 
assistance is considered by 25% of respondents as their highest unmet need, while the importance of housing 
and health care needs has increased since November 2004. 
























































While employment (34%) was the most important unmet need for Gaza strip respondents, ﬁnancial assistance
(29%) came ﬁrst for West Bank respondents. (Figure 7.14, above) Also, Employment was the most unmet concern
to hardship cases (36%), and for refugee households (29%) than for non-refugees (28%).  (Figure 7.15, above)
7.4 Community needs 
The analysis of the most important needs for the community will use two perspectives: the ﬁrst one will examine
the results obtained by adding the two most important needs of the community and then we will focus on the 
results for the ﬁrst most unmet need. 
10 Regarding the decrease in the level of employment assistance received from November 2004 to July 2005, we could have expected a 
corresponding increase in the need for employment. Employment remains the most important unmet need but to a lesser extent due to the 
signiﬁcant increase in other needs such as education and housing.. 
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When looking at the two most important community needs together, the importance of employment is critical 
and remained the most important in the past six months.
Furthermore, the need for education has dramatically increased from, 10% to 35%, in the past six months, while 
the need for food and ﬁnancial assistance have decreased, by 21% and 9%  respectively, since November 2004.






















When looking at the ﬁrst most important community need, we can observe (as in the analyses of household needs) 
that the need for housing has sharply increased by 12% since November 2004, along with the need for education 
in the community, followed in third position by the need for health care cited by 13% of the respondents, an 
increase of 6% in the past six months. 
Also noteworthy is the decrease in the importance of employment, food and ﬁnancial assistance as community
needs in the past six months. These results follow the general trend seen in the perception of assistance needs 
for both household and community. 
When considering the foremost needs separately, a signiﬁcantnumberofinterviewees(44%)mentionemployment
as their most important need where assistance is required. Six months ago, employment was already the central 
priority for 59% of respondents. (Figure 7.18, below)
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If we consider the most important assistance need of the community according to area of residence, the result 
cited above is conﬁrmed: employment is the most important need for communities in cities (39%), refugee camps
(48%) and villages (49%). Nevertheless, it is still much higher in the camps and villages. The need for housing and 
re-housing seems to be quite important for communities, especially in the cities (17%), while in the villages only 
6% of the people mentioned this need. (Figure 7.20, below)
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While only 20% of people in Jerusalem mentioned employment as the most important assistance need for their 
community, it was most important in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip (46% in both regions). If we consider 
that since the beginning of the Intifada, more Palestinian have lost their job or source of income in these two 
regions compared to Jerusalem, this result make sense. On the contrary, people living in Jerusalem are more 
concerned with housing needs (30%) than employment. 




























Employment is the most important need for assistance for the hardship cases (49%) and people living below the 
poverty line (46%). For those living above the poverty line, employment is still the ﬁrst priority, but they also give
importance to the housing needs. It is clear that the higher living conditions are, the less people see employment 
as the top priority.
7.5          Most important infrastructure needed 















As was the case in the previous survey, water supply is considered as the most important infrastructural facility 
need for 52% of the population, an increase of 8% since November 2004. When looking at the results of the 
previous poll, the importance of solid waste disposal services has decreased by 9%. 
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When examining the breakdown by region of residence, it is apparent that a higher percentage of respondents 
from Jerusalem considered the most important infrastructural improvement needed was the water network. The 
need for sewage disposal network facilities is considered by 33% of West Bankers as their most important need. 
When considering the more speciﬁc needs in the community for communication facilities, interviewees were
asked to state the most important facility needed for the community from a predetermined list of facilities (ﬁxed
phone line, mobile phone network and permanent connection to the Internet). 
According to the statement of the World Summit on the Information Society, “information technology and 
telecommunications play a signiﬁcant role in the development of society and the increase in the level of
education, knowledge and economy. They also improve the global standard of living and contribute to inter-
society integration.”11 
Obviously, in the context of the second Intifada and the protracted conﬂict with Israel, communication facilities
play a key role for the Palestinian population. Within the oPt, divided into isolated cantons by the erection 
of military checkpoints and the ongoing construction of the Separation Wall since 2003, the availability of 
communication services is clearly of crucial signiﬁcance.
The ﬁgure below indicates the most important communication facilities perceived to be needed in the community
in July 2005, in comparison with the answers provided six months earlier. 















Even if a new and modern infrastructure for the telecommunications and information technology sector has 
been provided in the past two years,12 the trend outlined in our previous survey is conﬁrmed by the current
poll: 62% of respondents considered that the ﬁxed phone line is the most needed communication facility, 17%
were of the view that it was a permanent connection to the Internet (3% less than in the previous poll). 17% of 
Palestinians interviewed considered the mobile phone network (+4%) to be the most important communication 
11 World Summit on the Information Society,, Contribution from Palestine, December 2003 (http://www.itu.int/wsis), p.4. 
12 Idem, p.5.  
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facility needed.13 Lastly, only 4% saw satellite as the most important communication facility needed. 




















From a geographical perspective, the ﬁgure above shows that the perception of the ﬁxed phone line as the most 
important communication facilities was held by 69% of residents of the Gaza Strip. This percentage has increased 
by 10% over the past six months. In our last survey, a high percentage of the people of Jerusalem considered that 
the ﬁxed telephone was their main priority, this percentage has decreased by 23% in the current survey.
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As clearly indicated in the ﬁgure above, 65% of refugee camp inhabitants, followed by 63% of city dwellers were
of the opinion that a ﬁxed phone line network is the most important communication facility for their community.
A permanent connection to the Internet is considered by 25% of village inhabitants as the most important 
communication facility needed. 
The Israeli occupation imposes obstacles to the development of Palestinian communication facilities by 
preventing the importation of equipment needed to develop communications networks, as well as preventing 
the connection of the oPt to international networks.14
7.6 Availability of services. 
One of the most problematic concerns encountered in the oPt is the poor state of basic physical infrastructures, 
resulting from decades of minimal investment as well as recurring destruction by the Israeli army. As a consequence, 
physical infrastructure in the Palestinian territory is underdeveloped. 
In general, as observed below, the majority of the Palestinian population is connected to an electricity network 
(97%) and to a water network (91%). 57% of households beneﬁt from a connection to a sewage disposal network,
while 64% are connected to a solid waste disposal facility. When examining the availability of communication 
services, more than half the population is connected to a ﬁxed phone network (58%), while 75% are connected
to a mobile phone network. 95% have a TV set and 75% have a satellite TV. 
13 JAWAL is the ﬁrst Palestinian mobile phone company. The number of its subscribers rose from 80,000 to 120,000 in 2001
and has reached 265,000 (most of them use pre-paid cards). Since the outbreak of the Intifada, JAWAL has been unable 
to expand and develop its network as it had planned, due to Israeli measures. The Israeli government, which controls 
all Palestinian borders, has hindered JAWAL from operating at maximum eﬃciency, by banning entirely, or delaying for
months, imports of technical equipment and other essential items. These measures came as a strong reaction by the Israeli 
government after JAWAL broke the Israeli monopoly of the Palestinian telecom markets and its capture of some 60% of the 
local market. (PALTEL, Palestinian Telecommunications Company, http://www.padico.com/palnet.htm). 
14 World Summit on the Information Society, op. cit. p.10. 
Chapter 7: Needs and Priorities120























91% of respondents are connected to a water network. Even if this percentage is substantial, it does not provide 
information about the quantity, the quality (drinking water or not) of the water and especially about the conditions 
in which water is consumed (e.g. restrictions on consumption, etc.). 
Indeed, as reported by UNCTAD,15 the oPt faces serious water-supply problems (shortages and deterioration in 
quality because of the  depletion of the aquifers and the subsequent seepage of sea water). 













The rate of connection is much lower  in villages than in other areas: 74% of the village dwellers are connected 
to a water network compared to 97% in cities and 99% in refugee camps. The connection to water networks is 
somewhat less substantial in the West Bank, especially in the north, where 79% of households are connected, 
and outside the refugee camps, where 85% of households are connected. 
In general, 37% of interviewees are connected to a well; a large percentage of households in the West Bank make 
use of a well (54%), as do 64% of camp-dwellers (64%) and 49% of non-refugees.
115 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), Division of Services Infrastructures for Development 
and Trade Eﬃciency (SITE). http://www.unctad.org. 
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In general, 97% of people interviewed aﬃrmed that they are connected to an electricity network. If we look
at these results according to area of residence, they are more or less the same. Again, cities (99%) and camps 
(99%) are privileged compared to villages (94%). The same percentage of households in Jerusalem (99%) and the 
Gaza Strip (99%) are connected to an electricity network, while the percentage reaches 96% in the West Bank. 
According to UNCTAD, “lacking generative capacity of its own, the Palestinian Authority (PA) relies on Israel for 
obtaining electricity. As a consequence, 140 villages use small diesel generators.”16 
Sewage disposal is a major issue in the oPt. Only 57% of people interviewed said they were connected to a 
sewage disposal network a number that has decreased by 8% in the past six months. A higher percentage of 
refugees (69%) are connected to a sewage disposal network than non-refugees (47%). The problem seems to 
be even more acute in the villages, where 82% of respondents are not connected to such an infrastructure. In 
parallel, only 43% of West Bankers are connected, the situation in the north being the worst, as only 38% of 
the respondents are connected to a sewage disposal system. However, in the Gaza Strip, which is known for its 
diﬃcult living conditions, 69% are connected to a sewage network.
As with sewage disposal networks, the provision of solid waste disposal services is quite precarious in the oPt, 
with 36% of the population not beneﬁting from any solid waste disposal service. The worst situation is in the
villages, where only 52% of respondents are connected, and in the Gaza Strip, where only 56% are connected.  
16 Idem. 
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Figure 7.31: Household connection to a sewage disposal network according to area of residence, place of residence, 













































Figure 7.33: Household connection to a mobile phone network according to area of residence, region of residence 
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Connections to mobile phone networks in Palestine have reached very high levels, regardless of the level of 
poverty. 75% of the population is connected to such a service, an increase of 20% since November 2004. Having 
a mobile phone in the Territories can be considered as a matter of security as it allows the population to stay 
connected to their relatives easily in a context of uncertainty. 
Figure 7.34: Household connection to the Internet according to level of education, region of residence, area of 

























15% of Palestinians interviewed had a permanent connection to the Internet. Such a service is most widely 
available in Jerusalem (34%) and in the cities (19%). It seems that respondents with a high level of education and 
those whose household is better-oﬀ represent the segment of society that most frequently enjoys the availability
of a permanent connection to the Internet. According to UN sources, only 145,000 people were connected in 
2003, which represents 3.8% of the whole Palestinian population, while the current ﬁgure of 15% represents
646’000 people.17 
Figure 7.35: Household connection to satellite TV according to area of residence, region of residence, poverty level 

























Overall, 75% of respondents are connected to satellite TV. This service is more widely available in Jerusalem 
(94%) than elsewhere. Again satellite TV is most generally available among the more highly educated elements 
of the population (84%) as well as better-oﬀ households.  
17 www.unstats.un.org
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7.7 Conclusion
< Half of the Palestinian population is in need of a lot of assistance in July 2005. This result conﬁrms the
growing dependency of the Palestinian population on assistance. Palestinians living in hardship are the 
households most in need, and the mapping of the population in need indicates that the need for a lot of 
assistance has increased by 8% in the West Bank, and dependence on assistance of respondents residing 
outside the camps has sharply increased as well. 
This ﬁnding is of great concern considering that, in the same period, the general level of assistance
delivered to the population has sharply decreased in the past six months (see chapter on assistance). 
< In July 2005, employment remains the most frequently cited household need but to a lesser extent than 
reported in our previous survey. As was underlined in our previous report, employment is the most 
important unmet need, whilst ﬁnancial assistance is the second most important unmet need.
< Changes occurred in the levels of priority in assistance needed by households. The distribution of 
household priorities is more evenly balanced amongst a range of needs in July 2005 in comparison with 
our previous survey. 
< Housing and re housing needs for households have sharply increased, particularly in the Jerusalem area, 
which can be explained, to some extent, by the demolitions and the damages caused to property in East 
Jerusalem as a consequence of the proposed extension of the Separation Wall to form a circle around the 
Ma’aleh Adumin settlement. 2004 saw a near-tripling of the number of Palestinian buildings demolished 
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Chapter 8: ASSISTANCE IN GENERAL
Matthias Brunner – Céline Calvé
Introduction 
Despite changes in the political situation in the ﬁrst half of 2005, the lack of real change in the humanitarian
situation in the oPt in the last six months has led assistance providers to continue their work in strategic areas as 
food security, emergency infrastructure and employment. Budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority and 
the strengthening of local capacities remain, as well, two main concerns. Over the past two years, there has been 
a slight shift towards development assistance, although the humanitarian focus remains dominant. The most 
crucial challenge now is to build a stronger link between emergency assistance and the development of the 
oPt,
This chapter explores the diﬀerent facets of assistance (types of assistance, source and value of assistance, etc.)
delivered to the Palestinian people. The ﬁrst section will examine aspects of assistance delivered (nature, value,
origin and the level of satisfaction of respondents). The second part will focus on the two most signiﬁcant types
of assistance: employment and food. 
Main ﬁndings
In general
4 The level of assistance delivered has decreased by 8% since November 2004. In July 2005, 38% of 
respondents received assistance in the six-month period prior to the July 2005 poll. 
4 The decrease in assistance received is particularly acute for the West Bank (a decline of 8% since 
November 2004) and the level of assistance is the lowest outside the West Bank camps. On the other 
hand, levels of assistance remain high in the Gaza Strip (56%), especially in the refugee camps (72%). 
4  During the period under scrutiny, the provision of assistance has focused on the poorest segment of the 
population. The level of assistance delivered to non-refugees has decreased. 
4  About one-third of the respondents have received food assistance (31%), followed by financial aid (8%), 
while 4% have benefited from employment assistance.
4  There is a decrease in the median value for all the types of assistance combined: 300 NIS in July 2005 as 
against 400 NIS in November 2004. 
4  The main providers of food assistance remain UNRWA, cited by 26% of respondents, followed by the PA 
(10%) and, thirdly, international organisations (3%). 
4  In comparison with the November 2004 survey, the level of satisfaction has improved in July 2005.  
Employment 
4  Roughly 150,000 households received employment assistance in July 2005. 
4  Employment assistance received personally has decreased by 12%, while the percentage of respondents 
whose households have benefited from such assistance has decreased by 19%.  
4  Since November 2004, for both the respondents and their households, the highest decline occurred in 
short-term jobs. In the survey conducted in July 2005, the PA is perceived by 58% of the respondents as 
the most important provider of personal employment assistance. UNRWA remains an important source, 
cited by a quarter of the interviewees. In general, a majority of beneficiaries of employment assistance 
(66%) evaluated it positively. 
The issue of food and its delivery
4 The proportion of Palestinians whose food consumption was not sufficient is quite high, as 19% of 
respondents have consumed less food than needed and 10% consumed much less food than needed. 
4 West Bankers consumed 19% less food than needed and 10% much less food than needed. În the 
Gaza Strip, it is clear that households cannot afford to meet their basic needs in food. It appears that 
households living outside refugee camps seem to face slightly more difficulty in being able to afford 
their food needs.
4  In July 2005, 78% of respondents cited basic commodities as their most-needed food items. Meat and 
poultry stand together as the second most important food item.  
4  Fewer Palestinian households rely on food assistance in July 2005 than they did in November 2004, the 
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majority of the respondents (86%) reporting that they rely on their own income for food.
4  In July 2005, 50% of respondents stated that they have reduced the quantity of food in the past six 
months, while almost half of the respondents have bought less-preferred food in the same period of 
time. 
4  33% of respondents have received food assistance in the past six months. UNRWA was cited by 25% of 
respondents as their main provider of food aid. 45% of interviewees have received food assistance twice 
in the six-month period up to July 2005. 
 
8.1 Assistance in general
In the ﬁrst six months of 2005, the situation in the oPt has not really changed, and the delivery of humanitarian
assistance has continued. In this section, we will concentrate on the actual distribution of assistance. We will 
examine its delivery, value, the nature of such assistance and the level of satisfaction with its provision. 
8.1.1  The assistance delivered 
8.1.1.1 The assistance received and its evolution since 2001. 
The Palestinians interviewed were asked whether or not they or a member of the household members received 
any type of assistance since the beginning of the Intifada and whether or not they or any of the household 
members received any type of assistance in the past six months.  
In July 2005, 38% of respondents stated that their household had received assistance in the past six months. As 
indicated in the ﬁgure below, this proportion has decreased by 8% since November 2004. In addition, since the
beginning of the second Intifada, 49% of Palestinians have received assistance, constituting a decrease of 5% 
since the November 2004 survey.1 
Figure 8.1: Level of assistance received in the past six months (assistance such as food, medicine, job, money, 
























8.1.1.2 Geographical trends in assistance delivery. 
If we consider the breakdown according to region of residence, the results shows that the highest percentage of 
respondents who reported receiving assistance in the past six months are those living in the Gaza Strip (56%), 
followed by the West Bank (33%) and Jerusalem (6%). 
1 The proportion of Palestinians who received assistance since the beginning of the second Intifada indicates 
the general trend of assistance delivered to the population in the past 5 years. This proportion was 50% in Feb 
2004; 55% in Nov 2004; and 49% in July 2005, indicating that, in spite of the decrease of 5%, roughly half of the 
Palestinian population have beneﬁted from assistance since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada.
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The percentage of households that have received assistance in the Gaza Strip has decreased by 5% in comparison 
with our previous survey, while the percentage of those in the West Bank has decreased by 8%. The substantial 
diminution of assistance received by those in Jerusalem is clearly due to the sampling procedure used by the 
polling institute (PCBS Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics) contracted for the ninth poll.2 














When examining results by place of residence, we can see that the percentage of households that have received 
assistance in the past six months is lower than the percentage of households that have received assistance since 
the beginning of the Intifada. The results also indicate that the assistance received in the past six months is in 
general more important inside the refugee camps in the West Bank (67%), but particularly in the Gaza Strip 
(69%). On the other hand, the level of assistance is lowest outside the West Bank camps (29%). 
Figure 8.3: Assistance received in the past six months and since the beginning of the second Intifada according to 



























Considering the breakdown by area of residence, the level of assistance delivered in villages (35%) remains close 
to the level of November 2004. The assistance delivered in the cities (31%) has decreased by 14%, while it has 
increased slightly in the refugee camps by 2% (67%). The percentage of respondents living in refugee camps and 
who have received assistance in the past six months is the lowest since November 2001. 
2 See section of report on methodologies.
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8.1.1.3 Targeting the poor and the refugees
During the period under scrutiny, the provision of assistance has been concentrated on the poorest segment of 
the Palestinian population. Households living in hardship have received the most assistance (51%), followed by 
Palestinians below the poverty line (41%) and people above poverty line (19%). Again, when monitoring those 
results with the previous poll, it appears that the earlier general ﬁnding of a decrease in assistance delivered is
conﬁrmed, as the percentages of households that received assistance have decreased in the past six months,
regardless of the level of poverty. 
Figure 8.5: Percentage of the total population who received assistance during the past six months, according to the 
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As, on average, refugees are poorer than non-refugee Palestinians, a higher percentage of refugees (59%) have 
received assistance in the past six months compared to 19% of non-refugees. These results conﬁrm the overall
trend observed since the outbreak of the second Intifada: Palestinian refugees receive more assistance than non-
refugees. Since November 2004, it appears that the assistance provided to non-refugees has sharply declined by 
17%.









Further data analysis of assistance delivered in the past six months to refugees and non-refugees according to 
their level of poverty reveals that non-refugees living in hardship are much less catered for than extremely poor 
refugees. 74% of refugee hardship cases have received assistance since November 2004, but only one-quarter 
of the extremely poor non-refugees have reported that their household has received such assistance. The ﬁgure
below indicates that, in general, the level of assistance delivered to non-refugees decreased. More speciﬁcally,
the percentage of non-refugee hardship cases who have received assistance has halved since the November 
2004 survey. Also, a quite high percentage of the relatively better-oﬀ segments of the population have beneﬁted
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from assistance; as was already the case in November 2004, this was particularly true for refugees above the 
poverty line (38%). This ﬁnding is related to assistance in general (e.g. food, medicine, job, money, education, etc),
and does not solely refer to emergency assistance. As a consequence, it suggests a widespread poverty amongst 
refugees. 
Figure 8.7: Percentage of the total population who received assistance during the past six months according to 
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When examining the percentage of refugees and non-refugees who received assistance according to their place 
of residence, the analysis reveals that the delivery of assistance to refugees in camps has slightly increased. This 
result is not surprising, considering the earlier ﬁndings that the level of assistance has increased by 2% in refugee
camps, but it is clear that a higher percentage of refugees than non-refugees beneﬁt from this increase. For the
population residing outside the refugee camps, the gap in assistance delivery between the refugees and the 
non-refugees is much more pronounced in the Gaza Strip (47% versus 34% in November 2004) than in the West 
Bank (25% versus 9% in our last survey). The delivery of assistance to non-refugees has decreased considerably 
outside the refugees camps both in the Gaza Strip (-16%) and in the West Bank (-10%).  
Figure 8.8: Percentage of refugees and non-refugees who received assistance in the past six months according to 






























8.1.2  Nature of the assistance delivered 
After having analysed the distribution of assistance, its evolution since the beginning of the Intifada and since 
November 2004, this section deals with the nature of the assistance delivered. 
8.1.2.1 Assistance delivered in general
Respondents were asked to state the most important type of assistance that they or their family received in 
the past six months. When adding the two main types of assistance received in July 2005, about one-third 
of respondents received food assistance (31%), ahead of ﬁnancial aid (8%), while 4% have beneﬁted from
Palestinian Public Perceptions Report IX 131
employment assistance.3 These results remain the same when compared with those of the poll conducted in 
November 2004.
The  adjacent graph presents the 
percentages of aid delivered by type of 
assistance. The results conﬁrm the general
trend of a decrease in assistance delivered 
in the past six months; the levels of food 
aid, ﬁnancial aid as well as employment
assistance have decreased, although 
employment assistance has gained 
importance since 2001. 
Food assistance is currently beneﬁting
roughly 1, 2 million people4 in Palestinian 
households. Given the importance of 
such a means of aid, we need to look more 
closely at it in the third part of this analysis. 
Medical assistance is mentioned by 1% of 
respondents (the medical services are not 
cited at all as a type of assistance provided 
in villages and outside refugee camps). 
This percentage has decreased by almost 
2% since November 2004. Coupons assistance is not used anymore. As a consequence, only the percentage of 
the total population who received ﬁnancial and employment assistance will be analysed further.
8.1.2.2 Financial assistance received 
8% of respondents have received ﬁnancial assistance in the past six months, that is to say 300,000 Palestinians
households within the oPt. Financial assistance is considered by 25% of the respondents as their most important 
unmet need.
When considering the breakdown by refugee status, the highest percentage of respondents receiving ﬁnancial
assistance are refugees (11% versus 6% of non-refugees). In addition, ﬁnancial assistance was delivered to a
higher percentage in the Gaza Strip (14%), in refugee camps (12%) and more particularly in the Gaza Strip refugee 
camps (15%). Lastly, 12% of hardship cases have received such assistance in the past six months. 
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Figure 8.9: Types of assistance received during the pas six months 



































3 See Part II: Employment assistance. 
4 Projected mid-year population in the Palestinian Territory by governorate (2001-2007): oPt: 3’762’005 (West 
Bank: 2’372’216, Gaza Strip: 1’389’789 and Jerusalem: 398’333).See: www.pcbs.org 
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8.1.3  Value of assistance delivered 
After analysing the percentage of the population who received assistance, it is important to consider the median 
value of various assistance types and their evolution over time. We will examine in detail the value of each type of 
assistance provided to the Palestinian population during the period under scrutiny. It is worth remembering that 
the real value of assistance does not fall within the scope of this analysis; it concerns, rather, the perceived value 
of assistance received. At the time of the writing of this report, currency rates were as follows: 
100 NIS (New Israeli Shekels) = US$ 21.20 (US Dollars) = EUR 17.7 (Euros) = CHF 27.55 (Swiss Francs).
As displayed in the ﬁgure below, the total value of received assistance has increased almost constantly since
February 2002. Yet, there is a decrease in the median value for all the types of assistance combined (any type of 
assistance), standing at 300 NIS in July 2005 versus 400 NIS in November 2004. In regard to the median value of 
food assistance, it has increased by 50 NIS (US$ 10.6) since November 2004, while the median value of ﬁnancial
assistance has decreased by 155 NIS. The median value of employment assistance has increased sharply by 400 
NIS (US$ 85) in comparison with our previous survey. Lastly, there are no signiﬁcant results when considering the
breakdown by geographical area or by poverty level. 
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8.1.4  Sources of assistance delivered 
Palestinians identify assistance providers as those organisations that directly deliver the aid. In some cases, this 
could explain the fact that the international organisations are not cited as the main providers of assistance because 
they are more likely to target their beneﬁciaries through the PA ministries, or through local organisations.
When looking at the ﬁgure below, the main provider remains UNRWA, cited by 26% of respondents, followed
by the PA (10%) and - in third place - international organisations (3%). When comparing the results of the 
previous poll, the visibility of the international organisations has remained stable, while the visibility of Islamic 
organisations has decreased by 3% and NGOs by 6%. For UNRWA, the percentage of respondents who perceive 
it as a source of assistance received has increased by 6%, conﬁrming that the agency is still the single most-cited
source of assistance. For the PA, the percentage has decreased by 5% in comparison with November 2004, and 
it stands at the level of February 2004. The fact that the PA is cited as the main provider of diﬀerent types of
assistance received by 10% of respondents is positive in terms of state-building. We should ﬁnally mention the
sharp decrease in the visibility of trade unions. 
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We could take the analysis one step further to provide a better picture of where and to which sub- groups of 
the Palestinian population the various providers have delivered their assistance. We will look at UNRWA, the 
PA, international organisations and Islamic organisations as they are, successively,  the main providers of 
the assistance cited by the interviewees. 
According to the July 2005 survey, the majority of UNRWA’s beneﬁciaries are refugees (94%) residing in the Gaza
Strip (70%) and living in refugee camps (44%). As indicated in the ﬁgure below, 41% of UNRWA beneﬁciaries live
in cities, while 15% of them are villagers. Interestingly, UNRWA beneﬁciaries are more often classiﬁed as hardship
cases5 (49%) than as living below the poverty line (34%). On the contrary, the results of the November 2004 
survey indicated that UNRWA beneﬁciaries were more often as below the poverty line than as extremely poor
(Palestinian Public Perceptions, Report VIII, page 113). 
Figure 8.13: Composition of the beneﬁciaries of assistance received from UNRWA according to region of residence,
area of residence, refugee status and poverty level 
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Interestingly, we could have expected that the PA and/or municipalities’ beneﬁciaries would more likely reside
in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, as was the case in the results of the November 2004 poll. In July 2005, 
43% of PA beneﬁciaries can be found in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip. Also, 53% are non-refugees
whereas such was the case for two-thirds of the beneﬁciaries in the previous survey. 48% of PNA beneﬁciaries
5 The notion of hardship cases used in this report is diﬀerent from the notion of special hardship cases used by
UNRWA. The latter is not restricted to income-related criteria, as it also restricts eligibility to speciﬁc categories
of the refugee population (families headed by widows, for instance). 
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are refugees, a percentage which has sharply increased since November 2004. One can draw a parallel with the 
impoverishment of the refugees observed above (pages 6-7). The distribution of beneﬁciaries of PA aid according
to area of residence remains the same in comparison with November 2004: 44% of PA beneﬁciaries reside in cities,
32% in villages and 24% in refugee camps. Finally, the largest percentage of the beneﬁciaries of PA assistance
can be found, to a large extent, among the poorest segment of the population (48% are extremely poor) in 
comparison with November 2004.
Figure 8.14: Composition of the beneﬁciaries of assistance received from PA/municipalities  according to region of
residence, area of residence, refugee status and poverty level. 
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In regard to the beneﬁciaries of international organisations‘ assistance, and when comparing them with the two
most important assistance providers, the international organisations have the largest percentage of beneﬁciaries
who reside in Jerusalem (4%), and the largest proportion of their beneﬁciaries are living below the poverty
line (57%). The areas of residence of such beneﬁciaries are mainly the cities (44%), ahead of villages (32%) and
refugee camps (25%). Also, contrary to the results of the November 2004 survey, there are more non-refugees 
than refugees (62% versus 38%) among the international organisations’ beneﬁciaries.
Figure 8.15: Composition of beneﬁciaries of assistance received from international organisations according to region
of residence, area of residence, refugee status and poverty level. 
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As for the composition of beneﬁciaries of assistance from Islamic organisations, they mainly reside in the Gaza Strip
(51%) and in refugee camps (44%) rather than in cities (39%) or villages (17%). We can ﬁnd more beneﬁciaries of
Islamic organisations among refugees (58%) than non-refugees (43%). Lastly, as indicated below, 55% of Islamic 
organisations’ beneﬁciaries are living in hardship whereas, in November, this provider of assistance tended to
target households with a monthly income below the poverty line as well as hardship cases. 
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Figure 8.16: Composition of the beneﬁciaries of assistance received from Islamic organisations according to region
of residence, area of residence, refugee status and poverty level 
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8.1.5  Level of satisfaction with assistance
This section provides an evaluation of assistance by examining the respondents’ level of satisfaction with the aid 
that they have received. 
Since the beginning of the second Intifada, the level of satisfaction with assistance in general has continuously 
increased. 10% of respondents are very satisﬁed (this percentage has increased by 7% since November 2004)
with the assistance received and 55% are satisﬁed, while 23% are dissatisﬁed and 12% are very dissatisﬁed. In the
past six months, the percentage of people satisﬁed with the assistance provided has increased by 10%. The level
of dissatisfaction has decreased by 14% and the level of very dissatisﬁed people has increased slightly (by 3%). In
comparison with the November 2004 results, the level of satisfaction has improved. Compared to February 2004, 
the evaluation of the assistance by its beneﬁciaries is slightly less favourable.
Figure 8.17: Level of satisfaction with the assistance provided in general, November 2004-July 2005 
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The general level of satisfaction varies according to the region of residence of the respondents. As indicated in 
the ﬁgure below, 34% of West Bankers are dissatisﬁed with the assistance delivered and 13% are very dissatisﬁed.
The proportion of very dissatisﬁed respondents has increased by 5% since November 2004. A higher proportion
of respondents from the Gaza Strip have expressed their satisfaction with regard to assistance received in the 
time-frame of the July 2005 survey. The proportion of dissatisﬁed respondents residing in the Gaza Strip has
decreased by 24%, while the percentage of satisﬁed respondents has sharply increased (an increase of 12% of
satisﬁed respondents and 11% of those who are very satisﬁed). The level of satisfaction with assistance delivered
has decreased in Jerusalem from 80% to 64%, while the percentage of dissatisfaction has increased by 16%. 
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Looking at the level of satisfaction according to the place of residence, it appears that the level of satisfaction 
has decreased, particularly in the West Bank refugee camps where the proportion of respondents who judged 
it satisfactory has decreased by 14% in the past six months. The proportion of dissatisﬁed respondents has
increased by 4% and the percentage of very dissatisﬁed respondents has increased by 3%.
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Respondents who were unsatisﬁed were asked to state the reason behind their negative evaluation. In general,
49% of the dissatisﬁed beneﬁciaries of assistance felt this way because the assistance provided was too infrequent.
This proportion has increased by 3% in the past six months. 35% were discontented because of the small amount 
of assistance delivered and, lastly, 11% were dissatisﬁed because of the poor quality of the assistance received.
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When compared with the results of the November 2004 survey, the July 2005 results reveal that concern about 
infrequency has sharply increased in the West Bank by 11%. For the Gaza Strip respondents, the main reason 
for their dissatisfaction is also, to a large extent, the frequency of assistance provided, according to 60% of the 
respondents. Interestingly, this percentage has decreased slightly by 5%, whereas the proportion of dissatisﬁed
respondents because of the amount of assistance received has increased by 4%. 
Figure 8.21: Reasons behind dissatisfaction with assistance received according to region of residence, November 
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Indeed, the gap between the needs in term of assistance of West Bankers and the assistance that is actually 
disbursed in this region has increased considerably in the past six months. This gap certainly explains why, for 
respondents in the West Bank, the reason behind the discontent is by far the infrequency of assistance received, 
rather than the small amount of such assistance.
8.2 Employment assistance
As a consequence of the protracted economic crisis and the accompanying widespread unemployment that 
aﬀects the Palestinian population, employment remains, in July 2005, the most important household unmet
need for 29% of respondents. As a consequence, it is important to review in this section the types of employment 
assistance (long-term jobs, short-term jobs, unemployment funds and resources for the self-employed) received 
both at the personal and the household level, as well as who provides this assistance and their eﬀectiveness..
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8.2.1 In general 
Statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences can be established in the percentage of the total population (roughly 150,000
households) who received such assistance according to poverty level. 6% of  extremely poor respondents have 
received employment assistance in the past six months compared with 4% of respondents living below the 
poverty line and 1% of the better oﬀ. Also, when mapping the distribution of employment assistance, it appears
that such assistance is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and the refugee camps. 
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Eﬀorts to alleviate unemployment rates in the oPt have been apparent in our successive polls since the beginning
of the second Intifada. According to the Consolidated Appeal Process 2005, donors’ contributions have 
concentrated on two major sectors: food security and the recovery of infrastructure employment. Nevertheless, 
the decrease in socio-economic assistance received by the population in the past six months is also noticeable 
in regard to employment assistance, as illustrated in ﬁgure 9. The responsibility for this overall decrease in
employment assistance is not to be ascribed to UNRWA or UNDP, who allocate a considerable portion of their 
emergency funds to employment generation programmes.6
Employment assistance received personally has decreased by 12% while the percentage of respondents whose 
households have beneﬁted from such assistance decreased considerably, by 19%.
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6 See chapter on UNRWA and Refugees, 9.1.2: Causes of increased refugee poverty. 
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When one examines the regional impact of such a decrease on the Palestinian population, it appears that the 
highest decrease in the personal employment assistance occurred within the Gaza Strip (a decline of 17% when 
compared with November 2004), more particularly in the refugee camps (a loss of 21%), and among the extremely 
poor segment of the population (25% less). With regard to household employment assistance, in parallel with 
the results mentioned above, the highest decrease is obvious is the Gaza Strip (26% less), for the population of 
the refugee camps (27% less) and for the poorest part of the population (30% less). 
8.2.2 Types of employment assistance
Speciﬁcally, in regard to personal employment assistance, 10% gained long-term employment, 29% obtained a
short-term job, 48% beneﬁted from unemployment funds and 13% received resources aimed to assist the self-
employed. When monitoring with the results outlined in the previous poll, the proportion of respondents who 
received long-term job assistance and that of respondents who were allocated resources for the self-employed 
have slightly increased, by 2% and by 3% respectively. Meanwhile, the proportion of short-term jobs received has 
decreased by 5% and that of received unemployment funds remain stable. 
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Regarding household employment assistance, in the six-month period prior to July 2005, 13% beneﬁted from
long-term job provision, 27% obtained a short-term job, 42% received unemployment funds and 17% received 
resources for self-employment. In comparison with the November 2004 survey, the proportion of those whose 
household beneﬁted from a long-term job has slightly increased by 1%, while the percentage of those who
received resources for self-employment has increased by 7%. The proportion of households that have received 
unemployment funds has slightly increased by 2%. The proportion of those whose household obtained a short-
term job has decreased considerably by 10%. 


















����������� �� �������������� ������ ������������������������������������� ���
Chapter 8: Assistance in General140
In general, when examining the various types of employment assistance, it is clear that since November 2004, for 
both the respondents and their households, the highest decline occurred in short-term jobs.
When examining the various types of household employment assistance according to place of residence, the 
highest percentages of households that have received any kind of employment assistance are those in the 
refugee camps of the Gaza Strip, followed by West Bank refugee camp residents. Also, in general, the gap visible 
in November 2004 between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the allocation of job assistance has decreased. As 
in our previous survey, the lowest proportion of households receiving employment assistance are in Jerusalem. 
If we look in detail, the long-term job distribution is higher outside the Gaza Strip refugee camps. The short-term 
distribution is as important in the Gaza Strip camps as it is in the West Bank camps (3%). The unemployment fund 
distribution is higher in the refugee camps, in particular in the West Bank (10%) ahead of the Gaza Strip (9%). 
Lastly, the distribution of resources for the self-employed is more important outside the West Bank camps (4%). 
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In general, a higher percentage of households living in hardship (14%) have received employment assistance in 
the six-month period prior to the survey, followed by households living below the poverty line (12%) and those 
living above (7%). The most marked diﬀerence between hardship household and poor households, on the one
hand, and the relatively better oﬀ households, on the other hand, are the short-term jobs, the unemployment
funds and the resources for the self-employed received. Higher percentages of the poorest households have 
received such types of job assistance. In the same period of time, households living above the poverty line have 
obtained more long-term jobs than other segments of the population. This trend is a real concern, as the poorest 
segments of the population beneﬁt from precarious types of employment assistance, where incomes are low
and intermittent, while in November 2004, twice as many households facing hardship than those with avv living 
standard above the poverty line had beneﬁted from a long-term jobs.
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8.2.3 Sources of employment assistance 
In the survey conducted in July 2005, the PA is perceived by 58% of the interviewees as the most important 
provider of personal employment assistance. In comparison with our previous survey, this percentage has 
increased by 44%. UNRWA remains an important source, cited by one-quarter of Palestinians; only 2% fewer 
respondents mentioned the agency as the source of their personal employment assistance in July 2005. Also, the 
number of respondents that cited the municipalities as their providers of employment assistance has been halved 
since November 2004, while the percentage that mentioned NGOs has decreased by 9%. The increased visibility 
of international organisations as providers of personal employment assistance is conﬁrmed by the July 2005
survey: 5% of the respondents obtained personal employment assistance from an international organisation, in 
contrast to the 2% of respondents in February 2004 (PPP Report VII). 

















�������������� ��� ���� ���������������������������
����� ������������������ ����� ����������������
8.2.4 Level of satisfaction with employment assistance 
. 
In general, a majority of beneﬁciaries (66%) of employment assistance evaluated it positively in July 2005, while
34% of the respondents judged the assistance negatively. The ﬁgure below indicates that the level of satisfaction
with the provided assistance has improved continuously since the beginning of the surveys on Palestinian Public 
Perceptions. 
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Figure 8.29: Level of satisfaction with employment assistance received personally and/or by other household 
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As for the reason behind the dissatisfaction, 32% of beneﬁciaries are dissatisﬁed because the employment
period is very short, while 59% are dissatisﬁed because the number of opportunities are too few. In comparison
with the November 2004 survey, there is an increase of 22% in those who are dissatisﬁed with employment
assistance received because of the number of positions. At the same time, there is a decrease of 28% in the 
dissatisfaction with employment assistance because the period is very short. A parallel can be drawn between 
the most important unmet need of the Palestinian population, which is employment for 29% of the households, 
and the huge decrease in employment assistance provided in the oPt. The gap between those two indicators 
could explain the high level of dissatisfaction related to the paucity of employment assistance. 
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8.3 The issue of food and its delivery  
As mentioned in the introduction, food security is one of the main concerns of the humanitarian organisations. 
The deterioration in the nutritional status of Palestinians began soon after the beginning of the second Intifada 
in September 2000 and the consequent lack of access of the population to food and the disruption of markets. 
According to the World Food Program (WFP) in mid-2004, “food insecurity is a reality for 38% of the Palestinian 
population (i.e. approximately 1.3 million people), while a further 26% (586’000 people) are at risk of becoming 
food insecure”.7 
7 World Food Program (WFP), Emergency operation 10190.2: Support to the most vulnerable Palestinian 
population aﬀected by the protracted conﬂict, July 2004-June 2005, Occupied Palestinian Territories, p.2.
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8.3.1 Need for food
8.3.1.1 Household quantity of food consumption over the past months 
Figure 8.31: Household quantity of food consumption over the past months 
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The respondents were asked whether or not their food consumption has matched their needs in the six-month 
period prior to the survey. As indicated in the ﬁgure above, the proportion of Palestinian whose consumption
was not suﬃcient is quite high, as 19% of the respondents have consumed less food than needed and 10%
consumed much less food then needed. For the greatest percentage of respondents (63%), food consumption 
was more or less according to household needs. 
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An analysis of consumption of food according to the independent variable, region of residence, provides relevant 
indicators for mapping the malnutrition crisis in the occupied Palestinian territories. 
In July 2005, food consumption was adequate for the needs for 77% of respondents residing in Jerusalem. In 
the West Bank, 19% consumed less food than needed and 10% much less food than needed. It is obvious that 
Palestinians households living in the Gaza Strip cannot aﬀord to meet their basic needs in food. For 11% of them
food consumption is much less than needed, and for 22% the consumption of food is less than needed. 
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The results by place of residence are helpful in mapping the Palestinian households that have to cope with the 
lack of food. If we consider the answer much less than needed and less than needed together, one can see that 
households living outside refugee camps seem to face slightly greater diﬃculties in satisfying their food needs.
Within the Gaza Strip, for 32% of the inhabitants of refugee camps and for 34% of households living outside 
camps, their food consumption is not suﬃcient. In the West Bank, the proportion of Palestinians who cannot
aﬀord their food consumption is approaching 29% outside the refugee camps and 28% in the refugee camps.
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The situation is dire for the poorest segment of the Palestinian population; for 18% of the extremely poor, 
consumption of food is much less than needed. For 28% of the respondents living in hardship, the consumption 
of food is less than needed. 
8.3.1.2 Most needed food items
As mentioned in the chapter on needs, food is considered by 43% of the respondents as their most important 
need for their households. When examining the most needed food item for the household in general, dry food is 
the most important food commodity needed by the Palestinian household, ahead of fresh food.





















Baby Food Basic commodities Dairy poducts
Canned food Fruits and vegetables Meat and poultry 
In July 2005, 78% of the respondents cited basic commodities such as wheat ﬂour, sugar etc. as their ﬁrst most-
needed food item, ahead of baby food, cited by 11% of respondents. Basics commodities remained the most 
important items in the past six months, increasing by 9% since the November 2004 survey, while the need for 
baby food has decreased by 12%. As observed in the second pie-chart on the right, the basic commodities are 
followed by meat and poultry, two expensive sources of proteins, ahead of fruits and vegetables considered, 
respectively, by 33% and 32% of the respondents as their second most important food item needed. 
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8.3.2 Sources of food 
Fewer Palestinian households rely on food assistance in July 
than they did in November 2004. The dependency towards 
food assistance has been halved in the past six months, as 7% 
of respondent households rely on relief assistance for food, 
whereas such was the case for 14% in November 2004. Reliance 
on family support (7%) has slightly decreased by 3% since 
November 2004. The majority of the respondents (86%) said 
that their household relies on their own income for food; this 
proportion has increased by 10% since November 2004.
Figure 8.37: Main source of food in the household according to refugee status, region of residence, area of residence, 




























































When examining the sources of food according to the refugee status, it appears that more refugees than non-
refugees rely on outside sources for their food. The refugees rely on UNRWA for food assistance through the 
regular food aid programme that provides food parcels to special hardship cases or the emergency food aid 
program focusing on the “new poor.”8 While 13% of refugee respondents rely on food assistance, the proportion 
among the non-refugees is 1%. These proportions have both sharply decreased since the November 2004 survey, 
strengthening the earlier trend of a considerable decrease in the dependency on outside sources for food. 
The role of UNRWA also explained why more respondents from refugee camps rely on outside sources for food 
(19%) than city or village inhabitants (4%). 
When looking at the results by region of residence and by place of residence, it appears that the dependence on 
outside sources for food is higher in the Gaza Strip, particularly in the refugee camps (23%), ahead of the West 
Bank camps (9%). Finally, the dependence on outside sources for food is unsurprisingly higher for the extremely 
poor segments of the Palestinian population (14%). 









House relies primarily on relief assistance 
House relies on support form its extended family 
House relies on its own income 
8 This group consists of people who have lost assets due to the emergency (farmers, home and land owners), 
farmers who have lost access to markets and workers who have lost jobs. UNRWA Emergency Appeal 2005, p.8. 
Chapter 8: Assistance in General146
8.3.3 Attitudes toward food assistance
Since the beginning of the second Intifada, Palestinians households that rely more and more on their own sources 
for food are resorting to increasingly negative coping mechanisms, drastically reducing the quality, variety and 
quantity of food intake. 
8.3.3.1 The reduction of food consumption.



























In July 2005, 50% of respondents conﬁrmed that they had reduced their level of food in the past six months.
As displayed in the chart above, a higher percentage of Gaza Strip residents (55%) have reduced their food 
consumption in the past six months, whereas half the West Bankers (49%) and 33% of Jerusalemites have 
reduced their consumption. Also, more respondents residing outside refugee camps have reduced their food 
consumption (50% in the West Bank and 57% in the Gaza Strip). Lastly, 66% of the respondents living in hardship 
have reduced their food intake in the past six months. 
8.3.3.2  Reduction of food purchase 
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The respondents were asked whether they, or their households, have bought less-preferred food in the past 
six months. About half of the respondents (48%) have done so in the past six months. In comparison with the 
November 2004 survey, a slight increase of 1% is noticeable in the proportion of respondents who answered 
positively.
When examining the statistically signiﬁcant relationship that can be established with regard to the reduction in
food consumption, a higher percentage of respondents residing in the Gaza Strip (51%) and respondents living 
in hardship (65%) have reduced their food purchase in the past six months.  
8.4 Food assistance 
8.4.1 In general 
Figure 8.40: Received food assistance in general and according to refugee status, region of residence, area 
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As is apparent in the ﬁgure above, there has been a very slight decrease in the number of people reporting that
they have received food assistance in the past six months. While the percentage was 34% in November 2004, the 
proportion decreased slightly to 33% in July 2005. 
When looking at the main explanatory independent variables, the percentage of refugees among the respondents 
is much higher than non-refugees (57% versus 14%). Also, the results reveal that half of the respondents residing 
in the Gaza Strip have beneﬁted from food assistance while such was the case for 26% of West Bankers and only
5% of Jerusalemites. 
Further examination of the distribution of food assistance reveals that, while 63% of respondents living in refugee 
camps have received food (versus 26% of city inhabitants and 27% of village dwellers), a higher proportion of the 
Palestinian population living in refugee camps has received such assistance. It was the case for, respectively, 70% 
and 63% of the population living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip camps. When examining food distribution 
according to the level of poverty, the results indicates that 44% of the respondents living in hardship have received 
food aid, while 36% of those below poverty line and 18% of better-oﬀ Palestinians have received such aid.
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8.4.2 Source of food assistance   
Respondents were asked to mention the main providers 
of the food assistance they received. In July 2005, UNRWA 
was cited by 25% of respondents as their main provider 
of food aid. UNRWA was followed by the Palestinian 
Authority (19%), followed by the international 
organisations (15%) and Islamic organisations (13%). 
Indeed, the World Food Program (WFP) distributes food 
items to 480,000 non refugee households through the 
diﬀerent PA Ministries (mainly through the Ministry
of Social Aﬀairs and the Ministry of Agriculture).
International organisations involved in food assistance 
activities are also, to a large extent, working in close 
partnership with the PA. Such partnerships could explain 
the perception  of the PA as one of the most important 
source of the food assistance, as the ministries are 
often the direct providers of food items to Palestinian 
households. 
8.4.3 Frequency of food assistance 
As illustrated in the adjacent ﬁgure, according to the
respondents, 15% received food assistance three times 
during the six-month period before July 2005, 45% 
twice, while 30% have beneﬁted from food aid only
once. 
8.5 Attitude towards food assistance 
8.5.1 Attitudes towards the targeting of food assistance 
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As illustrated in the ﬁgure above, 7% of respondents consider that food assistance targets the needy, while 43%
feel that food aid is allocated to the Palestinian population without distinction. The majority of respondents 
(50%) feel that food assistance is delivered to the needy but that others segments of the population  not in need 
have received it. The results of the July 2005 survey reveal that the targeting of food assistance is not judged 
as positively as it was in the November 2004, with a decrease of 19% in people feeling that food assistance is 
focusing on needy Palestinians. 
If we consider the breakdown by region of residence, those earlier ﬁndings are, interestingly, conﬁrmed among
respondents residing in the West Bank. Only 5% of West Bankers believe that food assistance targets the needy; 
this percentage has decreased by 21% in the past six months. For 49% of West Bankers, food assistance is judged 
to be delivered without distinction. This percentage increased sharply in the past six months (an increase of 
28%). Also, 54% of Gazans feel that food aid is distributed to the needy but also to people who do not need it. 
8.5.2 Attitudes towards the organisation of food distribution 
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Attitudes toward the organisation of food are more positive in July 2005 than in November 2004. 40% of 
respondents believe that food aid is organised (an increase of 29%), while 35% feel that such assistance is 
somewhat organised (a decrease of 21%), and 26% of the respondents have a negative attitude toward the 
organisation of food distribution, a decrease of 7% from November 2004. 
According to the ﬁgure above, one can ﬁnd the most positive attitudes toward food distribution among refugees
(47%), Gaza Strip residents (48%) and camp residents (57%). When considering the breakdown by place of 
residence, it appears that Jerusalemites have the most negative attitude, as 53% of them feel that such assistance 
is poorly organised. 
8.5.3 Level of satisfaction with food assistance 
In general, the level of satisfaction with food assistance 
is more positive than it was in the November 2004 
survey.  The results indicate that, in July 2005, 22% 
of respondents were very satisﬁed with the food
assistance received, an increase of 21% over the last 
survey. Half the respondents were satisﬁed with the
food assistance, while 13% were dissatisﬁed and 12%
were very dissatisﬁed.














Chapter 8: Assistance in General150
Looking at the breakdown by region of residence, 
the highest level of dissatisfaction appears in 
the West Bank, where 25% of respondents are 
dissatisﬁed and 12% are very dissatisﬁed. On the
other hand, the level of satisfaction is far higher 
in the Gaza Strip. As observed in the chart above, 
the level of satisfaction of respondents residing 
in the Gaza Strip is higher as half of them are 
satisﬁed and 32% are very satisﬁed with the food
assistance received. The the level of satisfaction 
with food assistance is in general higher among 
the refugees, and the level of satisfaction is 
also high in refugee camps, ahead of city and 
villages.  
8.6 Conclusion
The Palestinian perception of an overall decrease in the level of assistance delivered is the main ﬁnding of this
chapter on assistance. Roughly 1,4 million Palestinians have beneﬁted from assistance in the ﬁrst half of 2005.
The decrease is particularly acute in the West Bank, where the level of assistance has dropped by 8% between 
November 2004 and July 2005. 
It is arguable that that the decrease in the amount of assistance provided to the West Bank is mainly due 
to the relative lull in violence, as well as to the guarded optimism related to the Palestinian election process of 
January 2005. On the other hand, the level of assistance remains high in the Gaza Strip because of the continued 
violence observed in the past six months. The need for additional humanitarian assistance has risen sharply as a 
consequence. In addition, one could argue that the assistance focused on the Gaza Strip in advance of the Israeli 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. For these reasons, more than half of the Gaza Strip residents received assistance 
whilst one-third of West Bankers beneﬁted from such assistance. Also, the level of assistance is lowest outside
West Bank camps. 
When examining the delivery of assistance to the refugees, it appears that non-refugees living in hardship 
are much less catered for than extremely poor refugees. Also the delivery of assistance to non-refugees has 
considerably decreased outside the refugees camps in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. As a consequence, 
when looking at types of assistance received (ﬁnancial assistance, employment assistance and food assistance)
it was delivered to a higher percentage of refugees and to Gaza Strip residents, particularly to those who 
are living in camps. 
Some interesting conclusions can be drawn through an analysis of where and to which segments of the 
Palestinian population the main providers of aid have delivered their assistance. In November 2004, the results 
indicated that the PA seemed to have a larger percentage of beneﬁciaries in the West Bank and amongst the
non-refugee and the poorer segments of the population, while the majority of UNRWA beneﬁciaries were much
more concentrated in the Gaza Strip, amongst  refugees and people living below the poverty line. In July 2005, 
for both UNRWA and the PA, the largest numbers of beneﬁciaries could be found in the Gaza Strip, among
refugees and hardship cases. Some interesting developments can be seen in the results of the July 2005 results, 
regarding the beneﬁciaries of aid from  international and the Islamic organisations. Non-refugees are less likely
to be targeted by international organisations than they were in the past. Also, coverage of the refugee camps 
by Islamic organisations has increased since November 2004. Lastly, there are more extremely poor beneﬁciaries
beneﬁting from aid from the Islamic organisations.  
These ﬁndings are conﬁrmed by the evaluation of the level of satisfaction with the assistance received, as a 
higher proportion of respondents residing in the Gaza Strip have expressed their satisfaction in this respect. On 
the other hand, dissatisfaction with assistance received has increased in the West Bank, and the results reveal 
that concern about the infrequency of assistance is the reason behind a dissatisfaction that has increased sharply 
in this region, by 11%. 
Figure 8.46: Level of satisfaction with food assistance according 
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Chapter 9: REFUGEES AND UNRWA
Jalal Al-Husseini
Part nine of the report focuses on the socio-economic status of Palestinian refugees in the occupied Palestinian 
territory (oPt) and the impact of international aid on their livelihoods.
Refugees constitute 44% of the survey’s population sample, i.e., 772 out of 1767 respondents.1 33% of them 
live in the West Bank, where they make up less than one-third of this region’s population. 7% of them live in 
the Jerusalem area, where they constitute one-third of the area’s total population. The majority of the refugee 
sample, i.e., 60%, live in the Gaza Strip, where they represent nearly three-quarters of the total population.2















About half of the refugees live in cities (46% of the refugee sample), one-third in refugee camps (38%) and one-
ﬁfth in villages (16%). However, as shown in ﬁgure 9.2, refugee camps remain“refugee pockets”, with populations
being mostly refugees.
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The chapter is divided into two sections:
• The ﬁrst section tackles the socio-economic status of the refugees with respect to poverty, levels of
income and employment.
• The second section analyses the assistance received by the refugees and their unmet needs. It also looks 
into the linkages between assistance, refugee status and UNRWA. 
1 Previous reports have shown that nearly all refugees (around 97%) were registered with UNRWA.
2 This is in line with UNRWA’s ﬁgures. According to the agency, out of 1,614,201 Palestine refugees registered in the oPt
(including Jerusalem), 41.9% are West Bankers (including Jerusalemites) and 58.1% are Gazans. (UNRWA, 30 June 2004).  
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The main explanatory (or independent) variables utilised in this part of the report are  “refugee status” as well 
as “camp resident”, either as area of residence (vis-à-vis inhabitants of villages and cities or, more generally, non-
camp inhabitants). Poverty status will also be used as an important dependent variable in the ﬁrst section of the
chapter. Other independent variables related to age, gender and education are excluded from this analysis, as 
they are dealt with in other parts of the report.
9.1 Socio-economic conditions of the refugees
9.1.1. Refugees and poverty: overview
The trend towards a uniformity in poverty status between refugees and non-refugees that had been underscored 
in previous reports (see, for instance, Palestinian Public Perceptions VIII, subchapter 9.2.3) was signiﬁcantly
altered during the period under scrutiny. In July 2005, refugees were signiﬁcantly poorer than non-refugees.
As highlighted in ﬁgure 9.3, refugees saw their percentage of hardship cases outmatch that of non-refugees by
8%, while the percentage of those above the poverty line amongst non-refugees was 4% higher than amongst 
refugees.

















From a geographical perspective, it appears that while the refugee camps have remained the poorest areas in 
the oPt, the degradation of living conditions during the period of scrutiny has mainly aﬀected cities and villages,
as illustrated in ﬁgure 9.4..




















More speciﬁcally, in the West Bank the percentage of hardship cases in refugee camps rose by 4% (32% to 36%)
as against 7% outside refugee camps (24% to 31%). In Gaza, the percentage of hardship cases in refugee camps 
3 Total below the poverty line refers to the percentage of hardship cases and that of the below the poverty line (between the 
HC and the poverty line).
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rose by 2% (from 41% to 43%) compared with 16% outside refugee camps (33% to 49%).
The renewed poverty gap between refugees and non-refugees also appears when comparing the levels of family 
income between November 2004 and July 2005. Figure 9.5 shows that more refugees were earning low salaries 
of less than 2000 NIS per month (an increase of 4%), and fewer were earning higher salaries over 3499 NIS (a fall 
of 6%). Conversely, non-refugees saw their income status improve during the period under survey. 
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This change was clearly felt by our respondents. More refugees conﬁrmed that their income had decreased over
the past six months (23%, as against 18% of non-refugees), while fewer refugees stated that their income had 
remained the same (72%, compared with 76% of non-refugees). Accordingly, refugees appeared less conﬁdent
than non-refugees in their ability to keep up ﬁnancially in the near future, with 49% of them admitting they were
already barely managing and/or were in serious condition, compared with 44% of the latter.
 
More concretely, as shown in ﬁgure 9.6, the survey also found that more refugees had resorted to coping strategies
in order to endure the hardship, both in absolute terms and in comparison with the non-refugees. In this context, 
the fact that fewer refugees had to resort to reducing their quantity of food may well indicate that this coping 
strategy was already exhausted.
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9.1.2. Causes of increased refugee poverty
When analysing causes of poverty, one usually looks at unemployment ﬁgures, as well as damage inﬂicted to
business or land. Our survey found that between November 2004 and July 2005, the unemployment rate for the 
overall oPt population has increased from 27% to 33%, while the percentage of people working, be it part time, a 
few hours a day or full time had decreased from 73% to 67%. In the oPt population’s eyes, refugees included, the 
three main reasons for decrease in income were reduction of working hours (36%), loss of job (29%) and damage 
of business/land (10%).
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Whereas this worsening in the employment situation, with its rise in unemployment and loss of working hours, 
may account for the general increase in poverty levels within the oPt population at large, it cannot explain the 
variations between refugees and non-refugees in this respect. Indeed, refugee status as an independent variable 
was not found relevant in our analysis of employment status and reasons for decrease in income.
Amongst the main identiﬁed reasons for such a degradation of the refugees’ poverty status is the decrease in
socio-economic assistance received by them (see section 9.2), including, employment assistance. As became 
clear in our previous survey, this type of assistance has come to play a structural role in the living conditions of the 
refugees (See Palestinian Public Perceptions VIII, sub-chapter 9.2.3). Figure 9.7 shows that household employment 
assistance has decreased for the total oPt population, but more particularly for the refugees. 
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The responsibility for this overall decrease in employment assistance is not to be ascribed to UNRWA, the agency 
that has catered for the refugees’ basic needs since 1950 (see below sub-section 9.2.2). Actually, the survey shows 
that, as in the previous period under scrutiny, UNRWA was the main provider of employment assistance projects 
for refugees, comprising mainly household short-term employment contracts.4 In contrast, other institutions 
(apart from the municipalities) had fewer refugees beneﬁting from their programmes, as shown in ﬁgure 9.8.






















4 For instance, between January and March 2005,, UNRWA oﬀered 6,449 temporary employment contracts under direct hire,
1,111 in the West Bank and 5,338 in Gaza (see UNRWA, 2005: 8).
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However, UNRWA’s ongoing eﬀorts to increase job opportunities could not alone counteract the employment
crisis that hit the oPt during the ﬁrst half of 2005. In addition, most job opportunities the agency (and other
stakeholders) provided consisted of short-term, temporary jobs, unlikely to provide a lasting solution to the crisis. 
In this regard, while over two-thirds of those beneﬁting - or having beneﬁted - from these projects, refugees and
non-refugees alike, claimed to be satisﬁed with them, 59% of them found that the number of projects was too
few, and 32% of them found the employment period too short.5
9.2  Assistance and needs of the refugees
9.2.1. Contents of assistance received and unmet needs
Employment assistance also decreased amongst refugees as an emergency (i.e., ﬁrst and second) most important
assistance item received), as is clearly indicated in ﬁgure 9.9. This ﬁgure also shows that, with the exception of
food assistance6, all other types within this category of assistance have decreased in importance for refugees 
and non-refugees alike during the period under scrutiny. However, given the refugees’ heavier dependence on 
institutional assistance, this trend may have aﬀected them comparatively more.
























The trends in refugee camps were somewhat in keeping with the overall refugee situation. In particular, the 
increase in food distribution was quite signiﬁcant in the West Bank camps (from 59% to 70% during the period
under survey) and the Gaza camps (from 52% to 63% during the same period). Employment assistance, as a most 
important assistance received, was an exception; whereas it decreased for refugees during the same period of 
time - as seen above - it increased slightly in the camps of the West Bank (from 6% in November 2004 to 9% in 
July 2005) and it remained stable in the camps of Gaza (8% for each period).
Not surprisingly, employment assistance services have become the refugees’ (and non-refugees’) most important 
unmet need during the period under survey (29%), ahead of ﬁnancial assistance (27% and previously the refugees’
most important unmet need), housing (15%), food (9%) and education (9%). Three other points are worth 
noticing in relation to the refugees’ unmet needs as illustrated in ﬁgure 9.10: ﬁrstly, food (which became more
signiﬁcant as a most important assistance item during the period under survey) logically saw its signiﬁcance as
an unmet need decrease; second, housing services have emerged as a signiﬁcant unmet need for the refugees,
the percentage of them deﬁning it as a most important unmet need increasing from 9% to 15% between
November 2004 and July 2005; and lastly, there was a decrease in the percentages of refugees characterising 
such traditional assistance items as health and education as unmet needs. This may be directly and/or indirectly 
due to improvements in access to services that have resulted from the easing in the closure policy imposed by 
5 The duration of employment may have been extended during the period under scrutiny, since the percentage of people 
criticising employment duration was much larger in November 2004: 59%. During the same period however, the percentage 
of people criticising the insuﬃcient number of employment project increased from 37% to 59%.
6 Increased food assistance has beneﬁted the camps only. In the West Bank and in Gaza, the percentage of refugee-camp
beneﬁciaries increased by 11% (59% to 70% and 52% to 63%, respectively), while it decreased by 4% and 2% outside the
refugee camps (from 26% to 22% and 45% to 43%, respectively). 
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the Israeli occupation authorities in the oPt and the reduction in the number of military clashes in the oPt (see 
chapter 1 of this report). The survey found that the refugees’ mobility status had improved, as the percentage of 
refugees having encountered mobility problems dropped from 86% in November 2004 to 77% in July 2005.
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Compared to cities and villages, refugee camps are the areas of residence where percentages of people referring to 
employment, health and housing services as main unmet needs were the highest: 30%, 14% and 14% respectively. 
More precisely, employment and housing services as unmet needs were more prevalent in Gaza camps (35% 
and 15% respectively), than in West Bank camps (22% and 13% respectively). Conversely, health services were 
mentioned slightly more as unmet needs in the West Bank camps (13%) than in Gaza camps (12%).
Despite the shortcomings in terms of assistance provided, and maybe on account of the signiﬁcant reduction
of violence and of mobility restrictions in the oPt (see chapter 1 of this report), the degree of overall satisfaction 
amongst refugees vis-à-vis most important services received increased signiﬁcantly from November 2004 to
July 2005, as shown in ﬁgure 9.11.















9.2.2. Assistance, refugee status and UNRWA
Despite increased poverty levels and a decrease in vital assistance items received, such as employment assistance, 
refugees are still the main beneﬁciaries of socio-economic aid in general: 60% of them received some kind of
assistance in July 2005, compared with 21% of non-refugees. As seen in ﬁgure 9.12, refugees are more targeted
whatever the poverty level: hardship cases as well as those below and above the poverty line.
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From a geographical perspective, the refugee camps remain the main targets of socio-economic assistance. 
In July 2005, the percentage of camp inhabitants receiving aid, 67%, had outmatched that of city and village 
beneﬁciaries combined (31% and 35%, respectively).
 













In the West Bank, 68% of camp inhabitants said that they received some kind of assistance, i.e., nearly three times 
as many as non-camp inhabitants (29%). In November 2004, the gap had been smaller (67% of camps as against 
39% of non-camps). The same phenomenon occurred in Gaza: the diﬀerence camp/non-camp was higher in July
2005 (69% as against 50% respectively) than seven months earlier (72% and 56%) 
The focus of socio-economic assistance on refugees may partly be due to UNRWA’s prevalence among refugee 
communities and, more particularly, the refugee camps. Since 1950, this agency has gradually taken the form 
of a “quasi-government”, providing registered refugees (over 95% of our refugee sample) with basic services 
(education, health, relief and social services, and income generation) on regular and emergency bases. Such 
prevalence, on the rise during the period under survey, is underscored in ﬁgure 9.14.































UNRWA, clearly, primarily targeted the poorer places of residence, i.e., the Gaza camps. As shown in ﬁgure 9.15,
over two-thirds of these residents conﬁrmed receiving their most important services from UNRWA in July 2005,
i.e., 18% more than in November 2004. UNRWA was also more active in Gaza outside the camps (increasing from 
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32% to 42%), while its involvement as provider of the most important assistance services remained stable in the 
West Bank, inside and outside the camps, and decreased in Jerusalem.7
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Comparing assistance and poverty levels between refugee and non-refugees leads us to the conclusion that, 
generally speaking, the impact of assistance cannot extend beyond cushioning the consequences of poverty. 
It is therefore no surprise that refugees still happen to feel more in need of socio-economic assistance than the 
average oPt population. Our survey found that 57% of them believed that a lot of assistance was still needed, in 
comparison with 48% of non-refugees.













The same phenomenon also occurs at camp level: 5% of West Bank camp inhabitants and 15% of Gaza camp 
inhabitants stated that they could do without assistance, as against 18% and 17% of non-camp inhabitants of the 
West Bank and Gaza respectively. . 
 Whatever assistance programmes are planned for the oPt in the short or longer run, the refugees may well insist 
that UNRWA be the prime stakeholder in that process. A poll carried out by Fafo in Gaza in September 2005 
indicated that over three-quarters of the population (78%) expressed conﬁdence in UNRWA, whereas only one-
quarter of them (24%) said they trusted the PA institutions (Fafo 2005; UNRWA 2005: 2).
9.3  Summary
The analysis on speciﬁc issues related to refugees and UNRWA have allowed us to come to a number of interesting
ﬁndings:
Refugees constitute 44% of the survey’s population sample. 33% of them live in the West Bank, where they make 
7 In comparison, the PA was also more active in Gaza in camps (18%, i.e.,9% more since November 2004) and outside camps 
(14%, one percent more than in November 2004) than in the West Bank outside the camps (9%, i.e., 9% less than in November 
2004) and inside the camps (6%).
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up less than one-third of this region’s population. 7% of them live in the Jerusalem area, where they constitute 
one-third of the area’s total population. The majority of the refugee sample, i.e. 60%, live in the Gaza, where they 
represent nearly three-quarters of the total population. Although only 38% of refugees live in camps (as against 
46% in cities and 16% in villages), the camps are mostly inhabited by refugees, who comprise 91% in the West 
Bank and 96 % in the Gaza Strip.
The trend towards uniformity of poverty status between refugees and non-refugees that had been underscored 
in previous reports was signiﬁcantly altered during the period under scrutiny. In July 2005, refugees were
signiﬁcantly poorer than non-refugees. Refugees saw their percentage of hardship cases outmatch that of non-
refugees by 8%, while the percentage of those above the poverty line amongst non-refugees was 4% higher than 
amongst refugees.
This change was clearly perceived by our respondents. More refugees conﬁrmed that their income had decreased
over the past six months (23% as against 18% of non-refugees), while fewer refugees stated that their income 
had remained the same (72%  as against 76% of non-refugees). Accordingly, refugees appeared less conﬁdent
in their ability to keep up ﬁnancially during the coming period than non-refugees, with 49% of them admitting
already barely managing and/or being in serious condition, compared with 44% of the latter. 
From a geographical perspective, the refugee camps are still the poorest areas in the oPt. However, the degradation 
of living conditions that aﬀected the oPt has mainly aﬀected cities and villages.
Amongst the main identiﬁed reasons for such a degradation of the refugees’ poverty status is the decrease
in assistance received by them. With the exception of food assistance, all other types within this category of 
assistance have decreased in importance for refugees and non-refugees alike during the period under scrutiny. 
However, given the refugees’ heavier dependence on institutional assistance, this trend may have aﬀected them
comparatively more. 
This is more particularly so in the case of employment assistance. However, the responsibility for this decrease 
is not to be ascribed to UNRWA. Actually, the survey shows that more refugees beneﬁted from UNRWA’s job
projects during the period under survey. But the agency’s ongoing eﬀorts to increase job opportunities could
not counteract alone the overall employment crisis that hit the oPt during the ﬁrst half of 2005.
Not surprisingly, employment assistance services have become the refugees’ (and non-refugees’) most important 
unmet need during the period under survey (29%), ahead of ﬁnancial assistance (27%, and previously the refugees’
most important unmet need), housing (15%), food (9%) and education (9%). Overall, one can see a signiﬁcant
decrease in the percentages of refugees characterising such traditional assistance items as health, education, 
ﬁnancial assistance and food as unmet needs. This may be directly and/or indirectly due to improvements in
access to basic services that has resulted from the easing in the Israeli closure policy and the reduction of the 
number of military clashes in the oPt.
Refugees (and more especially those residing in the camps) are still the main targets of socio-economic assistance 
in general, 60% of them receiving some kind of assistance in July 2005, as against only 21% of non-refugees. 
This may partly be due to UNRWA’s predominance among the refugee communities. Since 1950, this agency 
has provided registered refugees (over 95% of our refugee sample) with basic services (education, health, relief 
and social services, and income generation) on regular and emergency bases. Such provision of services was 
enhanced during the period under scrutiny. 
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Âö��«Ë ÂöŽù« ¨WÝUO��« ∫WO�Ozd�«  «dýR*«
v�≈ ZzU²M�«  —Uý√ YOŠ Æ≤∞∞∂ w½UŁ Êu½U�  dNý w�  bIF½« w²�« wF¹dA²�«  fK−*«  UÐU�²½« ©•∑∂®  5FKD²�*« WO³Kž√ XLŽœ º
WO�dA�« ”bI�« w� Íu� qJAÐ  UÐU�²½ô« W{—UF� bł«u²ð ULMOÐ ¨…ež ŸUD� w� Î«bł«u²� ÊU�  UÐU�²½ô« ÁcN� Èu�_« rŽb�« Ê√
 UŽU³D½« vKŽ Á—ËbÐ fJF½« Íc�« WO�dA�« ”bIK� ’U)« l{u�« vKŽ eO�d²�« rN*« s� t½S� ZzU²M�« Ác¼ v�≈ dEM�« bMŽ Æ©•≤π®
Æ UÐU�²½ô« Ác¼ h�¹ U0 5FKD²�*«
‰uŠ s¹—dI� dOž 5FKD²�*« s� ©•≤π® W³�½ p�UM¼ X½U� ¨wMOD�KH�« wF¹dA²�« fK−*«  UÐU�²½ô ÂUF�« rŽb�« s� ržd�« vKŽ º
n�u� ÊU� ¨q� vKŽ Æ≤∞∞µ “u9 dNý w�  UÐU�²½ô« w� rN²�—UA� ÂbŽ 5FKD²�*« s� ©•≤±® `{Ë√ 5Š w� ¨rN×ýd* r¼—UO²š«
Æ UÐU�²½ô« bŽu� s� dNý√ W²Ý q³� `{«Ë dOž 5³šUM�« s� ©•µ∞®
”UL( r¼—UO²š« vKŽ «Ëb�√ jI� ©•±≤® ULMOÐ ¨`²� `�UB� rNð«u�QÐ Êu�bOÝ rN½√ 5FKD²�*« s� ©•≤¥® —Uý√ ≤∞∞µ “u9 dNý w� º
Æ≤∞∞∂ w½UŁ Êu½U� dNý w� …bIFM*« wMOD�KH�« wF¹dA²�« fK−*«  UÐU�²½« w�
r¼√ s� UL¼ W¼«eM�«Ë ‚bB�« Ê√ rNM� ©•¥µ® `{Ë√ YOŠ ¨5×ýd*« r¼—UO²š« bMŽ —U³²Žô« 5FÐ WO�öš_« rOI�« ÊuFKD²�*« cš√ º
‚bB�« …—Ëd{ vKŽ bO�Q²�« Ê≈ Æ©•≤π® W³�MÐ »U�²½ô« »U³Ý√ r¼√ Y�UŁË w½U¦� rNðd³šË 5×ýd*« …¡UH� tOK¹ —UO²šô« «c¼ »U³Ý√
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ÆÂUFD�« s� b¹bý ÊU�dŠ s� w½UFð r¼dÝ√ Ê√ vKŽ rNM� ©•±∏® W³�½  œbýË ¨WłU²×L�«
rN½√ rNM� ©•¥µ® b�√ ULMOÐ ¨d�_« Âe� UL�UÞ WO�UL�« r¼—u�√ dÐbð ÊuFOD²�¹ rN½√ sOFKD²�L�« s� jI� ©•≥≤® Õd� ¨ÂUŽ qJAÐË  º
ÆW¹UGK� W³F� rN�Ëdþ Ê√ Ë√ r¼—u�√ dOÐbð ÊuFOD²�¹ œUJ�UÐ
dOAð YOŠ ÆW�bFL�« …dOIH�« dÝ_«  «dšb� „UN½≈ s� ¨WO�U²²�  «uMÝ fLš X�«œ w²�« ¨WOŽUL²łô« – W¹œUB²�ô« W�“_« XMJLð º
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Æ≤∞∞µ “uLð dNý w� ©•≥∂® W³�½ v�≈ ≤∞∞≥
rNF�œ ÂbFÐ «Ëd�√ s¹c�« sOFKD²�L�« W³�½ w� œU¹œ“« v�≈ sO¾łö�«  ULO�� Ã—Uš …ež ŸUD� w� ÍœUB²�ô« l{u�« —u¼bð Èœ√ º
w� ¨s¹b�UÐ rNðUłUŠ ¡«dý v�≈ «Ë—Uý√ s¹c�« sOFKD²�L�« W³�½  œ«œ“« ULMOÐ ¨©•µ±® v�≈ ©•¥∂® W³�½ s� rNÐ W�U��« dOð«uH�«
Æ©•∂≥® v�≈ ©•¥π® W³�½ s� ¨≤∞∞µ “uLð dNýË ≤∞∞¥ w½UŁ s¹dAð dNý sOÐ WF�«u�« …d²H�«
pÝUL²�« s Ò�√Ë …dO³� WOŽUL²ł«  U�U�I½« W¹√ ¨Êü« v²Š wMOD�KH�« lL²−L�« VM−ð ¨WO½U�½ù« W¹œUB²�ô« W�“_« s� ržd�« vKŽ º
ÆlL²−L�« w� dš¬ œd� Í√ l{Ë tÐUA¹ rNÐ ’U��« w�UL�« …dÝ_« l{Ë Ê√ sOFKD²�L�« w¦KŁ d³²Ž« bI� ¨tMOÐ ULO� wŽUL²łô«
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qLF�« ‚uÝ ∫WO�Ozd�«  «dýR*«
ÎU³¹dIð WK�UF�« ÈuI�« lÐ— ÊU� ULMOÐ ¨q�U� Â«ËbÐ WK�UF�« ÈuI�« s� ©•¥∞® nOþuð rð t½√ v�≈ ≤∞∞µ “uLð dNý WÝ«—œ ZzU²½ dOAð º
Æ ÎUOK� nþu� dOž ÈuI�« Ác¼ YKŁË qLF�« sŽ sOKÞUŽ
«c¼ bI¹ r� sJ�Ë ¨≤∞∞µ “uLð dNýË ≤∞∞¥ w½UŁ s¹dAð dNý sOÐ WF�«u�« …d²H�« w� WDO�Ð …œU¹“ q�U� Â«ËbÐ nOþu²�« ‰bF� œ«œ“« º
v�≈ ©•≤∑® s� XFHð—« YOŠ W�UD³�« W³�½ w� WKzU¼ …œU¹“ w� V³Ý ¨p�– fJŽ vKŽ qÐ  ¨V�×� W�UD³�« ÷UH�½« v�≈ dýRL�«
Æ©•≥≥®
WOÐdG�« WHC�« w� ©•¥¥® ‰œUFð ¨≤∞∞µ “uLð dNý w� ¨t²³�½ X½U� YOŠ ¨sO¾łö�«  ULO�� w� W�Uš Î«bł Ì‰UŽ W�UD³�« ‰bF� ÊU� º
Æ≤∞∞¥ w½UŁ s¹dAð dNý w� ©•≥∞® l� W½—UI� ¨…ež ŸUD� w� ©•¥±®Ë
¨…ež ŸUD� w� ©•≥µ®Ë WOÐdG�« WHC�« w� ©•≥¥® v�≈ t²³�½ XK�Ë YOŠ ¨sO¾łö�«  ULO�� Ã—Uš dO³� qJAÐË W�UD³�« W³�½  œ«œ“« º
Æw�«u²�« vKŽ ©•≤∂®Ë ©•≤∏® X�œUŽ w²�« ≤∞∞¥ w½UŁ s¹dAð dNý V�½ l� W½—UI�
ULMOÐ ¨WO½U¦�« W{UH²½ô« ‰öš qLF�« sŽ WKÞUŽ sJð r� WK²×L�« WOMOD�KH�« w{«—_« w� dÝ_« wKOF� s� jI� ©•≥≥® W³�½ Ê≈  ·
sOKÞUF�« W³�½ Ê√ v�≈ ZzU²M�« dOAð ¨p�– v�≈ W�U{≈ Æ©…bŠ«Ë WMÝ s� d¦�_® WK¹uÞ …bL� qLF�« sŽ ÊuKÞUŽ rNM� ©•¥π® W³�½ X½U�
ÆsOFKD²�L�« W³�½ s� ©•≥≤® q¦Lð ©sO²MÝ s� d¦�_® Î«bł WK¹uÞ …bL� qLF�« sŽ
w� W�UD³�« ‰bF� Ê√ v�≈ ZzU²M�« dOAð YOŠ ÆÎ«dLŽ dG�_« ‰ULF�«Ë WO½b²L�« W�UI¦�« ÍË– Èb� W�Uš …b¹bý W�UD³�« W³�½ ÊuJð º
ÆWMÝ ¥π≠≤¥ sOÐ U� W¹dLF�«  U¾H�« w� ©•≤≤® W³�½ l� W½—UI� ©•µµ® ÊuJ¹ WMÝ ≤¥≠±∏ sOÐ U� W¹dLF�«  U¾H�«
jI� ©•≤∞® W³�½ Ê√ YOŠ ¨qLF�« ‚uÝ w� ‰ULF�« WýUA¼ `O{uð w� dOG²L�« ÕU²HL�« wMOD�KH�« Ÿ—UA�« w� rOKF²�« Èu²�� bF¹  º
©•∑∞® W³�½ Ê≈ ¨p�– iOI½ vKŽË ÆqLF�« sŽ ÊuKÞUŽ rNM� ©•µ∂® W³�½ ULMOÐ ¨q�U� Â«ËbÐ ÊuKLF¹ WO½b²L�« W�UI¦�« ÍË– ‰ULF�« s�
ÆqLF�« sŽ ÊuKÞUŽ rNM� ©•±µ® ULMOÐ q�U� Â«ËbÐ ÊuKLF¹ WO�UF�« W�UI¦�« ÍË– ‰ULF�« s�
W³�½  œU�√ ULMOÐ ¨WKO¾{ WHOþu�« ÁcN� rN½«bI� WO�UL²Š«Ë …dI²�� WO�U×�« rN²HOþË Ê√ sOFKD²�L�« s� ©•≤π® W³�½  —Uý√  º
ÆU� bŠ v�≈ WKL²×� UN½«bI� Ê√ ©•≥¥®Ë UN½«bI� Î«bł qL²×L�« s� t½√ rNM� ©•±≤®
‚uÝ s� W¾OÝ  U¾� w� W¾H�« Ác¼ dBŠ WO�UL²Š« ÊuJð YOŠ ¨…dO³� WOBF²�L�«  ôU×�« ÍË– ’U�ýú� W�UD³�« WO�UL²Š« ÊuJð º
Ê√ WOBF²�L�«  ôU×�« ÍË– W¾H�« s� jI� ©•π® W³�½ XMKŽ√ ÆWO�U×�« rNHzUþË Ê«bI� v�≈ ÍœRð U¼—ËbÐ w²�«Ë W¹UGK� …dO³� qLF�«
rNO�≈ W³�M�UÐ WHOþu�« Ê«bI� dDš Ê√ WIÐU��« W¾H�« s� ©•≤∞® œU�√ ULMOÐ ¨¡«dIH�« dOž s� ©•≥π® l� W½—UI� WM�¬ nzUþË rN¹b�
ÆWIŠö�« W¾H�« s� ©•¥® l� W½—UI� Î«bł ÎöL²×� ÊU�
Â«ËbÐ ÊuKLF¹ ¡«dIH�« dOž s� ©•∑±® W³�½ Ê√ WÝ«—b�«  —Uý√ YOŠ ¨dIH�« dDš s� »dN�« VO�UÝ√ r¼√ s� wzeł Â«ËbÐ qLF�« d³²F¹  º
ÆÂuO�« w�  UŽUÝ lCÐ ÊuKLF¹ rNM� ©•≤∑® W³�½Ë qLF�« sŽ sOKÞUŽ l�b� dI� w� ÊuAOF¹ s¹c�« s� ©•µ∑® ÊU� ULMOÐ ¨q�U�
ÎUC¹√ ZzU²M�« dOAðË Æ ÎUO�UŠ ÊuKLF¹ ¡«dIH�« s� …dO³� W³�½ Ê√ ô≈ ¨dIH�« dDš s� »dN�« VO�UÝ√ r¼√ s� qLF�« —U³²Ž« s� ržd�UÐ º
 W³�½ œułË v�≈ ≤∞∞µ “uLð dNý WÝ«—œ  —Uý√Ë ÆrN�“— sO�Qð ÊuFOD²�¹ ô p�– l�Ë ÊuKLF¹ s¹c�« ¡«dIH�« s� …dO³� W³�½ p�UM¼ Ê√
Æl�b� dI� w� ÊuAOF¹ «u½U� rNM� ©•π®Ë ¡«dI� «u½U� q�U� Â«ËbÐ ÊuKLF¹ s¹c�« s� ©•≥∑®
¨©•¥±® v�≈ ©•≤∑® s� WKO×²�� t³ý Ë√ Î«bł W³F� X½U� …ež ŸUD� w� w{«—_« WŽ«—“ Ê√ vKŽ «Ëœbý s¹c�« sOFKD²�L�« W³�½  œ«œ“« º
Æ≤∞∞µ “uLð dNýË ≤∞∞¥ w½UŁ s¹dAð dNý sOÐ WF�«u�« …d²H�« w�
s� ©•∂∞®  œbý YOŠ ¨w{«—_« WŽ«—eÐ WIKF²L�«  …b¹«e²L�«  q�UAL�« WNł«u�  v�≈ ÎUC¹√  WO�dA�« ”bI�« w� ÊuŽ—«eL�« dD{« º
w½UŁ s¹dAð dNý w� ©•≥π® W³�½ l� W½—UI� WKO×²�� t³ý Ë√ Î«bł W³F� w{«—_« WŽ«—“ Êu� v�≈ ¨≤∞∞µ “uLð dNý w� ¨sOFKD²�L�«
Æ≤∞∞¥
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W×B�« ∫WO�Ozd�«  «dýR*«
w²�«Ë …U³KL�« dOž WOL¼√ WO�eML�«  UłUO²Šô« d¦�√ lÐ«— s� bFð UNMJ�Ë ¨WOL¼√ WO�eML�«  UłUO²Šô« d¦�√ w½UŁ s� W×B�« d³²Fð º
ÆWOL¼√ lL²−L�«  UłUO²Š« d¦�√ Y�UŁ s� W×B�« d³²FðË ÆbOł u×½ vKŽ tÐ r²¼« ÃUO²Šô« «c¼ Ê√ v�≈ dOAð
v�≈ rNðdÝ√ œ«d�√ bŠ√ Ë√ rNM� bŠ√ ÃU²Š« «–≈ ULŽ sOFKD²�LK� ‰«RÝ p�UM¼ ÊU� d¹dI²�« «c¼ w� XKBŠ w²�« WÝ«—b�« ‰öš s� º
©•∏® ∆—«uD�« vHA²�� W¹UMŽ v�≈ WłU×�« X½U� b�Ë ÆWÝ«—bK� WIÐU��« W²��« dNý_« w� WHK²�L�« WO³D�« W¹UMF�« s� Ÿ«u½√ …dAŽ
Æ©•∂® i¹dL�« qHDK� W�u−²L�« W¹UMF�« v�≈ WłU×�« tOK¹ ¨WO³D�« W¹UMF�« Ÿ«u½√ s� ÎUłUO²Š« d¦�_« w¼ …d²H�« Ác¼ w�
WłU×Ð «u½U� s¹cK� ¨WÝ«—bK� WIÐU��« W²��« dNý_« w� ¨UNŽ«u½QÐ WO³D�« W¹UMF�« b¹Ëe²Ð oKF²¹ sOFKD²�LK� dš¬ ‰«RÝ p�UM¼ ÊU� º
WO³D�« W¹UMF�« «uIKð rN½√ «ËœU�√ sOFKD²�L�« s� ©•∏∞® Ê√ v�≈ ZzU²M�« dOAðË ÆW²³�« UNOKŽ rN�uBŠ ÂbŽ Ë√ ‰u³I� s�“ ‰öš UNO�≈
«uIKð rN½√ sOFKD²�L�« s� ©•∑µ® —Uý√ YOŠ ∆—«uD�« vHA²�� W¹UMŽ u¼ bOŠu�« ¡UM¦²Ýô« ÊU� sJ�Ë ÆW�u³I� dO¹UFL� ÎUI�Ë W�“ö�«
ÆUN³KÞ s� sO²ŽUÝ ÊuCž w� …bŽU�L�« Ác¼ q¦�
 U�bš ¡UM¦²ÝUÐ ¨WO×B�«  U�b��« Ÿ«u½√ rEFL� w�Ozd�« œËeL�« W×B�« …—«“Ë d³²Fð ¨UNŽ«u½QÐ WO³D�« W¹UMF�« ÍœËeLÐ oKF²¹ ULO� º
ÆWKzUF�« jDšË ·UFÝ≈ …—UOÝ
WODGð ‰öš s� p�–Ë  «bŽU�LK� sOO�Ozd�« s¹œËeL�« s� «Ëd½Ë_« ¨q�√ bŠ v�≈Ë ¨wMOD�KH�« w�uJ×�« w×B�« sO�Q²�« d³²F¹ º
W�U��« r¼—œUB� ‰öš s� WO³D�« rNðUIH½ ÊuDG¹ s¹c�« sOOMOD�KH�« s� q�_« W³�M�« bł«u²ð ÆWO³D�« sOOMOD�KH�«  UIH½




UNOKð ¨sOFKD²�L�« WO³Kž√ v�≈ W³�M�UÐ  U¹u�Ë_« r¼√ s� ÂUE²½UÐ rNÝ—«b� v�≈ sOOMOD�KH�« ‰UHÞ_« »U¼– v�≈ WłU×�« d³²Fð º
UN²½—UI�Ë w�HM�« rŽbK� ‰UHÞ_«  UłU×Ð oKF²¹ ULÐ Æw�HM�« rŽb�« wIKð v�≈ rN²łUŠË WM�ü« ‰UHÞ_« VF� ’d� v�≈ WłU×�«
qC�√ WI¹dDÐ W¹cG²K� W¹—uH�« ‰UHÞ_« WłUŠ WOL¼√ œU¹œ“« kŠö¹ ¨s�U¦�« d¹dI²�« – WOMOD�KH�« W�UF�«  UŽU³D½ô« ZzU²½ l�
ÎU³KÞ q�_« WłU×�« Êü« bFð w²�« ¨‰UHÞú� w�HM�« rŽb�« WłUŠ »U�Š vKŽ tK� p�– ÊU� sJ�Ë ÆW{UH²½ô« q³� tOKŽ X½U� ULŽ
ÆsOOMOD�KH�« ‰UHÞ_« v�≈ W³�M�UÐ r¼_« WłU×�« v�≈ – bOF³�« ÈbL�« vKŽ – ‰u×²ð ·uÝ w²�«Ë
…dÝú� WO�UL�« œuOI�« tOKð ¨‰UHÞ_« rOKFð tłË w� nIð w²�« WO�Ozd�« W�UŽù« t½√ vKŽ b¹b−�« wMOD�KH�« ZNML�« v�≈ dEM¹ º
Ê√ sEð w²�«  UŽU³D½ô« Ê√ sŽ p�– nA� ¨wMOD�KH�« lL²−L�« s� WHK²�L�« WOŽdH�«  UŽuL−LK� oLŽ√ qOK×²ÐË ÆWOMOD�KH�«
ÍËc� ¨sO¾łö�« ¨ ULO�L�« w� sOLOIL�« Èb� ¨…ež ŸUD� w� W×{«Ë ÊuJð ‰UHÞ_« rOKF²� WO�Ozd�« W�UŽù« d³²F¹ b¹b−�« ZNML�«
ÆWO½b²L�« W�UI¦�« ÍËc�Ë WOBF²�L�« dIH�«  ôUŠ
ŸUD� w� …dO³� …—uBÐ ÎU×{«Ë ¡UO²Ýô« «c¼ ÊuJ¹Ë Æb¹b−�« wMOD�KH�« ZNML�« s� rNzUO²Ý« sŽ ÊËd³F¹ sOOMOD�KH�« WO³Kž√ Ê≈ º
ÆsO¾łö�« sOÐ Ë sO¾łö�«  ULO�� w� ¨…ež
Èu²�� bł«u²¹Ë ÆWK²×L�« WOMOD�KH�« w{«—_« w� rOKF²�« WOŽu½ ¡«“≈ U{d�UÐ U¼—uFý sŽ ©•∂¥® wMOD�KH�« VFA�« WO³Kž√ d³Fð  º
ÆWO½b²L�« W�UI¦�« ÍË– sOÐË ÈdI�« w� ¨WOÐdG�« WHC�« w� vKŽ_« U{d�«
bOł u×½ vKŽ ‰UHÞ_« dOC×ð vKŽ qLFð WK²×L�« WOMOD�KH�« w{«—_« w� ”—«bL�« Ê√ sOFKD²�L�« s� jI� ©•≥µ® W³�½ bI²Fð  º
ÆqLF�« ‚uÝ ‰ušb� bOł u×½ vKŽ ‰UHÞ_« dC×ð ”—«bL�« Ê√ rNM� ©•≤≤® W³�½ bI²FðË ¨w�UF�« rOKF²K�
¨…œb×� WLzU� ‰öš s� ÆWO½U¦�« W{UH²½ô« W¹«bÐ cM� dðu²�«  U�öŽ —UNþ≈ w� WK²×L�« WOMOD�KH�« w{«—_« w� ‰UHÞ_« dL²�¹ º
Ë√ WŽ«—e�« w� ÂUL²¼ô« WK� ©•≤∏® ¨w½«ËbF�« „uK��« ©•≥∏® ¨W¾OÝ WOÝ—b� ZzU²½ ©•¥∏® ¨‰UHÞ_« Èb� oKI�« sŽ ©•∂≤® W³�½ XHA�
Æ◊ö²šô« w� ÂUL²¼ô« WK� ©•±∑®Ë ¨Íœ«—≈ö�« ‰u³²�« ©•≤±® ¨fOÐ«u� ©•≤∑® ¨WO{U¹d�« Ë√ WOŽUL²łô«  UÞUAM�«
¡UÐü« Èb� œUI²Žô« «c¼ qI¹Ë ÆW¹UL×�«Ë W¹UŽd�UÐ oKF²¹ ULÐ rN�UHÞ√  UłUŠ WO³Kð vKŽ ÊË—œU� rN½√ ÊËbI²F¹ ©•∑≥® ¡UÐü« WO³Kž√ Ê≈ º
ÆWO½b²L�« W�UI¦�« ÍË– Èb�Ë W�bFL�« …dOIH�« dÝ_« Èb� ¨…ež ŸUD� w� ÊuAOF¹ s¹c�«
Î«—UA²½« q�√ ŸU³D½ô« «c¼ ÊuJ¹Ë ÆWK²×L�« WOMOD�KH�« w{«—_« w� ‰UHÞ_« b{ nMŽ œułuÐ ©•∏¥® sOFKD²�L�« WO³Kž√ bI²Fð  º
w� ‰UHÞ_« b{ nMFK� w�Ozd�« —bBL�« v�≈ W³�M�UÐ U�√ ÆWO½b²L�« W�UI¦�« ÍËc�Ë WOBF²�L�«  ôU×�« ÍË– Èb� ¨…ež ŸUD� w�
l³�√ rNM� ©•±±® W³�½ XNłË ULMOÐ ¨wKOz«dÝù« ≠ wMOD�KH�« Ÿ«eM�« vKŽ ÂuK�« ©•∂≤® sOFKD²�L�« WO³Kž√ XI�√ ¨WO{UL�« WM��«
ÆWK²×L�« WOMOD�KH�« w{«—_« w� wKš«b�« s�_« hIM� ÂUNðô«
r¼√ s�Ë ¨‰UHÞ_« W�öÝË W×B�UÐ oKF²¹ ULO�  U�uKFL�« vKŽ ‰uB×K� wMOD�KH�« VFA�« UNOKŽ bL²F¹ WLN� —œUB� p�UM¼ º
 UD×L�« ©≥®  ¨»—U�_«Ë  ¡U�b�_« ©≤®  ¨WOK×L�« “UHK²�«  UD×� ©±® ∫w¼ ¨WOL¼_« V�×Ð UN³Oðdð YOŠ s�¨ W�L��« —œUBL�«
¨ U³O²J�«Ë  UIBKL�« vKŽ sOFKD²�L�« s� dO¦J�« bL²F¹ ô ÆWO�uO�« WOK×L�« n×B�« ©µ®Ë ¨WOK×L�« WŽ«–ù« e�«d� ©¥® ¨WOzUCH�«
WO�HM�«  ôU×�«Ë W×B�«  w� oKF²¹ ULÐ  U�uKFL�« vKŽ rN�uBŠ w� ŸUL²łô«Ë  W×B�« ‰ULŽË WO×B�«   «œUOF�«  vKŽ Ë√
ÆrN�UHÞ_
 s� ¨rNž«d�  U�Ë√ ÊuCI¹ WK²×L�« WOMOD�KH�« w{«—_« w� ©WMÝ ±π v�≈ ±¥ dLŽ s�® sOI¼«dL�« Ê√ v�≈ WÝ«—b�« Ác¼ ZzU²½ dOAð º
¨—«u−�« w� Êu³FK¹ rNM� ©•µ∑® ¨rNzU�b�√ l� rNž«d�  U�Ë√ ÊuCI¹ sOI¼«dL�« s� ©•∑≥® ∫wK¹ UL� ¨WOL¼_« V�×Ð UN³Oðdð YOŠ
¨W¹uI²�« ”Ë—œ v�≈ Êu³¼c¹ rNM� ©•≤±® ¨WO{U¹d�«  UÞUAM�« w� Êu�—UA¹ rNM� ©•≤µ® ¨rNðU�UL²¼«Ë rNðU¹«u¼ Êu ÓLM¹ rNM� ©•≥¥®
rNM� ©•±∞® ¨ÊuKG²A¹ rNM� ©•±∞® ¨WO�UI¦�« Ë√  WOÝUO��«  UŽUL²łô« ÊËdC×¹ rNM� ©•±±® ¨Íœ«uM�« v�≈  Êu³¼c¹ rNM� ©•±∂®
ÆŸ—«uA�« w� ÊuFJ�²¹
167
Palestinian Public Perceptions Report IX
 U¹u�Ë_«Ë  UłUO²Šô« ∫WO�Ozd�«  «dýR*«
WOMOD�KH�« …dÝ_«  UłUO²Š« rOOIð
dNý cM� ©•∑® W³�MÐ …œU¹“ bFð Ác¼Ë ¨≤∞∞µ “uLð dNý w�  «bŽU�L�« s� dO¦J�« v�≈ WłU×Ð «u½U� WOMOD�KH�« dÝ_« s� ©•µ≥®  º
Æ≤∞∞¥ w½UŁ s¹dAð
Æ «bŽU�L�« Ác¼ q¦L� rN²łU×Ð «Ëd�√ sO¾łö�« dOž s� ©•¥∏® ULMOÐ ¨ «bŽU�L�« s� dO¦J�« vKŽ WłU×Ð sO¾łö�« s� ©•µ∑®  º
Æ «bŽU�L�« s� dO¦J�« v�≈ WłU×Ð l�bL�« dIH�«  ôUŠ w� ÊuAOF¹ s¹c�« sOOMOD�KH�« s� ©•∑∂®  º
Æ «bŽU�L�« s� dO¦J�« v�≈ WłU×Ð …ež ŸUD�Ë WOÐdG�« WHC�« w� s¹bł«u²L�« sOFKD²�L�« s� ©•µµ®  º
 «bŽU�L�« v�≈ WłU×Ð  ULO�L�« w� sOLOIL�« s� •∂± YOŠ®  «bŽU�L�« v�≈ WłU×Ð w²�« oÞUML�« d¦�√ s� sO¾łö�«  ULO�� º
Æ «bŽU�L�« s� dO¦J�« v�≈ ÎUC¹√ WłU×Ð r¼ ÈdI�«Ë ÊbL�« ÊUJÝ nB½ ULMOÐ ¨©dO³� qJAÐ
…œU¹“® WOÐdG�« WHC�« w� sO¾łö�«  ULO�� Ã—Uš W�Uš ¨œU¹œ“ôUÐ …cš¬  «bŽU�L�« v�≈ WłU×�« ÊS� ¨WIÐU��« WÝ«—b�« l� W½—UI� º
ÆsO¾łö�«  ULO�� qš«œ …dI²�� t³ý  «bŽU�LK�  UłUO²Šô« vI³ð ULMOÐ ¨©•µ W³�MÐ …œU¹“® …ež ŸUD� Ë ©•π W³�MÐ
WOL¼√ d¦�_« …dÝ_« ÃUO²Š«
ÆnOþu²�«Ë rOKF²�« ¨WO×B�« W¹UMF�« v�≈ ÃUO²Šô« tOK¹ ¨≤∞∞µ “uLð dNý w� WOMOD�KH�« dÝú� wÝUÝ_« ÃUO²Šô« ¡«cG�« Óqþ º
Æ…dOš_« W²��« dNý_« w� WLNL�« …dÝ_«  UłUO²Š« s� ÊUJÝù« …œUŽ≈Ë ÊUJÝù«  UłUO²Š« X×³�√ ¨ÂUL²¼ö� dO¦� qJAÐ º
w�U¼_ wÝUÝ_« ÃUO²Šô« nOþu²�« bF¹ ULMOÐ ¨WO×B�« W¹UMF�« u¼ WOÐdG�« WHC�« w�U¼√ v�≈ W³�M�UÐ WOL¼√ d¦�_« ÃUO²Šô« Ê≈ º
Æ…ež ŸUD�
W¹UMF�« tOK¹ ¨©•≤∞® nOþu²�« rŁ s�Ë ¨©•≤±® ÊUJÝù« ∫wK¹ UL� sO¾łö� wÝUÝ_« ÃUO²Šô« ÊU� ¨sOFKD²�L�« W�UŠ v�≈ W³�M�UÐ º
Æ U¹u�Ë_« r¼√ s� ©ULNOKJ� •≤±® WO×B�« W¹UMF�«Ë ¡«cG�« d³²F¹ ¨sO¾łö�« dOž v�≈ W³�M�UÐ U�√ Æ©ULNOKJ� •±∑® ¡«cG�«Ë WO×B�«
…U³KL�« dOž  UłUO²Šô« r¼√ s� nOþu²�« bF¹ YOŠ Æ≤∞∞µ “uLð dNý w� …U³KL�« dOž WOÝUÝ_«  UłUO²Šô« s� nOþu²�« Óqþ º
Æ…U³KL�« dOž …dÝ_«  UłUO²Š« r¼√ s� WO�UL�«  «bŽU�L�« WOÐdG�« WHC�« w�U¼√ d³²F¹ ULMOÐ ¨…ež ŸUD� w�U¼√ v�≈ W³�M�UÐ
WOL¼√ d¦�_« lL²−*« ÃUO²Š«
ÆW�UD³�«  öJA� qŠË nOþu²�«  «bŽU�� w¼ ÎUłUO²Š« d¦�_«  «bŽU�L�« Ê√ «ËbI²Ž« s¹c�« ©•¥¥® sOOMOD�KH�« s� WKzU¼ W³�½ Ê≈  º
¨WO×B�« W¹UMF�«  UłUO²Š« tOKð ¨lL²−L�« w� rOKF²�« ÃUO²Š« w� ‰U×�« u¼ UL� ¨©•±≤® W³�MÐ —bI¹ dO³� qJAÐ ÊUJÝù« ÃUO²Š« œ«œ“«
ÆsOFKD²�L�« s� ©•±≥® d�– UL�
WOL¼√ d¦�_« WO²×²�« WOM³�« ÃUO²Š«
ÆsOFKD²�L�« s� ©•µ≤® d�– UL� ¨ ÎUłUO²Š« d¦�_« WO²×²�« WOM³�« o�«d� r¼√ s� ÁUOL�« l¹“uð WJ³ý d³²Fð º
Æq�«u²�«  U�bš r¼√ s� w{—_« nðUN�« jš Ê√ sOFKD²�L�« WO³Kž√ d³²Ž« º
 U�b)« d�uð
WOMOD�KH�« dÝ_« s� ©•µ∑® W³�½ Ê≈ Æ©•π±® ÁUO*« WJ³AÐË ©•π∑® ¡UÐdNJ�« WJ³AÐ Êu�u�u� wMOD�KH�« VFA�« WO³Kž√ Ê≈ ¨ÂUŽ qJAÐ  º
¨ ôUBðô« d�uð W�bš vKŽ WÝ«—œ ¡«dł≈ bMŽË Æ U¹UHM�« s� hK�²�« W�b�Ð Êu�u�u� rNM� ©•∂¥® ULMOÐ ¨Í—U−*« WJ³AÐ Êu�u�u�
pK1 ÆW�UIM�« nð«uN�« WJ³AÐ Êu�u�u� rNM� ©•∑µ® ULMOÐ ¨©•µ∏® WO{—_« nð«uN�« WJ³AÐ Êu�u�u� ÊUJ��« nB½ s� d¦�√ ÊS�
Æj�ô s×� rN¹b� rNM� ©•∑µ®Ë “UHKð …eNł√ rNM� ©•πµ®
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Arabic Executive Summary
ÂUŽ qJAÐ  «bŽU�*« ∫WO�Ozd�«  «dýR*«
ÂUŽ qJAÐ  «bŽU�*«
 «bŽU�L�« «uIKð sOFKD²�L�« s� ©•≥∏® ¨≤∞∞µ “uLð dNý wH� Æ≤∞∞¥ w½UŁ s¹dAð dNý cM� ©•∏® W³�MÐ …œËeL�«  «bŽU�L�« ‰bF� q�  º
Æ≤∞∞µ “uLð dNý  UŽöD²Ýô WIÐU��« W²��« dNý_« …d²� w�
b�Ë ¨©≤∞∞¥ w½UŁ s¹dAð dNý cM� •∏ W³�MÐ ÷UH�½«® WOÐdG�« WHC�« w� W�Uš Î«dO³� ÊU� WLK²�L�«  «bŽU�L�« w� ÷UH�½ô« Ê≈ º
ÎUFHðd�  «bŽU�L�« Èu²�� qþ bI� ¨WKÐUIL�« WN−�« w� ÆWOÐdG�« WHC�«  ULO�� Ã—Uš Î«e�dL²�  «bŽU�L�« ÁcN� Èu²�� q�√ ÊU�
Æ©•∑≤® sO¾łö�«  ULO�� w� W�Uš ©•µ∂® …ež ŸUD� w�
Óq� bI� ¨p�c� ÆÊUJ��« s� WOBF²�L�«  ôU×�«  «–  U¾H�« vKŽ  «bŽU�L�« Ác¼ œ«b�≈ e�dð ¨h×HK� WF{U��« …d²H�« ‰öš w� º
ÆsO¾łö�« dOG� …œËeL�«  «bŽU�L�« Èu²��
 «bŽU�� s� rNM� ©•¥® œUH²Ý« ULMOÐ ¨©•∏® w�UL�«  rŽb�«  tOK¹ ¨©•≥±®  WOz«cG�«  «bŽU�L�« sOFKD²�L�« YKŁ w�«uŠ vIKð  º
ÆnOþu²�«
 dNý w� qJOý ≥∞∞ ‰œUFð WLOI�« jÝu²� X½U� YOŠ ¨WFL²−�  «bŽU�L�« Ÿ«u½√ lOLł WLO� jÝu²� w� `{«Ë ÷UH�½« p�UM¼ Ê≈ º
Æ≤∞∞¥ w½UŁ s¹dAð dNý w� qJOý ¥∞∞ ‰œUFð X½U� ULMOÐ ≤∞∞µ “uLð
Ë ©•±∞® WOMOD�KH�« WOMÞu�« WDK��« UNOKð ¨sOFKD²�L�« s� ©•≤∂® d�– UL� ¨WOz«cG�«  «bŽU�LK� WO�Ozd�« …œËeL�« «Ëd½Ë_« XOIÐ º
ÆW¦�U¦�« W³ðdL�« w� ©•≥® WO�Ëb�«  ULEML�«
Æ≤∞∞µ “uLð dNý WÝ«—œ w� U{d�« Èu²�� w� —uDð p�UM¼ ¨≤∞∞¥ w½UŁ s¹dAð dNý WÝ«—œ l� W½—UI� º
nOþu²�«
Æ≤∞∞µ “uLð dNý w� nOþu²�«  «bŽU�� WOMOD�K� …dÝ√ ±µ∞¨∞∞∞ XIKð º
Ác¼ q¦� s� r¼dÝ√  œUH²Ý« s¹c�« sOFKD²�L�« W³�½ XK� ULMOÐ ¨©•±≤®  W³�MÐ œdH�«  Èu²�� vKŽ nOþu²�«   «bŽU�� XK�  º
Æ©•±π® W³�MÐ  «bŽU�L�«
w²�« WÝ«—b�« w� Æb�_« …dOB� nzUþu�« w� dO³J�« —u¼b²�« ÀbŠ ¨r¼dÝ√Ë sOFKD²�LK� W³�M�UÐ ¨≤∞∞¥ w½UŁ s¹dAð dNý WÝ«—œ cM� º
vKŽ nOþu²�«  «bŽU�L� wÝUÝ_« ‰uLL�« bFð WOMOD�KH�« WDK��« Ê√ sOFKD²�L�« s� ©•µ∏® `{Ë√ ¨≤∞∞µ “uLð dNý w� X¹dł√
s¹bOH²�L�« WO³Kž√ XL ÒO� ¨ÂUŽ qJAÐ ÆsOFKD²�L�« lÐ— d�– UL� ¨rN� —bB� X�«“ U� UN½S� ¨«Ëd½Ëú� W³�M�UÐ U�√ Æœ«d�_« Èu²��
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